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3.0 out of 5 stars
Deutschland Uber Alles..., August 2, 2006
This review is from: Merchants and Migrations: Germans and Americans in Connection, 1776-1835 (Modern Social and Economic History) (Hardcover)
'The Germans make everything difficult, both for themselves and for everyone else.'-Goethe
To preface this review, although the author and I have never met in person, we have disagreed many times, and quite heatedly, on the subject of the Napoleonic Wars in general and on Napoleon and Imperial France in particular on various Napoleonic forums on the internet. That was my motivation for purchasing and reading this book, as the author had cited material found for the period during his research for this book in the subject discussions. I was curious to read it for myself.
Overall this is an excellent, well-researched volume that the author treats what many might think is a very boring subject with wit, verve, and a genuine interest in the subject matter. I found most of what the author said to be credible. In short, this book is a keeper no matter what your main interest in history may be. And, as an added benefit, the author is an excellent writer.
I have two problems with the book, one minor and one major. The minor problem is adressed by the author himself in the introduction to the book, in that the use of the term 'Germany' when referring to the geographical, vice political, entity that is peopled by ethnic Germans. This can be somewhat confusing for the novice, for Germany in the late 18th and most of the 19th centuries (until 1871 and the announcement of the German Empire under Prussia) was made up of many separate states all populated by Germans. What is inaccurate is that the greater majority of the citizens of those states considered themselves to be Saxons, Bavarians, Wurttembergers, etc., before they were Germans, and Germany then was not a united nation. Including Austria in the term 'Germany' is equally confusing.
The major error of the book is Chapter 7, Napoleon and the War on Commerce: 1800-1815. The following are examples of the errors in fact that are in that particular chapter and that detract from the overall impact of this otherwise excellent volume. It also begs the question, that if there are this many inaccuracies in one chapter, how many are in the others?
'Napoleon did not make good on his threat to march on northern Germany if he did not receive massive bribes.'
What threat was this? It isn't made clear by the author what the situation was at the time (1800), and what was said either by Napoleon or anyone else. No reference is given.
'This time, in all the Hanse ports, the French arrival was accompanied by violence against civilians, the worst instances in Lubeck.'
What isn't mentioned is that Lubeck was the site of a major action of the 1806 campaign where the city was defended by the trapped Prussian general Blucher at the end of the French pursuit, and that Lubeck was taken by storm and sacked. Additionally, the Prussians weren't innocent in this aspect either, whcih is apparently ignored.
'Deprived of his fleet at Trafalgar...' This implies there was no French fleet after Trafalgar. That is inaccurate and incorrect. The Toulon squadron was destroyed at Trafalgar, not the French navy. The Brest and Rochefort squadrons were still in existence, and Napoleon also rebuilt the Toulon squadron after Trafalgar and the Imperial Navy worried the British into 1814.
'Bourriene...' Using Bourrienne as a reference is not a good idea. Bourrienne's memoirs were ghost-written and were published to curry favor with the Bourbons. Bourrienne also had an axe to grind with Napoleon, who fired him twice for corruption, namely embezzlement. Lastly, Bourrienne went insane in later life. All in all his alleged 'memoirs' are erratically in accurate and cannot be relied upon.
In the text, it states that Bourrienne was still functioning in Hamburg in 1813, when in actuality he had been caught with his hand in the till in 1810 and sacked by Napoleon.
'...already by that point [1808], Napoleon's system was extensively perforated, and rife with cheating, corruption, and black marketeering.'
Again, this statement is offered without documentation. Further, there are always two sides to any historical question, and there is a dearth of primary French evidence in the conclusions and opinions regarding the French administration in the Hanseatic ports. What is completely ignored is the role Hamburg played in French intelligence operations, especially regarding smuggling. The pro-'German' bias of the book is evident in this chapter.
'...three officers of the French 128th infantry regiment (stationed just outside Bremen) were caught in the autumn of 1811 trying to desert by ship to Great Britain. Napoleon's recruiters combed Hamburg's prisons and poorhouses to flesh out the four new 'French' infantry regiments created from the new Hanseatic subjects. When their performance failed to meet the satndards of the Grande Armee, Napoleon decided to give these German-speaking troops to the Westphalian army of his brother Jerome. Even the Westphalians, however, chose not to take these regiments into Russia in 1812.'
The 128th ligne, though nominally a French regiment because the units were formed after the annexation in 1810, was composed of the Garde de Breme, and various German recruits. There were three line infantry regiments formed from the Hanseatic area: the 127th, 128th, and 129th. None of these were ever part of the Westphalian Army and all three went into Russia in 1812. All three fought at the Berezina in 1812, among other actions. The core of these regiments was the Legion Hanoverienne.
'Wichelshausen must have been as astonished as most of his countrymen when the US had joined the 'wrong' side of the war in 1812.'
This interesting statement suggests that France and the United States were allied in the War of 1812. They were not. The United States declared war on Great Britain in 1812 on its own, and not with a French alliance or with French support.
'...all the French officials were so corrupt and easy to bribe.'
A sweeping statement, especially one as absolute as this is, is difficult to support historically, and there was no reference cited in the text to support it. In fact, Napoleon went to considerable efforts to stop corruption in his officials, establishing the Auditors of the Council of State to investigate high-level corruption. They were efficient and had an excellent reputation for honesty.
'During April and May Marshal Davout at the head of an entire French infantry corps, stormed his way back into Hamburt. The fighting was hard, and the allied forces held out until the night of May 30/31.'
In actuality, Davout dispatched Vandamme to reoccupy Hamburg and he was assisted by the Danes who already held the Altona district. Resistance was not as heavy as implied in the text, though there was fighting in the area before the allies were driven off.
What is equally confusing to this reviewer is that while the Correspondence of both Napoleon and Davout are listed, they don't appear to have been used overly much in compiling the subject chapter. There are just too many errors.
All of this information referred to for the Chapter 7 errors is readily available and easily found in the following reference material:
-Napoleon's Diplomatic Service by Edward A. Whitcomb for information on Bourrienne.
-Swords Around A Throne by John R. Elting for information on the 127th, 128th, and 129th Ligne, as well as information on the intelligence operations regarding smuggling.
-The Napoleon Series on the internet for information on the above three infantry regiments and their service.
-The Iron Marshal by John Gallaher for information on Marshal Davout in Hamburg in 1813-1814
-Napoleon Bonaparte by Vincent Cronin for information on Bourrienne.
This volume is recommended, but should be used with care in Chapter 7.
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