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Mind: A Brief Introduction (Fundamentals of Philosophy)

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This is a relatively short book by Searle devoted to the philosophy of mind. This book is something of a hybrid. It is intended as a short introduction to the major themes in the philosophy of mind and does contain an introductory material on this topic. It is, however, largely a presentation of Searle's thinking on this topic. Readers familiar with Searle's work will find repetition of ideas he has presented previously, notably his work on consciousness, the Mind-Body problem, and intentionality. These ideas, however, are presented on a background of other approaches to these problems. The core of the book is an explication of the Mind-Body problem and Searle's distinctive approach to this problem. Briefly, Searle claims to have 'solved' this problem, though like many clever solutions to difficult problems, the answer is a less a solution per se than a redefinition that makes the whole situation more tractable to analysis. Searle's central point is that the first person nature of consciousness is not reducible to material events but is part of the natural world in a causal sense. He finds the mind/body dichotomy to be false. As is true of all his work, this book is written clearly, is without a lot of technical language (though readers need to know the meanings of epistemic and ontologic), and he defends his position vigorously. Searle goes on to examine a number of other issues in the philosophy of mind, including intentionality, free will, the nature of self, and perception. One of the most interesting aspects of the book is that Searle highlights certain issues, like the question of free will and the nature of the self, as poorly understood and as targets for future research.
In terms of explicating and defending Searle's point of view, this is an excellent book. It is less good on the historic background and alternative approaches to these questions. I suspect Searle's critics will find his discussion of alternatives unsatisfactory, and I suspect some of these complaints will be justified. In my amateur opinion, for example, I think Searle is not fair in his discussions of Hume's treatment of induction and perceptions. In a book that is supposed to be an introduction for a broad reading public, inadequate presentation of other prespectives is a drawback. There is some bibliography but it is not extensive or annotated. A better guide to further reading would have been worthwhile.

One of my favorite philosophical sayings is from Berkeley: "The philosophers kick up the dust and then complain they cannot see." John Searle is not this kind of philosopher. Rather, he draws on science and common sense to render ostensibly complex issues simple. The central issue of the book is the mind-body problem. He rejects dualism, materialism, epiphenomenological and functionalist approaches, among others. Rather, he argues that the mind is part of nature, a product of biological evolution, and hence part of the physical world. The mind, he says, is simply the operation of the brain from an organizational point higher than the neuron and synapse, the same as we might say that a computer is the operation of electronic devices, viewed at a level higher than the bit and the byte.

How very simple! Why is this pellucid view more acceptable today than a century or a millennium ago? The answer is that modern science has made Searle's answer credible. First, we now can chart the development of mind in animals, and we can be quite certain that many vertebrates are conscious beings. Therefore consciousness and mind are products of biological evolution. Second, modern science is quite at home with the stunning inscrutability of the natural world. Einstein, a Twentieth century scientist with a Nineteenth century aesthetic and morality, never accepted quantum mechanics, considering it just too, too weird. Complexity theory, revealed mathematically and through the power of the computer, allows us to understand the concept of emergence, in which a higher level of complexity supports the emergence of properties that cannot be predicted or analyzed completely from component parts.

It used to be thought that science is reductivist, but now we know that sciences is a dynamic tension between reducing wholes to their parts, and recognizing that at critical points, the whole is a complex, nonlinear, dynamical system that transcends it parts.

If you understand how profoundly weird the laws of nature are, and if you appreciate how stunningly beautiful and unexpected are the products of evolution, then you will have no trouble accepting Searle's thesis. The human mind is an entity of completely, utterly, overarchingly inscrutable functioning. But, for all that, there is no reason to cast mind out of the realm of the physical, into some other mysterious never-never land. This is Searle's message.

All of Searle's positions flow from the above insight. For instance, he resolves the issue of free will vs. determinism by asserting that since mind is part of the physical world, and since physical entities can cause physical events to occur (Searle rejects Humean skepticism concerning causation), then psychological causes are possible, and hence free will is possible, at least at our current level of understanding of mental events.

Searle replaces philosophical questions with scientific questions. If mind is part of physical reality, and if free will is possible, then there must be something radically missing from physics and chemistry, which cannot explain mind. But, of course, physics and chemistry cannot explain life, either in the deepest, most mysterious sense of ontological being, or in the most mundane sense of biological theory. It does not help to know the quantum state of a frog. Similarly, the fact that physics cannot explain consciousness in no way means that mind is something other than part of nature.

The last sentence of the book says it all. "There is just one world; it is the world we all live in, and we need to account for how we exist as part of it."

When Nietzsche said that every great philosophy is the "personal confession" of its author, he pointed to something which many philosophers would rather forget, and some would vehemently deny-the hidden subjectivity of so called rational arguments. If this is a characteristic of great philosophers, then how much more so of thinkers more modest in stature? I preface my review of Searle's book with this comment to point to a general trap in all philosophizing, with Searle's book another example. What are presented as rational arguments are often exemplars of the bewitching power of language, where words like "really" and "actually" slip unnoticed from one meaning to another, or seem to resolve the problem that is at the very core of the issue.

The central conundrum tackled by Searle is the mind-body problem, one which, despite the juggernaut of thinkers who have made their contribution over the centuries, has continued to leave camps divided. Searle argues against the dualist notions of mind and body, and deterministic notions reducing everything to matter. He proposes what he calls "biological naturalism," in which mental events are a higher level manifestation of systemic neurobiological processes. His thoughts regarding the mind-body problem are, I think, the most well laid out and forceful arguments in his book, but in the context of what I said at the beginning of this review, no amount of arm chair thinking, however "rational," can ever give us final answers, can ever solve the great questions of mind-body, free will, perception and causation. Searle's attempt to refute established notions regarding these problems only reinforces the unending back and forth cycling of arguments that typify philosophy, with the problems in question not subject to rational solution. All philosophy can do is bring to light the complexity of the issues, our false paths of thinking, and the errors in underlying assumptions.

Searle is least convincing in his views of causation and perception. He attempts to depose Hume's analysis of causation, and the absence of any "necessary connection" between cause and effect. Calling Hume's analysis "disastrously mistaken," he attempts to establish the existence of necessary connection by appealing to our first person experience of force, as for example, when someone bumps into us. Many of his arguments in his book are of this kind of appeal to common sense experience. I did not find Searle's argument against Hume persuasive-and I use the word "persuasive" in the same sense as that of being persuaded by a salesperson to purchase a car-there is always in philosophy a degree of manipulation in so called rational arguments. At times, Searle can be quite blatant in this regard. In attempting to show the shortcomings of Hume's conception of causation, he provokes the reader with this emotional outburst: "Is that right? Does that sound plausible to you?"

In his chapter on perception, Searle attempts to set right the mistaken thinking of philosophers like Hume and Locke pertaining to our experience of the world in terms of perceiving only sense data, arguing instead for a type of naïve realism. He calls the sense datum theory "hopelessly misconceived" and its arguments "fallacious." In his rejection of the sense datum theory, held by nearly all famous philosophers for the past 350 years, Searle's attitude is peremptory-an attitude that surfaces periodically throughout the book, as he goes against the grain of more generally accepted philosophical views. He bluntly states, "I do not believe they will bear a moment's scrutiny." Despite his self-assured delivery, I found his refutation of the sense datum theory completely unconvincing. One of his arguments against sense datum theory is that those advocating this theory are guilty of a flaw in reasoning, the "genetic fallacy." Searle is misappropriating the genetic fallacy to make his case, mixing up the science of perception with the genesis of a person's belief about what he or she "sees."

Considering his penchant for making rather peremptory statements, his humility regarding the puzzle of free will is refreshing. He concludes: "We really do not know how free will exists in the brain, if it exists at all."

Although Searle's introduction to mind has weaknesses, I recommend his book as a good introduction to those new to thinking about the great problems of philosophy. In chapters on the mind-body, self identity, causation, and free will Searle nicely lays out arguments and counterarguments. Searle writes in a vernacular that is engaging, though at times vague, or leaving too many gaps for the reader to fill in. For the academic philosopher his attempt to dispose of more widely accepted ideas regarding causation or perception provides plenty of grist for the mill.

If you haven't read any Searle, this is a great place to start. If you have read Searle's work, you will not be suprised by what you find here. Searle is back to his old tricks in what is probably one of the most muddled yet thought provoking books I have read in the last year. Searle's writing is crystal clear in the sense that he doesn't use a lot of jargon, and while reading him it is easy to become convinced that his thinking is just as clear. For the life of me I can't seem to decide if Searle is deeply confused or profoundly correct, a reaction that is ubiquitous for those who read him. The old cliche "you either love him or hate him" is particularly apt for Searle, for he writes with such bravado and confidence as to woo you into agreement. If you do not appreciate his style and his prior commitments to the so-called "common sense" approach to philosophy you will probably just feel outraged. Indeed, the essence of his entire philosophical project is the legitemization of our common sense notions about the world. He takes this to be THE purpose of philosophy: so don't expect him to try and refute ideas like relativism and extreme skepticism. Rather he takes our common sense notions about the world to be the starting place rather than a hopeful ending point.

As for the arguments themselves my personal feeling is that Searle is trying to get something from nothing. He introduces odd and spurious-seeming distinctions in order to smooth over conceptual difficulties. He rejects four fundamental assumptions which he says are needlessly plaguing the philosophy of mind but then seems to underhandedly invoke them in strange new ways throughout the work. For instance he wants to abolish the assumption that the mental and physical are distinct, but then goes through great pains to show that the mind cannot be ontologically reduced to the brain! In these and other arguments I am perfectly content to accept that I have probably misunderstood him in some fundamental way. In any event, Searle's work is definitely worth taking the time to read if for no other reason than to disagree with his very original approach to the field.

This book served as my introduction to the mind/body problem, and his introductory material (the first 100 pages or so) was actually quite decent. He explained the issues, gave the differing views on the issues, and was rather comprehensive and fair for the most part. The only complaints I had about that section were (1) that he often gave the reader the bare minimum of information and left the reader to figure out what it meant instead of giving a clear example of what he was saying (the issues he was discussing were ofter very difficult to understand, and I would have to read a section and sit and think about it for five minutes to figure out what exactly he was saying, when he could easily have given examples to significantly speed up the process), and (2) I think he unfairly dismissed dualism without really giving many reasons why it was not correct. I agree that there are significant problems with dualism, but I think his treatment of it was far too brief and not especially fair.

The rest of the book, however, was not so great. The position he takes is called non-reductive physicalism. This means that he thinks the mind is nothing but physical processes but is not reducuble to physical processes. The whole rest of the book is about how this theory explains things like consciousness, free will, etc. The two main problems I had with this part of the book are far more significant than those I had with the first part. They are (1) the failure to adequately explain how a mind which is entirely physical processes can escape being reduced to physical processes, and (2) his section on free will.

The reason he wishes to escape reducing the mind to physical processes is that if we do that we are left with determinism. Everything we think, and thus do, is then reduced to the outcome of physical processes leaving no room for free will. The problem is that Searle offers no legitimate explanation of how we escape reductionism if the mind is "just physical processes" (that is exactlty how Searly says it). Other non-reductive physicalists like Nancy Murphy do go into detailed explanations (which I find unconvincing as well), but Searle just passes it off as plausable then moves on, effectively skirting the issue by changing the topic to how this theory explains mental phenomenon like free will.

The problem with that is that when he gets to free will, he is forced to admit that his system does not seem able to account for free will, so he calls it a mystery and appeals to quantum mechanics. He acknowledges that randomness does not amount to freedom (which many who advocate quantum mechanics as the basis of free will fail to acknowledge, so at least it's a step forward), but he is forced to look there for help because, as he notes, it is the only non-determined field of science we know about. Since he has already decided that nothing non-physical can be a part of our minds, he is left with no choice but a listless appeal to quantum mechanics, though he openly admits he has no idea how this solves anything and that it does not really seem to work. Perhaps this is a good indication that his starting point of physicalism is lacking.

In short, this is a good introduction to the mind/brain topic, but his own ideas about the subject are largely unconvincing and seem to me to be rather lacking in evidence. That said, I would recommend it to anyone wishing to learn about these issues, as the non-redcutive physicalism is a growing position you would do well to know about and understand, and Searle presents the one of the most comprehensive discussions of that position in this book. He also presents an excellent critique of reductionist philosophies of mind, from behaviorism to functionalism to the newer theories about how the mind is to brain as computer program is to hardware.

Overall grade: B

Edit (April 11th): In the few months since I read this book, I have actually come to adopt Searle's position (or something very close to it). A number of other sources played in my "conversion," making me wonder whether this really is a good introduction to the topic or something which should be read after a working knowledge of competing positions is already known. It could be that Searle's position was so radically different than my own that I would have rejected it no matter how it was first presented to me, or it could be that Searle's presentation of it was just not as convincing as the positions of Nancy Murphy and Kevin Corcoran in The Search for the Soul (a survey of four views of the soul [or lack thereof] from a Christian perspective), which played a significant role in my shift of positions.

I enjoyed this book but one has to be discriminating because Searle does a great job with some topics, e.g., the mind-body problem, an interesting but somewhat flawed job on other topics, e.g., the unconscious, and not such a good job with others, e.g., free will. He tends at time to use too much jargon without really explaining the need for it and when he could take a more common sense approach. For someone seriously interested in what philosophy does, this is a very good starter book. Just don't buy into all the arguments.

Published in 2004 John Searle's `Mind' is an instalment in the Oxford University Press Fundamentals of Philosophy Series. Searle, a long time UC Berkley professor is a leading contemporary analytic philosopher with numerous publications in the philosophy of the mind, philosophy of language and social philosophy. I read this text in conjunction with Searle's Philosophy of the Mind course available thru itunes/itunesu/UC Berkley. The lectures are a tremendous complement to the text.

The first part of the book provides an introduction to the modern philosophy of the mind tradition, its key thinkers and ideas. While brief, this overview is outstanding, with his characteristic flair and confidence Searle succinctly dissects the various views, identifying their antecedents, postulates and challenges. For readers new to this subject (this is tagged as an introduction), it is important when approaching a work such as this to be mindful of the author's perspective. While he is an outstanding scholar, Searle, like all commentators, approaches his work with certain presuppositions. These assumptions in turn determine what arguments and evidence are deemed credible and which are dismissed as unconvincing. In this respect, Searle like many analytic philosophers of his generation is a committed naturalist; as a consequence non-naturalistic approaches (idealism, theism, etc.) are not considered to be live options.

In the latter part of the book Searle addresses a range of issues such as, the mind body problem, mental causation and free will. In attempting to dissolve the mind-body problem Searle's propounds a view that he calls `biological naturalism'. A view which despite his denials seems best described as a form of emergent property dualism, wherein, while, reality is a closed physical system higher level/emergent phenomena (e.g. the mental) are not amenable to explanation in reductive physical terms. While such views are popular in contemporary philosophy they are not particularly satisfying, in that it names a phenomenon without providing a viable explanatory mechanism for the phenomenon. That is, how does one state of being (the mental) emerge out of and entirely separate order of being (the material)? Indeed, it could be argued that notions such as emergence appear to be motivated, as much as anything, by the desire to avoid substance dualism and supernaturalism. These small criticisms aside, the text is an engaging read. Many of Searle's asides, such as his critiques of Hume's views on causation and the self are outstanding.

Overall, Mind is an excellent resource for readers interested in the philosophy of the mind. Searle is an outstanding thinker; informed, entertaining and provocative, he has an excellent critical eye and just the right mix of overconfidence, intelligence and wit.

I'm not going to present Searle's thesis (or criticize it) here. That's what the book is for. I will point out how many comments this book has, which discuss its critical points--good evidence that it is wonderfully accessible! If you majored in philosophy, went on to other things, but still have an interest in the field, this is the best book on the Philosophy of Mind you can buy. The same goes for high school students looking to explore the subject. Searle consciously aims his book at "young John Searle," so he presents philosophy clearly without dumbing it down. In my opinion, we of the educated public are not looking for "philosophy of the Matrix" written by nobodies; we're looking for book like this: great ideas aimed at an intelligent audience (think philosophy major graduating seniors at Princeton), written by the leading experts in their fields. Come on, old philosophers...your name and ideas might be circulating in the wider public (outside the APA) long after you are!

John Searle provides what he thinks is a corrective to other introductory works in the philosophy of mind. In traditionally Searlean prose, he guides us through what he sees as the major problems of philosophy of mind, giving a background and providing some solutions of his own to the major problems. The writing style is clear, simple, and concise, which makes the book quite readable and indeed pleasant at many points. It is when you begin to dig beneath the words and extract Searle's arguments that the book falls apart.

In the beginning, we see a rather good explication of Descartes' views on the mind, which lead into contemporary approaches to the subject. This is where the book runs into problems. The first approach other than dualism that Searle considers is behaviorism. Here, he betrays philosophical superficiality by completely ignoring the valuable points made by behaviorists and painting a terrible caricature that barely qualifies as a straw man. As he continues, it becomes obvious that Searle has failed to understand virtually every argument in the history of the philosophy of mind. His treatment of functionalism is terribly vague and while his outline of various anti-functionalist arguments is useful, his characterization of their rebuttals is not.

As the work goes on, we get more into Searle's positive work, which is even more muddled than his critical work. He freely contradicts himself, such as in the chapter on free will, where he goes against one of his core philosophical principles (common sense). There is also his theory of consciousness, in which the brain causes the mind, which is separate and sits on top of the brain, but it is not dualism. Such conceptual muddles plague this book, making it difficult to even make sense of what Searle wants to say.

In the end, the book deserves two stars because it causes violent disagreement and is a suitable starting place for discussions and inquiry. However, anyone reading this book would do well to get another introductory book (I recommend Kim) or a good anthology (I recommend Chalmers) to accompany it, because alone the book is wholly inadequate at mapping the field or providing a positive position. It is probably more valuable as an introduction to John Searle, and someone interested in Searle's philosophy of mind would find this an easy way to get acquainted with his ideas.

I used this book to teach a course in the philosophy of human nature and I loved it. Searle touts his brand of philosophy in this work called "biological naturalism." It is the view that all of our conscious states arise from neurobiological processes. The book is also an introduction to the common problems in philosophy of mind. But you better come prepared for a somewhat technical (in some places) discussion of free will, mental causation and the mind-body problem. As usual, however, Searle is crystal clear in his explanations and arguments. Moreover, he appears to be pretty convincing in his refutations of materialism. This book is informative and a pretty good read.