4 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
Russia's Press Agent, September 25, 2009
This review is from: The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History (Soviet (Russian) Military Theory and Practice) (Paperback)
David Glantz has read a great number of sources about the Soviet military. His bibliography shows a very wide range of Russian/ex-Soviet sources. But apparently, he never thought critically about them.
One example: the Soviet military boasts that they were creating a doctrine of "deep operations," what the West later dubbed Blitzkrieg, in the 1930s. They claim that they successfully tested this theory in maneuvers during the mid-thirties. But when WWII came, they were unable to carry out such operations, because their communications were almost totally dependent on wire transmission. When the Germans attacked in June, 1941, the Soviet lack of radio was one of their greatest handicaps, especially after German commandos destroyed the wire networks that the Red Army was planning on using. (Communication was lost with the Tenth Army before the attack opened, and NEVER regained. The Germans surrounded the Tenth Army while it was under orders not to fire, and destroyed it.) Questions: Did the Red Army have sufficient radio networks ready to go in the mid-thirties, and then do away with them? Did they use wire communications during the maneuvers that tested deep operations? Did they decide wire communications would be better for "deep operations" than radio? Who made the decision to depend on wire communications? Glantz never raises these issues.
So, if you want a handy summary of Russian/ex-Soviet military propaganda, ('We're great, anything bad that happened was Stalin's fault, we love peace, etc.'), this is a fine book. But if you're not prepared to accept Russian/ex-Soviet claims on the basis of blind faith, find yourself another author.
Not recommended.
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