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The Mexican War, 1846-1848

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In the 1960s the Macmillan Company contracted with a large group of military historians to write book-length overviews of the wars of the United States. Although it took decades to complete the series, collectively the more than twenty volumes that appeared in this "Macmillan Wars of the United States" series reinterpreted American military history for a new generation of readers. K. Jack Bauer's volume deals with the origins, evolution, and immediate aftermath of the war with Mexico in 1846-1848. It is a powerful narrative exploring this relatively forgotten chapter in American history.

I first read this book in graduate school in 1980, and I recently reread it to refresh my memory and assess its continuing relevance. Although first published more than thirty years ago, upon rereading I would still recommend it as the most authoritative one-volume history of the war, although there are others that are also capable narratives of the same subject. Those others include John S.D. Eisenhower's "So Far from God: The U.S. War with Mexico, 1846-1848" (New York: Anchor Books, 1989) and Otis A. Singletary's "The Mexican War" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). But I recommend this book as both a very useful overview and an insightful study of lessons -learned that might be applied to both the Vietnam and Iraq wars.

Bauer's work, like much history of the 1970s, especially military history, was informed by the U.S. debacle in Vietnam. Americans had just suffered a defeat at the hands of a dedicated opposition fighting in its own territory. It represented a dramatic failure of the American Empire. Bauer expends considerable energy investigating the similarities, as well as the discontinuities, in these two episodes.

First, like the nation's leadership during the Vietnam era, Bauer argues that the leadership of the United States in the 1840s understood virtually nothing about the Mexican civilization and failed to fathom attitudes and reactions to American ideas and attitudes. National leaders did not appreciate that positions accepted as sui generis in the United States did not persuade those on the other side of the Rio Grande. President James K. Polk, he notes, believed that just a little more pressure would force Mexico's Santa Anna to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution to differences.

Second, Bauer believes that much of the history of the war with Mexico, like the Vietnam experience, revolves around a failure to deal with legitimate differences through diplomacy. The failure to communicate brought a devastating result for Mexico, and arguably for the United States as well since the acquisition of the American Southwest brought to the fore the question of the extension of slavery into U.S. territories. This led to the American Civil War of 1861-1865 and the Reconstruction period of 1865-1877.

Third, Bauer explores the issue of public perceptions of the war. Some marched off believing that they represented the forces of manifest destiny sent from a republican nation to free a people under the domination of an evil dictator who deserved overthrow, Santa Anna. Many embraced the war not as an act of conquest, but as an act of kindness, done out of a sense of duty to help fellow humans in the Southwest. Others viewed it as bald-faced aggression and conquest. Those who did faced the challenge of opposing the policy of war while still seeking to show support for the troops engaged in the military action. It was a difficult balancing act, and over time those in opposition, like those opposing the Vietnam adventure became more strident in their criticisms. These differences did not reach the state of agitation seen in the 1960s over Vietnam only because the war with Mexico lasted only two years.

Interestingly, the story Bauer tells here also has salience in relation to the American war in Iraq. The division of the nation's citizenry over this military action, the casting of Saddam Hussein as an evil dictator requiring our overthrow, the long-term negative consequences of the Iraq war, and a host of other issues suggest close parallels. I would hope that policymakers and military officials would restudy the war with Mexico for lessons about current challenges.

Finally, and this also relates both to Vietnam and Iraq, Bauer warns of the folly of inadequate planning in undertaking foreign policy objectives. The military missteps, the inability to deal with sustained resistance, the lack of preparation for how to govern conquered provinces all portend both the Vietnam and Iraq experiences. Bauer draws explicit parallels to Vietnam, but since the book was published in 1974 readers are on their own to consider parallels to Iraq. But they are quite apparent.

A good read covering by-and-large, a forgotten era in American History. While this book shows the footprint of being written by an academic (endnotes aplenty), it still remains readible for the rest of us. Definitely a thoroughly researched and documented read, however, the copius and methodical endnotes do eventually detract from the flow. It's almost as if Bauer was working down a checklist of topics in every chapter. The mid-chapter transitions from section to section don't always flow and the bouncing around on topics sometimes seems a bit random. Although the writing isn't dry or dull it doesn't consistenly shine or carry one through from idea to idea. Certainly not the final book on the subject, it is fairly objective and fairly comprehensive in balance and scope. Bauer delves into the political squabbles in Washington while occasionally highlighting the instability inherent in Mexico's capacity to govern itself at the time. Although emphasizing a bias towards presenting the American perspective, Bauer clearly makes a strong effort to portray the Mexican army perspective as well (not something always done in many military history books, or at least not done with an attempt to provide a balanced perspective). Ultimately Bauer's book prooves readible, not spellbinding, but not dull. It tries to provide at least a decent effort to cover every significant aspect of the war. However, at times, it would seem as if more could have been written. However, like a good historian, Bauer sticks to the facts and the material revealed by his sources maintaining a strong self-discipline avoiding speculation or dramatization. He also highlights (what would seem to be) all the documented efforts of later famous civil war generals and heroes in their early careers.

Bauer does a decent job of covering in a comprehensive manner, a largely forgotten era of American history. One would be hard pressed, prior to reading this book, to recall any signifcant events about this war (unless one is a historian, of course). A true tragedy in light of the current American occupation of Iraq. Many lessons that were learned in the war with Mexico seem readily applicable to our modern plight - bandits raiding unguarded or lightly guarded supplies for example. Balancing the occupation of a foreign power with the fact that the nation was by-and-large barely controlled by the previous regime before being deposed. Then the ultimate question, what to do if one actually succeeds in conquering a foreign nation - how do you deal with a population that is, for the most part, ambivalent about who is in power. And those that do care and want a stake take the fight underground.

This is the best of the Mexican War books I have read. The only critical comment I would have is that the actors sometimes get confused as Bauer tries to put their experience in this war in a context with the War Between the States. His careful scholarship, though, shows how closely PBS came with its mini-series and where they failed. Few books, I think, give such insight into the role of fashion in historical research, which, by itself, is valuable to us amateurs. It is the last book on this subject of which I am aware which has not taken political correctness into account and so his critical attitude towards the Mexican government and that country's ruling classes might provide food for thought for some.

Bauer has done a great job here. It might be a little spare on the personalities, but for those who know nothing about this war, and there are multitudes, this is a good start.

The only thing I disagree with is Bauer's notion that the United States had nothing to fear from foriegn expansion into the near empty land which was claimed by Mexico. Republican Government had few friends in 1846 and we should put ourselves in the shoes of Andrew Jackson, Sam Houston, and James K. Polk when we think of this era. They believed, and probably correctly, that the worst threat to the survival of the U.S. was to continue to try and exist with such a huge open territory on our borders. All that would be needed would be a foreign power with a thirst for empire on our borders and we might cease to exist. Men who thought this way were not imperialists, they were filled with fear for the survival of their decendants. Mexico was not governing much less defending the territories necessary for American survival and something needed to be done about it and fast. I don't recall any of the great Americans of this era ever using the term "manifest destiny." (Bauer doesn't say that either. Revisionists use this newspaper term.) More like manifest survival. This opinion shouldn't of mine shouldn't keep readers from enjoying this book, though. Wonderful job Dr. Bauer!

Bauer is no Shelby Foote and this book no elegant synthesis of art and history. It remains a serviceable addition to the history buff's library, however, with its detailed accounts of the politics and battles of this little known conflict. Through Bauer we can appreciate men such as the unsung Commodore David Conner, the brash Commodore Robert Stockton, the easy-going, slovenly Zachary Taylor, the brilliant Winfield Scott. Civil War buffs will want this volume to appreciate how this conflict shaped the tactics and personalities of the next great confrontation in American history.

A workman-like narrative of the Mexican War, evenly divided between military history and the political/diplomatic aspects of the conflict. Although not as engaging as Eisenhower's So Far From God, it is far more comprehensive.

Unlike authors who have viewed this war as basically inspired by imperialism and au fond, immoral, Bauer's thesis is that the war was "unavoidable" as it was the conflict with Mexico over a common boundary, which in turn was a result of the "inexorable westward....demands of destiny." Manifest Destiny--not imperialism. (I'm not sure that there is much of a difference to the lay person). Mexican demands for national sovereignty and self-respect prevented Mexico from relinquishing any territory it considered its own except to overwhelming force.

Polk, according to Bauer, wanted a negotiated settlement with the Mexican government (which, at the time, was in near-chaos) but chose the path of rough wooing rather than trying to negotiate as with equals. Although high members of the Mexican government were willing to do so, they could not begin as it would appear that they were caving in to gringo pressure. The actual casus bellum was the Mexican crossing of the Rio Grande into territory that Polk claimed, and ordered occupied by American troops before the start of negotiations. The Mexican view was that the border between Texas and Mexico proper was the Nueces River, about 35 miles north of the Rio Grande where it enters the Gulf of Mexico.

Along with the conventional account of the campaigns of Taylor, then of Scott, Bauer also devotes several chapters on the US navy's role in the war. The Mexican navy consisted of small craft; it's only significant warships had been transferred to British commercial interests at the start of the fighting. Basically, the job of the US navy was to blockade some six east-coast ports--not an easy task, as the there were only two seasons along the east coast--the rainy season when yellow fever was rampant, and the dry season, which brought vicious northerly gales that could strike without warning. Hence the navy preferred to seize the ports rather than blockading them. By 1848, all but two of the eastern ports had been captured. The western coast of Mexico was also blockaded. Again, seizure of the ports, rather than blockade was the preferred option. It's not clear whether naval operations were intended to complement the land war as part of a single plan. Rather, the navy did its thing without too much coordination with Scott and Taylor.

The political fallout of Mr. Polk's war was felt early. Polk had been able to make the Whigs party to the decision to go to war, thereby quieting dissent. When the Congressional session ended, however, strong opposition to the war erupted. Anti-administration Democrats and moderate Whigs contended that the war was unconstitutionally begun by Polk. The Whigs split into radical and conservative camps. The radical Whigs were primarily located in New England and proclaimed that the primary aim of Polk's war was to extend slavery. But the Whigs were between a rock and a hard place. Whigs had voted for the war because they feared their opposition would be looked upon as traitorous, as were the Federalists in 1812 and beyond. Moreover, once having voted for the war, they were committed to furnishing the money to wage it--in short, to "support the troops". All this seems familiar.

Bauer closes with an assertion that the war, from a moral point of view, wasn't all that bad. Polk may have been a believer in "manifest destiny" but was not rapacious. He had planned to negotiate and buy his way into acquiring California and other parts of the west, but got into a war that got out of control. Mexico's leaders, writes Bauer, bear much responsibility for the conflict. For the most part feckless and fearful of public opinion, they refused to negotiate at the beginning, and at the end would not negotiate in good faith. Miscalculation by the leaders of both nations brought about the conflict, a conflict that can be seen as the matrix from which the American Civil War emerged some 13 years later.

Bauer provides extensive notes to original sources, and a large bibliography. The greater part of the source material is in English; relatively little use was made of Mexican sources