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Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror

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This is a frustrating work. You read the glowing blurbs (none of them experts on Southeast Asia, to my knowledge) and you expect a great book. The book does not, alas deliver: it is good in some ways, not in others.

At one level, the book is quite good. Abuza manages to tie together a wide variety of facts into a coherent narrative. The book reads reasonably well, although there is clear evidence of haste (e.g. misspelled names). If you knew little about Islam or Southeast Asia, you'd probably come away with the impression that this is a crackerjack book.

But what if you *do* know something about Islam or Southeast Asia? Alas, here the book is irritating. Take this howler: "Because Malaysia is a predominantly Muslim country, it is easier for radicals and terrorists to fit in." (p. 123). That is an absurd statement. (On the same page, Abuza opines about former PM of Malaysia Mahathir's "insecurity about being a Muslim Malay" -- who knows what he is talking about?)

Abuza, to his credit, usually avoids such bizarre claims. But he resorts to a formulation all too common on "terrorism" experts: that there is something called "moderate" Islam in SEA and then radical or extremist (which he identifies with "Wahhabis" or Salafis).

If you know anything about Salafis, you know that Saudi Arabia is full of them, some of them probably seeing themselves as Salafis committed the 9/11 attacks . . . BUT that the vast majority of them do not embrace terrorism! No matter. Abuza paints with a broad brush and thus smears all Salafis without explaining what, exactly, in their beliefs makes them terrorists. This is intellectually lazy. It explains nothing.

The use of terror is a TACTIC. It is a tactic used by weak non-state groups of all sorts of backgrounds. What we really need to know is why, at this particular time in history, a tiny percentage of Salafis have decided that it is the tactic to use.

One last point: Abuza seems to like "moderate" Muslims. WEll, almost all Indonesians are Muslims. Some of these so-called moderates (e.g. NU, the military leadership) engaged in the killings of 1965-66 that left about 500,000 civilians dead. Some of these "moderates" killed East Timorese (over 100,000). But just as I would never use this as proof that "moderate" Muslims are bloodthirsty thugs BECAUSE OF THEIR ISLAM, so I don't think that individuals are terrorists because of their

Islam. Islam contributes a world view, and many Salafis are rigid and uncompromising in their beliefs. . . one might want to argue that Salafis are more *predisposed* to the use of terror . . . but Abuza does not even make that more nuanced argument.

My advice: read this book for the story of the different networks of terrorists in SEA. Take some of its claims with a grain of salt: after all, who really respects the Philippine intelligence services, who provide some data to Abuza. But discount Abuza's explanations on Islam.

Chapter One says it all. This is a litany of ineptitude by an acknowledged master in the field. Beyond the typographical errors and linguistic mistakes, which point to the author's lack of familiarity with any of the relevant languages needed for the work, there are major undergraduate-level mistakes. Cairo's Al-Azhar is not known as a Wahhabi institution ... And how can anybody (or anybody's editor) claim that 15 percent of Cham Buddhists are Wahhabi? This would be like asserting that 15 percent of Hindus are members of Opus Dei. Caveat emptor.

I acquired this book, "Militant Islam in Southeast Asia," in order to do some background research for a novel I am writing. My book is a long-term project with no projected publication date as yet. It is a rather ambitious undertaking - a retelling of "The Odyssey" set as an Al Qaeda terrorist story that takes place partly in Indonesia! So, in preparation for an eventual fact finding trip to Indonesia, I have been doing some reading about terrorism and Southeast Asia.

Zachary Abuza is on the faculty in the Political Science and International Relations Department at Simmons College in Boston. He has traveled extensively in researching this book, which has received enthusiastic praise from many quarters.

W. Scott Thompson of Tuft's University's legendary Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy had this to say about Abuza's work:

"Showing an astonishing persistence in tying together the threads of the terrorist threat, Abuza has come up with a dazzling display of Al-Qaida at work. It is rare that a book comes out with so deep and thoughtful analysis of a contemporary subject - this may well become the standard reference on everything happening in the Southeast Asian theater of the world terror crisis."

Barnett, in "The Pentagon's New Map," and in his recent "Blueprint for Action," makes it clear that Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, will play a pivotal role over the next several decades in impacting the balance of power among the leaders of what Barnett calls "the Core" and the "New Core." Indonesia is the largest Muslim nation in the world, and will play a significant part in determining the relationship between the United States and the Muslim world. Therefore, Abuza's seminal work becomes a very helpful tool in understanding how terrorism in general - and Al-Qaeda in particular - may serve as a crucial factor in determining how the relationship between the West and the worldwide Muslim may evolve.

Using painstakingly well-documented and footnoted research, Abuza traces the growing influence of Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia - from Afghanistan and the jihad against the Soviets to the bombing in Bali and beyond. His basic premise follows a logical chain of events. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, many zealous Southeast Asians who had fought as mujahadin returned to Asia to use their skills and battlefield experiences to bring the passion of jihad to several local struggles to establish autonomous Muslim states through Southeast Asia. These struggles included the secessionist movements in Mindanao, East Timor, Sulawesi and the Malukus and Aceh - among others. Once the U.S. attacked Afghanistan to topple the Taliban and neutralize the command and control of Bin-Laden's team, Al-Qaeda was forced to flee from its lair in Afghanistan and scatter among a handful of safe havens - many in Southeast Asia. At first, these safe havens - Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand - were used as a convenient "back offices" for Al-Qaeda to conduct training, money-laundering, weapons acquisition and coalition building. Al-Qaeda also funded and co-opted many local insurgents and gave them a vision of taking part in a global jihad against the "savage intervention of the American Crusade Armed Forces and their allies [who are involved] in the Muslim cleansing scheme. . . as a `harsh reprimand' to Jews and Christians led by American heathens in oppressing and tainting the Islamic holy land, where the Revelation of the Prophets descended." (Pages 166-167).

Eventually, the terrorists took advantage of lax security and political dissent in these nations to launch terrorist attacks on soft targets within these host nations - the bombing in Bali being the most spectacular and deadly among these incidents.

For anyone who wants to develop a more comprehensive understanding of where Al-Qaeda is heading in its long-term strategy and short-term tactics, this book as a valuable resource.

Al

I have the advantage, in reviewing this book, of having heard the author present his views in a superb illustrated briefing that held 150 government intelligence professionals glued into their seats and fixated on the author's rapid-fire compelling presentation.

This man is a brilliant scholar who has returned to the almost lost art of combining persistent field work with foreign language open sources (both printed and oral), and thoughtful analysis.

Across the board, from his narrative to his footnotes to his bibliography to his index, this book is as good as it gets. This is a world-class contribution to our understanding in three areas: 1) what can be known about terrorism and militant Islam from open sources of information (but is being largely ignored by the so-called professional intelligence agencies that are obsessing on secret sources and methods; 2) what governments in Southeast Asia are and are not doing about it (in many cases, abusing American naiveté or being put off by American arrogance; and 3) where militant Islam is going in this area--be afraid, be very afraid.

If all academics were this good, we would not need spies. This book and this author represent the very best scholarship that one could ask for. The author is the Program Director for East Asian Studies and associate professor of international politics at Simmons College. Goggling him yields a fine selection of interviews and Congressional testimony.

This is a fascinating book that examines the Southeast Asian terrorist network in chilling detail. It is highly readable, yet filled with data and information. It is essential reading for all those interested in Southeast Asian terrorism,and to understand how Al Qaeda has morphed.

This book is rubbish. Abuza uses weak secondary sources with third rate results. He does not know the relevant languages to do substantive research (Indonesian, at least) and has cobbled together a text that panders to the most paranoid of policymakers. He's part of the fear-mongering industry and his work should be read with great skepticism, if read at all.