Customer Reviews

Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation (Representation and Mind)

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This is a must for anyone who's in need of an adequate physicalist metaphysics for the mind. Kim's clarity invites even the not so technically trained young philosopher to consider the puzzles that arise when one is committed to an antireductionist stance on the nature of mentality. Aside from its excellent historical account of the mind-body problem since the Smart-Feigl central-state materialism, I think that the major contribution this book makes is precisely the confrontation of the possibility of us remaining antireductionists and still consistently claim that the mental is real, in the sense of its having autonomous causal potency.

If you believe, as many functionalists do, that mental properties (functional properties) could be understood as second-order properties defined in terms of the causal/nomic relations of its first-order realizers, please read this book!! You'll be surprised by how untidy the metaphysics of functionalism has been since its inception in the late sixties.

Kim once more has shown that his work is here to stay.

This book is great because after a great page you turn and get another, and another.... For the reader, an orgiastic feast of clear, insightful explanations of reductionism, the reigning non-reductive materialism, and dualism. Kim admittedly has no startlingly new theory which he hasn't expressed before, so the book is more of a textbook than a new thesis. But it simply overflows with illuminating presentations of the various aspects of the mind-body problem. And the argument that our only real choices are substance dualism and hardcore reductionism is excellent. Kim, no substance dualist, opts for reductionism. Non-reductive materialist functionalism, property dualism, anomalous monism - all these are either confusions or substance dualism in disguise. It gives us epiphenomenalist property dualists a kick in the rear. CORRECTION: I recently met Kim and asked him whether he was a reductionist, just to make sure. He said that people often misread him that way. Yes, he's saying there is a stark choice between dualism and reductionism, with no "non-reductive materialist" middle ground. But he's a dualist (actually, a property dualist, not a substance dualist).

Kim's proposal about reduction is persuasive. Since Nagelian Model of standard reduction collapsed, philosophers haven't dared to build up a new one. Now we have Kim's functional reduction.

But it is doubtable that his reduction can be applied to the case of consciousness. In his another book (Philosophy of Mind), he said that qualia problem is not captured by materialism and non-reductive materialism must meet the problem of downward causation or causal realism. Thus, he confessed that the two difficult problems are entangled: consciousness and mental causation.

This book can't solve that problem, but I'm expecting his next elaboration.

Anyway, in this book, he achieves new model of reduction through his original arguments! If his model is decisive, he has overcome the problem of functionalism vs. physicalism!

Overall, Kim's arguments are clear and easy to follow. But the debate about "generalization" (chapter 2 & 3) leaves a room for controversy.

Kim shows (not says) 'causation' covers the "mental" and the "non-mental" as well as a pawn covers two pieces in chess.

Kim's proposal about reduction is persuasive. Since Nagelian Model of standard reduction collapsed, most of philosophers haven't dared make one. But now we have Kim's functional reduction.

But it is suspicious that his reduction can be applied to the case of consciousness. He said that qualia problem is not captured by materialism and non-reductive materialism must meet the problem of downward causation or causal realism.(in "Philosophy of Mind" 1996) So, he confessed that he confronted two horns of dilemma.

His latest book(this book) couldn't solve that problem. But I'm expecting his next elaboration.

Anyway, in this book, he achieves new model of reduction through his original arguments! He has overcome the problem of functionalism vs physicalism!

This book amalgamates and contextualizes much of Kim's journal publications within the last twenty years. So, readers expecting something entirely fresh may be a bit disappointed. That being said, this book, or the equivalent articles, is a must for anyone wishing to espouse functionalist second-order properties, or is hunting new ways of maintaining the strict physicalism of the mind. To Kim's credit, significant criticisms have been few and far between, and most share the attitude and thinness of Ned Block's causal drainage argument that if there is no ultimate atom, causal powers seep into minute infinity.

I might add, as somewhat of a disclaimer - just so you don't blame me later - this little book has all the dormitivity of a hand full of Seconals washed down with a bottle of Beefeater. Enjoy.

The tedious more or less standard arguments and discussions about the mind-body problem are fatally flawed on at least three counts: (1) the conceptually highly problematic nature of the "physical world" (see, for example, Galen Strawson's, or Skrbina's latest, or George Greene's books); (2) the equally problematic nature of psychology's supposed "objects of study" (see, for ex., Colin McGinn's latest on subjective "experience", or Sigmund Koch's posthumous study/critique of psychology as a discipline); (3) the confused and confusing concept of "causality" (does one billiard ball hitting a second one "cause" the resulting movement? or does the second ball "cause" a deflection of the first? physics is acausal.). So, given these fundamental limitations, discussing how M&B are (causally?) related when we do not begin to understand the meanings of the principal terms seems downright silly to me.

The reviews of the major positions (the omission of panexperientialism or panpsychism -- not even mentioned -- is notable and in my view inexcusable) are useful, even though at times they use unnecessarily specialized terminology.

The emperor is getting mighty chilly in
his new duds. Anyone who thinks that
restating the obvious dilemmas and repeating
the word 'supervene' on every other page will
advance the discussion of the mind-body
problem has gone soft in the cranium.
Readers desiring a honest hard scientific look at
this problem would do far better by consulting
the number of recent titles - all variations on
'how the brain creates the mind'.