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Mind, Language, And Society: Philosophy In The Real World (Masterminds)

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In this somewhat informal presentation, philosopher John R. Searle condenses a lifetime-to-date of thought on various issues surrounding the so-called "mind-body" problem.

The solution to this problem, he contends, is to regard mind as a natural phenomenon that depends causally on the brain but also has causal powers of its own (much like such macro-properties of matter as "solidity" and "color"). In this way, he argues, we can do justice to the empirical facts without falling into either of the twin errors "dualism" and "materialism," both of which he ascribes to an inherited philosophical language that is frankly better dispensed with.

He summarizes his views on consciousness and "intentionality," quickly but precisely describing the essential features of mental activity that set it apart from other natural phenomena.

On this foundation, he builds his theories of speech acts and socially-constructed reality, never losing sight of the fact that each of these depends on a "background" of what he calls "external realism" (the view that there is a given reality that exists independently of our minds, which he correctly notes is not really a "view" but the implicit basis on which _all_ "views" are held).

And there are other delights along the way: for example, we are also treated, in summary fashion, to Searle's engagingly straightforward defense of the aforementioned "external realism" (presented more fully in the three closing chapters of his previous work, _The Construction of Social Reality_).

All in all, this highly readable, entertaining, and thought-provoking volume by an eminent modern philosopher succeeds in its aim of restoring, and even somewhat advancing, the ideals of the Enlightenment against a modern/postmodern onslaught of obfuscatory antirealism. It should lead satisfied readers to investigate the rest of his works, to which this volume is a valuable introduction and which they will find equally brilliant: Searle does philosophy as it ought to be done.

About fifteen years ago, Mortimer Adler wrote a slim volume, "Ten Philosophical Mistakes," which received little attention. Adler was deemed not a professional philosopher and was thus summarily dismissed. Moreover, he argued cogently for a return to what in philosophical parlance is know as "naive realism," but all the chic thinkers then, and now, debunk such a world view as archaic and not very interesting. It didn't help, perhaps, that Adler repeatedly appealed to Aristotle and Aquinas to justify his positions - whether these sages have something to contribute or not.

Now comes John Searle, a very professional philosopher and a distinguished professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. He's written a great many books, some of which have been standards in the field of language and psychology throughout the world. He's Oxford trained and is widely respected. And, like Adler, he has a few philosophical mistakes he'd like to clear up. And does so incisively against those who attack the external world, mind, consciousness, intentionality, society, and language with clarity, elegance, style, and wit. Unlike Adler, he applies the Anglo-American style of analytic philosophy, the most rigorous intellectual approach, but one doesn't need to know logic to understand the force of his compelling arguments.

In many ways, this is Searle's best book. Not because it is a detailed examination of every philosophical nuance, but because he brutally demythologizes idealism and all attending -isms that have no foundation, no raison d'etre, no excuse, other than the "will to power" to force _their_ reality onto others. In 161 short pages he turns many philosophical "puzzles" into enigmas of someone else's making, not perplexities we have to live with. It's a refreshing and enjoyable read. I only hope time will bear the fruit of Searle's views on ethics, one field in which he has been curiously silent.

This book is an excellent summation of Searle's thought. The first section is an attack on antirealist (i.e., there are no facts in the world independent of facts we construct with thoughts and language) strains in contemporary intellectual circles that is right on the money. The next section reiterates Searle's position that consciousness is a biological phenomenon and the product of the brain. While I think that Searle avoids ontological issues, his main aim is to do away with the Cartesian (i.e., the mind is a distinct substance from matter) framework that haunts the mind-body debate.

Finally, Searle presents his thoughts on how social and institutional facts (like "money", "points in a ballgame", "marriage", etc.) enter into the world. The conclusion of the book talks about what the role of philosophy is and how philosophy makes progress. That is, Searle explains the importance of philosophy.

As a student of philosophy, I found, first of all, Searle's methodological approach to philosophical analysis and conceptual mapping very helpful. The clarity, rigor, and logical structure that Searle writes with are to be admired. For anyone looking for well-done and well-written philosophy text, this is certainly a book to consult.

Although I am not sympathetic to analytic philosophy and its problems, this book deserves to be read and thought through. Furthermore, even though this book was intended to scratch the surface of conscienceness, language, etc., it is certainly not lacking in rigor.

Finally, Searle has an interesting philosophical tool to analyzing philosophical problems: he attempts to get past the dominant and current categorization of problems (for example, materialism and dualism when talking about the mind and constitution) and form his own way of talking about the problem (and thus forming his own category). I am not sure if the methodological approach is of any help (because it just creates another category). But I will say that his break with the traditional notions of dualism and materialism is helpful and rather thought provoking.

My one question: Even though Searle attempts to get past these traditional categories in thinking about the mind and its structure, I think that, even though he says he does not, he has a prior commitment to a naturalistic worldview. If so, fine. I just wish he was explicit. If not, then what is he?

Great book. Read it and enjoy. Simply put: this is great philosophy and done very well.

In this short, readable book, John Searle gives an account of how minds, language, and social institutions are situated within a material universe. The account goes roughly like this: consciousness is a biological phenomena; conscious minds exhibit intentionality (i.e., the ability to refer to or "fit" the external world); and intentionality allows human minds to create social institutions and vest meaning in words. Searle transcends standard materialist and dualist positions in philosophy. He insists that mental, social, and linguistic phenomena must be explained in natural terms, but he does not try to "reduce" them to other categories or "explain" them out of existence. Along the way, he discusses a variety of issues ranging from realism to philosophical method.

A professor at UC Berkeley, Searle has a genius for cutting to the heart of a philosophical position and keeping his concepts tied to reality and common experience. He also writes so well that it's hard not to be carried along by his argument. At the same time, I never really bought his argument that consciousness is a purely biological category, especially after he conceded that "first person" conscious experiences cannot be reduced to "third person" facts about brains. Nor did I understand his account of how consciouness operates as a "macro" feature of the brain able to cause effects in "micro" features such as neurons. He draws an analogy with an automobile engine, where macro-features such as pistons and spark plugs have causal effects even though everything in the engine obeys the laws of subatomic physics. Unfortunately, the analogy doesn't convince: whatever else consciousness is, it doesn't seem to function like a piston. Searle blames our inability to see the force of his analogy on our cramped intuitions about causation. He doesn't provide any alternative intuitions.

It seems undeniable that conscious experience is constructed by material brains -- anyone who doubts this should read a few clinical essays by Oliver Sacks or A. R. Luria that describe the deformed consciousness of brain-injured patients. However, the mind also exhibits so many non-physical features that fitting it into "nature" may be harder than Searle lets on. The puzzle isn't solved -- just restated -- by insisting, "The mind is OBVIOUSLY real (so materialism is false), the mind is OBVIOUSLY part of the brain (so dualism is false), the mind OBVIOUSLY can cause effects in the brain (so epiphenomenalism is false)," and so forth. Maybe Searle is right that materialism and dualism are outmoded categories. Even so, consciousness is such a peculiar biological phenomenon, and so totally unlike any other process or feature of our bodies, that dualistic philosophies will inevitably emerge to account for it -- and will, in turn, spawn materialistic counter-philosophies aimed at resolving the paradoxes of dualism. The dualism/materialism debate may be sterile, but I doubt that Searle has brought it to an end.

None of these remarks should be taken as serious criticism of "Mind, Language, and Society," which covers a lot of ground beside the mind/body question. In only 150 pages or so, the book summarizes work Searle has published over the years in modern classics such as "The Rediscovery of the Mind," "Intentionality," and "The Construction of Social Reality." In fact, I recall that Searle presented some of this material in undergraduate courses at Berkeley in the late 1970s. Even though Searle doesn't discuss the free will problem or give equal time to opposing positions, his book is first-rate, and I definitely want to read it a second time. Anyone who has already taken a few introductory classes in philosophy and wants to probe deeper into the subject would benefit from reading it.

I'd like to note, first of all, that I didn't find Searle as uncharitable as some of the other reviewers here. He did give a few low blows, but I think his arguments appeared as straw-man's because rather than refute a lot of the other claims, he was integrating them subtly: dropping off parts which were unnecessary and then using the leftovers to create a greater and more encompassing theory. He never goes into depth of why he finds the parts of theories credible that he does, as this book is not intended for deep analysis. The reader must simply take Searle's word for it at times to understand what he is getting at (Searle does provide a nice "Further Reading" section at the end for readers who are more interested in the "why's" behind his arguments).

Which leads me into the content of his book...

This book is a modern introduction to more recent philosophical issues. Searle sums up in the first chapter most of the out-standing problems in the field that remain unsolved from the last few hundred years. These include the mind-body problem, skepticism, realism, and issues relating to consciousness such as binding and intentionality. Searle has an interesting perspective in that he tries to alleviate conflicts by "going behind the issue and merging premises." With this method he finds complete theories that integrate many perspectives that before seemed contradictory.

The writing of this book is not as thick as his other works. Most of his language is quite precise and his arguments are logically spelled out. The analogies are simple for easy understanding; more advanced readers will probably want to contemplate further implications of Searle's ideas than he discusses.

Searle is yet another voice in the last few decades that has shown a tendency towards integration to solve logical issues. This seems to be a trend with many other authors, and might be called the "leading edge" of philosophical thought right now. The book takes the reader from step one, and slowly builds up a view of reality that integrates mind, society, and language exquisitely.

And if you happen to be a proponent of one of the many theories Searle disagrees with, try to be patient, and see where he's going. He does use a condescending tone now and then. But other than that, recommended...

For anyone familiar with contemporary analytical philosophy, they will indubitably recognize the name John Searle. Well known for taking up the Speech Act project started by the late Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin, Searle has found his niche in Mind, Language and Society: a clear and concise presentation that brings complex philosophical issues from the Ivory Tower to the casual reader (the Real World?).

This book is a very good "intermediate" philosophical text for the younger student interested in getting a more in depth look at some the many major problems that have always perplexed philosophers -- skepticism, the mind-body problem, intentionality and consciousness -- but Searle also places these issues into his own philosophical project -- a "re-invention" of enlightenment philosophy and the cartesian theatre of the mind.

I would not recommend, as others have, of using this book as a source for advanced philosophical research. Searle's other texts and papers like *Intentionality* and *Speech Acts* take these discussions a few steps further in thier analytic analysis. Also, the endnoting used in the book is not very practical for those of us who follow footnotes as crucial elements of a discussion.

All in all, however, this book is a excellent achievement of transparent style and presentation.

...I like it anyway. I just really like John Searle's personality. Yes, he's smug, yes, despite being sloppy, yes, almost surely he sets up straw men quite regularly, and yes, he would definitely sneer at anyone who argued with him. If you disagree with Searle, probably you won't like him very much and if you do agree, you should probably be careful to check whether or not you like him because he's convincing or because he's reassuring. I just really like reading his books and articles for their vast power to entertain.

Chapter 1 is essentially an attack on post-modern nonsense. One of the things I love about Searle is that (like Carl Sagan, perhaps) he's interested in bringing down views that he deems preposterous, and can we argue that this isn't at least a little bit fun? One of my favorite books about the post-modern is "Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul De Man" by David Lehman. Next to Lehman, Searle is downright respectful of the opposition...though to be honest I judge Lehman's approach to be far more along the lines of what is deserved. Chapter 2 begins with a similar treatment of those in analytic philosophy who would embrace dualism or materialism. For about 50 pages, he's convincing, indeed moving in spots. Unfortunately, he sets the problem up far better than he "resolves" it. Indeed, for about 15 pages he blathers on about how consciousness is just "a biological phenomenon like any other" (only not like any other), and how once we realize this we won't be troubled by materialism, dualism, the threat of epiphenomenalism etc. I don't think there's an argument there anywhere, and certainly no one could be convinced or more probably even figure out what he means. However he does at least pause to "wrinkle his nose" at any approach that ignores natural selection (most writers on the mind-body problem avoid this entirely, which is almost surely catastrophic for their views), which I applaud. From there it's on to intentionality, social reality, language etc. in a similar vein.

Ultimately, the value of John Searle as a philosopher is not in any arguments he comes up with, but in the fact that his intuitions are extremely good--he almost always comes down on the right side of the fence. In short, he follows his nose, with an uncanny aptitude for finding what's most apt to wrinkle it at. More importantly, he's not afraid to do so, which I for one find damn refreshing.

John Searle has presented brilliantly original basic theories in the philosophy of language, mind, and the nature of institutional reality. This book summarizes this work, and very importantly, shows the interconnections and hierarchical arrangement of his ideas. Those new to Searle should read this as *the* introduction to his work; those familiar with his work will profit from the arrangement of all of his theories into a single, fully integrated, philosophy.

Ever since I read "The Construction of Social Reality" I have admired Searle. Yet, after reading this work I am left with a foul aftertatse that i can't shake off.

Essentially, Searle is presenting a summary package of his overall philosophy and, in doing so, is also writing a sort of "introduction to philosophy" type book, where he will take the reader through the various problems of philosophy. However, he does a disservice to the uniformed reader by seriously underrepresenting his opponent's arguments. I'm not sure if he does this simply because he is writing to a more elementary reader and, thus, feels justified in brushing off the "hard" philosophical positions by using words like "preposterous" to characteristically push them to the periphery, but this is a common tactic in this book. In the very first chapter Searle classifies the "default positions" that the "common man" will undoubtedly take for granted in every day life. These are positions like naive realism, the correspondance view of truth, the referential theory of meaning, etc. He then states that it is his intention to defend these doctrines, which is fine, but he also is very upfront about his presupposition that denying any of these doctrines is obviously absurd. While in the end I'm sure it matters very little, there is still an air of unsportsman-like conduct festering in Searle's writing. Searle should know better than to commit the strawman fallacy, even if he is writing a more elementary text. It can misrepresent some serious challenges that "ought" to be given serious attention to the average reader. After reading Searle's book, one might mistakenly think that these matters are pretty much settled.

It is still an interesting read, but if this is one of your first reads as a student of philosophy I encourage you delve deeper into the issues Searle has addressed.