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Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy)

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Anyone interested in the issues that make up current debates in metaphysics should read this book. It opens up an entirely new vocabularly and conceptual scheme for those with little or no prior knowledge of the subject. Working through the chapters, arguments, and positions will greatly facilitate comprehension of more technical philosophical papers. At the same time the book presents the material in a technical fashion; it reads like real philosophy, as it should. Arguments receive in depth treatment and important sides to issues get presented fairly. For a beginner, this book will present many challenges. But overcoming these will reap great rewards. Probably the best thing to do after completing the book is to read it again. Of course this principle holds true for a lot of philosophy books, but since this one builds a foundation a second deep reading becomes almost essential.

Seven chapters cover some of the biggest issues in metaphysics. Each chapter builds on its predecessors, so the book doesn't hold up well to random browsing. It should be comprehended linearly. Starting off, the nearly ancient debate between nominalists and realists (with a small 'r') fills two chapters. Arguments for and against both positions take up most of the space (e.g., abstract entities, predication, Ockham's Razor, etc., along with a delineation of the various types of nominalism - austere, metalinguistic, trope theory). Chapter three discusses the arguments relating to the nature of concrete particulars, or the 'substratum' versus the 'bundle' theory. The nature of propositions gets a fair shake in chapter four; are they abstract necessarily existing entities or just talk about regular old concrete objects? Next, David Lewis' eyebrow-raising view of possible worlds and modality is coherently outlined in chapter five. Here the discussion get really juicy and complex. Modality is no picnic. Do possible worlds actually exist in the same manner of our own world or are possible worlds merely potential actual worlds that never obtained the level of an 'actual world'? Chapter six revisits the concrete particulars examined in chapter three, but now with the element of time included. Two views, endurantism and perdurantism, are juxtaposed along with two theories of time, presentism and eternalism. Finally, chapter seven gets to the bottom of many of the book's debates, which can be, cursorily, ground down to the question of human beings' connections between language and the world. Do languages actually refer to a mind-independent world or is the world we talk about inextricably linked to our sensory and conceptual processes? These questions explode in the debate between Realists (this time with a capital 'R') and anti-Realists. Anti-Realists challenge the 'traditional' notion of a direct connection between language and a mind-independent world. The idea of the 'inscrutablility of reference' (from W.V.O. Quine, though with a specific interpretation by the author and Hilary Putnam) provides meat for the anti-Realist's argument. This final chapter sees Realists and anti-Realists duking it out over these issues. The chapter, and the entire book, provide plenty of food for the brain to chew on.

Throughout the book, the author argues for an Aristotelian-flavored "being 'qua' being" approach to metaphysics. This is very apparent in the book's excellent introduction as well as in the final chapter (aptly titled "The challenge of anti-Realism"). Though he makes his preference explicit, the arguments against his position still get a very fair shake. The author's position in no way degrades the quality of for-and-against delineation of arguments. So, even if readers do not agree with the author's overall stance, they can still obtain much useful knowledge.

Though the book's subtitle reads "a contemporary introduction" it is not an easy read. Major universities have used it for courses (the University of Minnesota's Philosophy department used it in a 5-XXX level class). Still, the book is not inaccessible to any careful general reader. It just takes some work. And that work, especially to someone seeking an entryway into the foundations of current metaphysical debates, will pay off in droves.

Michael J. Loux's _Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction_ is an excellent introduction to the metaphysical issues which are of paramount importance in contemporary Anglo-Australo-American analytical philosophy.

Another reviewer has already noted Loux's helpful treatment (in Chapters 1 and 2) of realism vs. nominalism as regards universals; I concur and shall therefore limit my summary here to other features of the text.

Loux devotes Chapter 4 to a crucially important topic of which many readers may not even have been aware: the ontological status of _propositions_. Do properties, kinds, and relations cover all the sorts of abstract entity whose existence we must admit, or do "propositions" constitute another such class?

Loux dedicates Chapter 5 to a discussion of _modality_ (necessity and possibility). In particular, he provides a solid introductory discussion of possible-worlds modalism.

And in chapters 3 and 6, Loux tackles the problem of the "concrete particular" -- first in regard to what it is (the subtitle of Chapter 3 is "Substrata, bundles, and substances"), and second in regard to how such an entity persists through time (endurantism, perdurantism, presentism, eternalism).

The presentation is clear and accessible throughout, and each chapter is helpfully introduced with a summary of its important points. Readers interested in this topic will find Loux's work both readable and self-contained; those who wish to read further will profit from his suggestions for further reading (at the end of each chapter).

Readers unfamiliar with the field may also want to pick up _ A Companion to Metaphysics_ (edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa), a fine collection of 264 alphabetical entries by various respected philosophers. And the _Oxford Companion to Philosophy_ (edited by Ted Honderich) is an excellent general reference which no student of philosophy should be without.

(The Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy series seems to be very good in general, by the way; Robert Audi's _Epistemology_ is also highly recommended.)

General metaphysics is a difficult and central area of philosophy. While there is a lot of literature devoted to it, I do not think that there are very many introductory texts. Michael Loux's "Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction" fills a gap.
This book is devoted exclusively to general metaphysics; there is no discussion of the subjects of special metaphysics, such as the existence of God, the nature of mind, and free will. The subjects covered are the nature of universals, substance, propositions, modality, persistence through time, and the Realism/Anti-Realism debate.
Loux explains the different theories about these subjects and evaluates arguments for and against these theories. The focus is on the contemporary literature; however, some historical background is provided. While the coverage is comprehensive, depth is not sacrificed.
The chapters are well-organised, each beginning with a brief chapter overview and concluding with suggestions for further reading. Loux style is clear and friendly.
While introductory, this book is not elementary. It is intended for students who have already attended an introductory philosophy course. Those without any previous exposure to contemporary analytic philosophy may find it very difficult.
I recommend this book strongly for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy. Readers may also be interested in Loux's anthology, "Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings".

Anyone who wants to understand contemporary analytic ontology should buy Loux's superb introduction to this subject. Any philosopher who does understand it should buy it anyway. The book is incisive, clear, and covers the subject with authority. Loux begins by explaining the nature of metaphysics as ontology, after which the book goes on to give detailed accounts of the problem of universals (in two chapters), problems involving the nature of concrete particulars, propositions, possible worlds and modality, and finally the problem of identity over time. Throughout the book, arguments are presented rigorously, terminology is carefully laid out, and the different approaches to the problem at hand are meticulously articulated. This book is useful as a reference as well as an ideal introduction to its chosen subject.

Ryan, Guha, and Gibson did such a remarkable job of describing Loux's excellent work that there is little left to say. I would, however, like to offer a few words on Chapter Seven, "The Challenge of Anti-Realism," which as was pointed out Loux added in the second edition.

Using as examples the anti-Realism of Michael Dummett, W. V. Quine, and Hilary Putnam along with various objections that have been raised against each, Loux describes each theory with considerable lucidity (as much as can be expected, anyway). Equally helpful is the way in which Loux moves from the least radical position (viz., Dummett's) to the most radical (Putnam's). By doing this, the reader can see how the arguments of the latter rest somewhat upon the arguments of the former.

Gibson is right to say that beyond the addition of the seventh chapter, Loux's second edition is not that much of an update. Since anti-Realism both is easily misundestood and is making serious waves, however, it should be pointed out that the Loux's addition is both helpful and needed.

"Metaphysics" has meant many things to many different people. Loux helpfully distinguishes in the introduction between general and special metaphysics. The former concerns being qua being, and the latter concerns disparate topics such as free will, cosmology, and God. Loux said he would only concern himself with general metaphysics. Specifically, he concerns himself with Anglophone general metaphysics from 1950 to 1990. Thus, the subtitle, "A Contemporary Introduction."

Loux treats universals (realism vs. nominalism), concrete particulars (substrata vs. bundles, persistence through time), propositions, and modality (necessity and possibility). He handles matters will a degree of explicitness, thoroughness, and evenhandedness. The text is challenging at points--I attribute this to the fact that metaphysics cannot be dumbed down.

All in all, quite thorough and an excellent introduction to contemporary general metaphysics.

This is an excellent introduction to contemporary metaphysics. You cannot put this book down without clearly understanding the many shades of Realism and Nominalism. The chapters on necessity and possibility were excellent.

For me, at least, there is the glaring omission of any sort of contribution that A. Whitehead (the 20th century's pre-eminent metaphysician)made to the field, but that's understandable in an introductory text.

This is philosophy. Go for it.

Metaphysics is an extremely abstract topic in philosophy, yet one cannot fully do philosophy without a basic understanding of metaphysics. Loux's book is the introduction to metaphysics that anyone can pick up and begin to understand what the arguments are in metaphysics. After reading this introductory book, one should have the knowledge to begin to delve into other areas of philosophy - or to seek a deeper understanding of metaphysics in other areas. I can't think of a better beginning point for learning about the basic arguments and positions in metaphysics than this book. Though every introduction is limited by space and will cover different topics, Loux's book is one of the most comprehensive introductions to metaphysics that I've seen.

This book made the study western metaphysics a positive, stimulating enterprise again for me. I was especially pleased in how Loux tied contemporary viewpoints to their ancient roots where possible.

Aristotle disinterred and tweaked

A professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, Michael Loux is a self-identified Aristotelian. Aristotle died in 322 BC, and most academic philosophers now view Aristotle in a purely historical perspective. But for Loux Aristotelianism is a living "contemporary" philosophy. Since I am neither an Aristotelian nor an antiquarian, I found most of this book uninteresting and anachronistic.

But the book became interesting for me where Loux opposes his philosophy to the contemporary pragmatism that prevails in academia today. He argues specifically against the thesis of "ontological relativity" set forth by Harvard University pragmatist philosopher Willard Van Quine in Ontological Relativity (1969), the thesis that Quine had earlier called "referential inscrutability" in Word and Object (Studies in Communication) (1960).

The conflict is engaged in the closing chapter of Loux's book titled "The challenge of anti-Realism". Note that Loux's anti-Realism means specifically anti-Aristotelianism, and that while Quine is certainly not an Aristotelian, he is a self-identified realist. For example in his "Scope and Language of Science" in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Revised Edition Quine writes that we cannot significantly question the reality of the external world or deny that there is evidence of external objects in the testimony of our senses, because to do so is to dissociate the terms "reality" and "evidence" from the very application that originally did most to invest these terms with whatever intelligibility they may have for us. Quine thus affirms his "unregenerate realism".

The origin of the issue is Loux's belief in Aristotle's naturalistic-absolutist semantics and ontology, as opposed to the pragmatist's artifactual-relativized semantics and ontology. In this book Loux therefore says that some if not all terms must be "referentially fixed". But contrary to Loux, the pragmatist says that no term is ever "referentially fixed", because all terms are always vague, or as Quine says "empirically underdetermined". Thus terms may be described as referentially fuzzy, because increasing a term's context can reduce referential fuzziness indefinitely - but never completely. Quine thus says that terms are "referentially inscrutable".

The reader of this book should furthermore keep in mind that the contemporary pragmatism prevailing in academia today had its origins in reflection on the modern quantum theory, which was developed nearly two millennia after Aristotle. Both Einstein and Heisenberg practiced ontological relativity as part of their great scientific revolutions. Einstein posited relativistic time as real time instead of Newton's absolute time, when he rejected Lorentz's making relativistic time apparent time. In his Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science as well as elsewhere Heisenberg described interpreting his uncertainty relations realistically, and he cited Einstein as precedent. In fact Galileo practiced ontological relativity, when he affirmed that heliocentrism should be construed realistically, to the fateful chagrin of Pope Urban VIII who denied its realism and demanded its instrumentalist interpretation.

Loux's metaphysics is a vestige from prescientific eras. Ontological relativity means that realism need not be identified with any particular ontology, and thus enables realism in this age of dramatic scientific change that still continues to produce perpetual revision of ontologies in evolving and revolutionary science. I have no doubt that Loux considers Aristotelian metaphysics to be contemporary, because he is innocent of the history of science.

Readers interested in Quine and Heisenberg are invited to Google "History of Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science" at the website "philsci" that enables free downloads by chapter.

Thomas J. Hickey