"Using innovative analytic techniques, Anna Harvey offers a surprising argument, that the Supreme Court responds to changes in the partisan composition of the House of Representatives. Her extension of the argument to raise questions about the value of judicial independence and judicial review in established democracies is especially interesting."—Mark Tushnet, Harvard Law School
"A rigorous examination of the role of the Supreme Court in the American system of checks and balances."—Jeffrey A. Segal, SUNY Distinguished Professor, Chair, Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University
"There is no scholar whose work on judicial independence is more provocative or demands greater attention than Anna Harvey. Professor Harvey’s empirical finding that the U.S. Supreme Court is responsive to the preferences of the House of Representatives poses a profound challenge to the conventional wisdom about both judicial independence and the Supreme Court. This conclusion is documented at length with painstaking methodological rigor and transparency. In particular, her strategy of drawing inferences from what she terms the “missing docket,” or the cases that the Court declines to hear, is instructive and groundbreaking. This book ought to be a must-read for constitutional scholars, law and courts scholars, judicial politics scholars, and public law scholars alike." - David Law, Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis
About the Author
Anna Harvey is associate professor of political science at New York University.