Customer Reviews

The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(7)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Geoffrey Parker argues that during the 16th Century a "military revolution" occurred that profoundly changed the way Europeans conducted warfare. This revolution involved four distinct changes in the art of war: a change in tactics; a marked growth in the size of armies; more ambitious and complex military/political strategies; and an acute impact on society as a whole. Parker further contends that the initial imperial gains and conquests by European nations (before the full impact of the Industrial Revolution was felt) would not have been possible had it not been for these revolutionary changes. Not all historians of early modern European military history agree with Parker's argument. In the Second Edition, Parker answers his critics in an updated addendum (for those who enjoy conversational footnotes, Parker does seem to have a particular axe to grind with the historian John A. Lynn and vice-versa)..Parker incorporates a thread of cause and effect to illustrate his claims. For example: the technological advancements in firepower in the form of larger canons, prompted the wide spread development of the bastion fortifications system known as trace italienne. These improved fortifications required larger garrisons as well as larger siege armies of the opposing enemy. Infantry became the core of these new and expanded armies of Europe. Larger armies created the need for revised tactics as well as improved logistical, supply, medical, and financial solutions. All of these factors had a direct upon the societies that depended upon these armies for protection. Parker applies similar cause and effect methodology in a discussion of sea power. Though Parker is a known scholar of early modern Europe, he turns his analysis into a global study by comparing and contrasting the European art of war with various non-western armies and empires. Parker discusses the reactions, adaptations, successes or failures of Near Eastern (Muslim, Ottoman, Indian, and African) and Far Eastern (China, Japan, Southeast Asia) armies in their contacts with the west.Parker consults a vast array of archival material. From Machiavelli to an assortment of 16th Century French, Spanish, Dutch, German and British documents in varying native languages, Parkers research is truly impressive. Absent, however, are non-western sources turning this "global" analysis into one from a western perspective. European colonial contacts with the east are seen only through western eyes in Parker's study. Sprinkled throughout the book are period etchings and engravings that Parker utilizes to support his premises. As an art history lover, however, I would have liked to have seen a description of the art work itself in the caption.Parker writes well. The author blends a well developed scholarly argument with historical narrative with great effect. For the most part, Parker maintained a set literary style throughout that held the reader's interest. One flaw, however, is the author's tendency to make a point early in a paragraph, then support his claim with a "list" of obscure little known European battles. One would have to be well versed in European military history to be on the same page with Parker on these rare instances. A solution would be to "list" fewer examples and explain "why" this particular battle supports the point he is illustrating.This is a must read for the serious student of military history though not for the faint of heart.

The purist may not appreciate the title of this excellent survey of the rise of Western European military and eventually cultural dominance. Any revolution that takes 300 years to accomplish begs the question. The subtitle is more revealing, and more accurately portrays the content of the book. The years of 1500 to 1800 indeed saw a series of military innovations that directly contributed to Western military hegemony.

What the author has done, which is truly unique, is to survey the innovations and to document how they affected events in Europe and elsewhere. A good part of the book accounts for developments in sail and guns and global exploration and confrontation. Also discussed is how other societies such as the Ottomans, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and others reacted or failed to react to these developments. In this course, Parker proves his thesis of how the West gained its "35%" toehold on the globe by 1800, which set the course for the century of rabid imperialism.

There is more detail to be found in other sources, but the synthesis of analysis is what marks this contribution as one of the best in the history of early modern Europe.

Geoffrey Parker is probably the best military historian active today. In this book he deploys an astounding amount of research and a brilliant intellect in grappling with a very big historical question: how did the West, between 1500 and 1800, come to achieve military superiority over other cultures, even before the invention of steam power, cartridge rifles, malaria vaccines, etc. etc. The first edition of this book won "best book" prizes from both military history and technological history societies. The second edition, which adds a rebuttal to his critics (for whom see my _The Military Revolution Debate_), is even more useful.

This relatively short work is an insightful description and analysis of changes in Military and Naval technology in Early Modern Europe. The fundamental idea is that a constellation of changes in military and naval technologies and tactics produced a qualitative change in the coercive powers of nascent European states. These innovations had major consequences including major expansion in the size of armed forces and increases in the fiscal and bureaucratic powers of states in order to support larger and complex armies. This toolkit of military and naval technology provided the crucial advantages that made possible successful European imperialism and colonialism in the pre-industrial period. Parker details changes in artillery capability, the development of new fortification technology, new infantry tactics, the emergence of ships as effective weapons platforms, the organization of armies, and the life of soldiers. A particularly interesting section deals with the reception of European military technology by sophisticated non-Western states such as China and Japan. Strongly recommended for those interested in Early Modern Europe.

During the 1990s, it was fashionable in the defense intellectual community to talk and write about a military revolution driven by the advances of the Information Age. The concept of a "military revolution" can trace its lineage back to a lecture given by the British historian Michael Roberts at Queen's University in Belfast in January 1955 titled "The military revolution 1560-1660." Thirty years later Geoffrey Parker delivered a series of lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge, that endorsed, but modified Roberts' original and highly influential thesis, and which was ultimately turned into book form as "The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800."

It is important to clearly state Parker's main objective in writing this piece. He notes that much scholarly attention has been devoted to explaining the rapid conquest by western states during the 19th century. It has been claimed that between 1800 and 1914 the West went from controlling 35% of the earth's surface to 84%. Here Parker endeavors to explain how the West came to control the first 35%, which cannot be explained by the Industrial Revolution, and his explanation is derived from Roberts' original thesis of a military revolution in the 16th century.

Parker accepts but modifies Roberts' general argument that a fundamental change in tactics, accompanied by a stunning growth in army size, the development of complex strategies, and the profound impact of military operations on society led to a military revolution that had deep and lasting consequences. To begin with, Parker suggests that the impact of the military revolution was much slower to develop and much less decisive than Roberts had argued. Thus, where Roberts' revolution is contained in a one hundred year period (1560-1660), Parker sees a revolution that unfolded over a period that began a bit earlier (1500) and took much longer to mature (1800). Next, he sees the rise of modern fortifications, especially the famed trace italienne, as the truly distinguishing characteristic of the revolutionary period, and not the tight drill of handheld firearm weaponry by infantry units as argued by Roberts and brought to perfection by the Swedish army of Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years War. Parker suggests that Roberts over-emphasized the importance of tactical changes in set piece battles, such Breitenfeld (1631) or Lutzen (1632), which occurred in Germany precisely because of the absence of modern trace italienne fortifications. It was the artillery fortifications that drove the rapid expanse in army size and logistical sophistication, Parker argues, and not mobile infantry firepower.

Parker sees a clearly definable progression of military development. First came the maturation of gunpowder artillery, which so clearly obsolesced the high and thin fortification walls of Italy in the French invasion of 1494. Second, in response to the power of siege artillery against classical walls developed to thwart scaling attacks, a new form of fortification was low, thick and oblique in design (not to mention incredible expensive), which diffused all through out the lands of the Hapsburgs in Western Europe and were effective against artillery barrage. Third, the answer to conquering the new "artillery fortresses" was massive manpower to strangle the strongpoint into submission over a long period of time. Fourth, in order to recruit, supply, and pay such forces of unprecedented size required a bureaucratic revolution that ultimately changed the face of governments in Europe and, in Roberts' and Parker's view, led directly to the rise absolutism. Finally, and central to the whole thesis of the book, Parker maintains that the combination of artillery firepower, large armies with an infrastructure to support them, and nearly impregnable artillery fortresses to garrison conquered land combined to serve as the engine of empire in the early days of Western expansion, leading directly to conquest of one-third of the world by dawn of the 19th century.

This book is a great read and a vivid introduction to the topic of the military revolution of the 16th century. I can't remember the last time I read a serious work of history that included so many relevant and useful pictures, diagrams, and maps. It is highly recommended to anyone with an interest in early Modern Europe, military innovation, or western imperialism.

In this well written and concise book, Geoffrey Parker argues that a revolution in European fighting methods in this era transformed Europe and gave Europeans a military advantage over the rest of the world. As a result, by 1800 European powers held substantial empires which they would expand greatly in the eighteen and nineteen hundreds. Parker gives convincing arguments on the advantages of gunpowder weapons, superior European organization, superior European naval power, and the ruthlessness of European warfare compared to that of some opponents. What is less convincing is the emphasis on the Italian trace system of fortifications and the supposedly resulting increase in army size and weakness of smaller states. Good coherent coverage is given to naval warfare and early imperialism, like the Portuguese and Dutch in Indonesia as well as later British success in India. The efforts of non-western powers to adapt to the revolution are also covered, as well as eastern practices of impoundment of goods as a substitute for strong naval power. This book is excellent, but for a fuller view, please also read "The Military Revolution Debate" edited by Clifford Rogers.

Professor Parker has come in for a lot of criticism for this book over the years - see Jeremy Black - A Military Revolution?: Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800 (Studies in European history) - published in 1991, for examples. I remeber having some doubts about it myself when it was first published. Professor Parker noted that being unfamiliar with oriental languages, he had made use of his students to research the chapters on eastern Asian developments. I thought at the time that perhaps he had made to much use of them on the western chapters, also, as in one of them, he made use of a long passage from Jonathan Israel's The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-61, to support his theory on the Trace Italiene. However, I had just read thet book, and remembered that Israel had come to the exact opposite conclusion to Parker.

Some years later, I came across an article in the Mariner's Mirror (volume 82, #3, August 1996) by Professor Parker, entitled "The Dreadnought Revolution of Tudor England" (pp. 269-300), which described the advent of the first 'all-big-gun battleship'. The next article was by N.A.M. Rodger, entitled "The Development of Broadside Gunnery 1450-1650" (pp. 301-324), which to me seemed to take some of the wind out of the sails of the predeeding article. Professor Parker wasn't appearing to have much luck with his theses.

It was only many years after that, that I realised that despite his theories being heavily revised or refuted, what he was succeeding in doing was getting people to do research and dig even deeper into the subject under discussion, to the benefit of research in general and us readers in particular. How mmany good books would not have been launched without Parker (and Roberts before him) prodding at the boundaries?

Jeremy Black - A Military Revolution?: Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800 (Studies in European history) Pages 10-12:
"The battles of the Thirty Years War, unlike some of the famous encounters in the Italian wars, were not generally determined by different tactics and weaponry. Instead their results reflected differing experience and morale and if forces were fairly evenly matched in terms of veterans they were either inconclusive encounters or determined by other factors such as terrain, the availability and employment of reserves and the results of the cavalry encounters on the flanks which, if conclusive, could lead to the victorious cavalry attacking their opponent's infantry in flank or rear, as happened at the Spanish defeat at Rocroi (1643). Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, a German prince who served Sweden in 1630-5 before transferring with the army he had raised to French service, won a number of battles by outmanoeuvring his opponents, outflanking them and attacking them from the rear. At Jankov (1645) the Swedes under Torstensson were initially unable to defeat the Austrian force, which was also about 15,000 strong, but finally won as a result of outmanoeuvring their opponents and attacking them from the rear. The Austrians lost their army, the Swedes benefitted from tactical flexibility of their more experienced force.

Indeed victory commonly went to the larger army and the more experienced force rather than to that which had adopted Dutch-style tactics. At Rocroi there were 24,000 French to 17,000 Spaniards; at the White Mountain (1620) 28,000 in the army of the Catholic League against 21,000 Bohemians and German Protestants; at Nordlingen (1634) 33,000 Catholics to 25,000 Protestants; at Breitenfeld Gustavus Adolphus outnumbered his opponents by 42,000 to 35,000. Breitenfeld was the largest battle, in terms of manpower, of the war and exceptionally so for a conflict in which field armies were rarely more than 30,000 strong and the creation of larger forces posed major logistical problems. Lutzen (1632), where the two forces were about the same, each 19,000 strong, was partly for that reason essentially inconclusive.

The Saxons at Breitenfeld adopted the Dutch tactics of small units deployed in relatively narrow formations, but they broke when the Austrians attacked. Ernest, Count of Mansfeld, a leading anti-Habsburg general of the early years of the war, also adopted Dutch tactics without conspicuous success. Victory tended in general to to larger armies, especially if more experienced, as the Spaniards, Swedes, Weimarians and some of the Austrian and Bavarian units were. Saxe-Weimar rejected the Dutch tactics and in the late 1630s used his heavily cavalry-based army, which was essentially self-sustaining, to fight in an aggressive fashion. Thus, consideration of the battles of the period suggests that Roberts' stress on new infantry tactics is misleading."


James Raymond was a student of professor Black, and as I have noted in my Amazon review of his book Henry VIII's Military Revolution: The Armies of Sixteenth-century Britain and Europe (International Library of Historical Studies), he is acquainted with many people who have published on the subject since this book was written. In his Conclusion, Mr Raymond writes "One cannot escape the relative merits of what one might term the 'evolutionary model' of military development. Throughout the early modern, and indeed medieval, period, continuity appears to be the dominant theme - as opposed to any sudden revolutionary change - in continental military practice. Such a view for the period 1494-1559, was recently endorsed by J. Black who concluded that a "consideration of the warfare of the period suggests that 'military adaption' is a more appropriate term than revolution" (European Warfare, 1494-1660 (Warfare and History)") And Mr Raymond concludes "The military revolution debate, like any other form of historical classification has provided a necessary and thought-provoking framework. However the profusion of alternative interpretations has ensured the concept now bears little resemblance to any reasonable definition of a revolution. It seems fair to conclude that the original notion of an early modern European 'military revolution' is now defunct.

This book is still worth reading today, albeit with caution in places, but the revolution of yesterday has now become evolution in action.

There are already some good reviews, so I will only suggest reading the following books on war in addition to Parker's: a) "War in human civilization" by Azar Gat; b) "War before Civilization. The Myth of the Peaceful Savage", by Lawrence Keeley; c) "How War Began" by Keith F. Otterbein; d) "War and Peace and War: The Rise and Fall of Empires" by Peter Turchin; and e) "War and the Law of Nations: A General History" by Stephen Neff.

This book is useful to help its reader to understand certain aspects of the gunpowder revolution, and it is particularly useful to point out the political effect of the change in military technology.

The book does not give as much tactical detail as one might wish, but it is likely that anyone who wishes to study the subject seriously (and Parker's work is obviously intended for the serious reader)will have a copy of Delbruck, and that will give access to detailed descriptions of certain of the important tactical developments leading up to the introduction of massed gunpowder weapons.

Parker managed to analyze the R.M.A. phenomenon (which still is a controversial issue for many) giving a global perspective. This is one of the big advantages of this book; he is not 'isolated' in the European continent but rather gives us an idea of the R.M.A.'s impact in other cultures and societies. Excellent book for postgraduate students...