The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (American Academy Studies in Global Security) [Paperback]

Jeffrey Lewis (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0262622025 | ISBN-13: 978-0262622028 | Publication Date: February 23, 2007

In The Minimum Means of Reprisal, Jeffrey Lewis examines China's nuclear and space capabilities and deployment strategies, as well as the Chinese government's stance in arms control negotiations. Lewis finds that Chinese officials hold a "restrained view" about the role of nuclear weapons in national security and maintain a limited nuclear capacity sufficient to deter attack but not large enough for control of these weapons to be compromised.The future of cooperative security arrangements in space will depend largely on the U.S.-Chinese relationship, and Lewis warns that changes in U.S. defense strategy, including the weaponization of space, could signal to China that its capabilities are not sufficient to deter the United States from the use of force. Such a shift could cause China to reconsider its use of restraint in nuclear strategy, further damaging the already weakened arms control regime and increasing the nuclear threat to the United States and the world.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Jeffrey Lewis builds his analysis of the U.S.-China strategic relationship on solid historical data. His theoretically grounded work is certain to spark debate and valuable discussion in the political science and policy communities. A valuable read for anyone interested in security issues, China, and U.S.-China relations."--Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair of the National Security Decision Making Department, Naval War College, and author of *Space As A Strategic Asset*

"*The Minimum Means of Reprisal* reveals the unique nature of the Chinese nuclear philosophy and provides rigorous and convincing evidence on China's approach to nuclear deterrence. Lewis offers a fresh, informative, and valuable perspective on China's nuclear and arms control behaviors. Anyone interested in the US-China relationship should read this book."--Li Bin, Professor and Director of the Arms Control Program at the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University, Beijing

About the Author

Jeffrey Lewis is a Research Fellow at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy's Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland.

Product Details

• Paperback: 282 pages
• Publisher: The MIT Press (February 23, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0262622025
• ISBN-13: 978-0262622028
• Product Dimensions: 8.9 x 6 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12.8 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,352,154 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Interesting analysis of Chinese nuclear posture, June 29, 2007

By 

S. Huntsman - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (American Academy Studies in Global Security) (Paperback)

During the Cuban missile crisis, the US had an order-of-magnitude numerical advantage in nuclear weapons over the USSR. Yet JFK and his close circle felt that there was strategic parity in nuclear weapons. In particular, the USSR had more than what Marshal Nie Rongzhen would term "the minimum means of reprisal".

Lewis argues quite successfully (it is not a hard case to make) that China has based their nuclear (and to a lesser extent strategic) forces with this phrase as a guiding principle: the score or so of ICBMs (and 100+ IRBMs presmably directed at Russia and India) China maintains certainly suggests that is the case. However, the notorious failure of the Xia-class submarine indicates that China has also had some measures of nuclear restraint thrust upon it by the shortcomings of its military-industrial complex. Lewis argues that China could field a larger nuclear force, but has chosen not to, and that the Chinese posture is motivated as much by the party's need for control over strategic forces as by any external factors.

None of this should come as a surprise, but it is still nice to have it all laid out.

The successful test by the Chinese of an antisatellite weapon (evidently after the book went to press, but not before its publication) in January 2007 bears some consideration when reading the book. Lewis goes on at some length about the Chinese efforts to "[prevent] an arms race in outer space", and cites the supposedly rudimentary nature of the Chinese ASAT program to support his arguments in a late chapter. Obviously these arguments have been undermined by the test, but the subtler point Lewis raises here is not: China sees a linkage between missile defenses and ASAT, and rather than attempt a nuclear "sprint to parity", it seems evident that China seeks to work asymmetrically, developing ASAT and information operations techniques with an eye towards (though probably not the present intent of) threatening the space-based component of a US missile defense, along with nuclear C2 and more general C4ISR capabilities. This is completely consistent with stated Chinese defense policy and PLA strategy.

I find that although I like this book, it is unusually difficult for me to find strong praise for it, and easy to find faint praise and minor flaws. The book is not particularly engaging, even for a wonk. It covers the nuclear stuff well, but would have benefited from exploring the linkages between nuclear and other areas more extensively. That said, it does its job efficiently. I would stress again that I do like the book...and simply say that if you have gone in for a penny by reading this entire review, then you should probably go in for a pound and read the book.