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Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified Law

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because I had difficulty following his examples, but still somewhat interesting. Halivni argues that Jews' means of describing Jewish law have swung back and forth over the centuries from "apodictic" (i.e. law as final conclusion with little explanation) to "discursive" (law as constant argument, sometimes with no ultimate conclusion at all). Halivni explains that the first swing of the pendulum came from Second Temple Midrash (some explanation) to the Mishnah (almost no explanation) after the destruction of the Second Temple. Then came another swing from the Mishnah to the Talmud (which is almost entirely discursive). And after the Talmud came the medieval codifiers such as Maimonides, who moved back to the apodictic code - though in turn they were followed by commentators on the codes.

Halivni also asserts that the discursive strain in Jewish thought was exemplified by medieval Torah commentators which exercised considerable freedom in interpreting the Torah, sometimes in contradiction to settled Jewish law.

Halivni's sympathy is clearly with those commentators and with the Talmud; he seems to believe that regardless of whatever practical law governs Jews, Torah should be studied for its own sake.