Customer Reviews

The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since World War II

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Japan has always been a culture that values uniformity, homogeneity, conformity. Whereas in the West, 'the squeaky wheel gets the grease,' in Japan, 'the nail that sticks up gets hammered down.' And so, when after its defeat in World War Two, Japan had a 'peace constitution' imposed upon it by the American occupiers, and that constitution was endorsed by the Emperor and his government, the Japanese people began to abide by it.

But almost from the time the 'peace constitution' was imposed, the American occupiers began pressuring the Japanese to ignore it and assume a larger share of their own defense. Today, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, while arguably still illegal under their constitution, are one of the largest and best-organized military forces in Asia. Hoyt's book is a fascinating look at how this happened. While it is obviously somewhat out of date now (it was published in 1985, while the Japanese 'economic miracle' was still bubbling along), Hoyt's historical investigations are particularly useful and revealing.

He demonstrates how, in typical fashion, America encouraged Japan to beef up its military might while at the same time forcing them to remain a very junior partner in the defense relationship. As Hoyt was writing, the Soviet Union was the major threat in the Pacific. But even as the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (aka 'Navy') was once again cruising the Pacific as a unified fighting force, Japanese leaders were admitting to one another that American and Japanese interests were not, and are not, always identical, and deciding where to go from there.

Hoyt's definition of 'militarism' seems to involve a more assertive foreign policy, a national spirit that honors *bushido* and the values instilled in the 1930s and 40s, former members of the Imperial Army and Navy playing prominent roles in certain areas of public life, and the expansion of powerful industrial and financial combines. Hoyt does not argue that anyone in Japan is advocating the re-colonization of Manchuria, another march down the Malay Peninsula, or another attack on America.

This book is not 'anti-militarist.' Nor, for that matter, is it 'pro-militarist'. While clearly concerned about certain aspects of the rise of 'militarism,' Hoyt's tone is not hectoring, partisan, shrill, or even particularly alarmist. At the end, I felt like facts had been laid before me, and I was left to draw my own moral conclusions. I appreciate that.

Now the USSR has collapsed, and tensions between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China are on the rise. Will the U.S. try to compel Japan to continue its historic post-war role as American deputy in the Far East? Or will America yield to the demands (audible even as Hoyt wrote) to evacuate Okinawa and allow Japan to pursue its own interests and goals? Hoyt's book is an excellent place to begin searching for an answer. It's just a shame his analysis ends fifteen years ago