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Mipham's Beacon of Certainty: Illuminating the View of Dzogchen, the Great Perfection Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism (Volume II)

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A previous reviewer has pointed out that the introductory text and translation of Mipham's Beacon of Certainty are inaccessible for their use of non-standard terminology, Latin terms and so forth. The author ought to acknowledge these observations gratefully, but as someone who has written a book that is in nearly every respect identical to the one under discussion, I have some idea of what goes into the translation and writing of such a book, and also why in this case the use of Greek- and Latin-based terms and non-standard conventions of translation is desirable, if not absolutely necessary. Two or three comments are in order here.

First of all a "conventional and/or literal translation" of a philosophical term is not automatically the best translation. The early Tibetan translators were well aware of this and created an artificial vocabulary to translate Buddhist terms from Sanskrit into Tibetan -- so artificial that hardly anyone, even the most stalwart Tibetan Geshes and Khenpos, ever reads those old translations. Instead they read Tibetan-authored commentaries on the translated scriptures, which commentaries are highly technical, but nonetheless more readable than the translations. So perhaps Mipham's Beacon of Certainty is overly technical in its approach, but then Mipham's original composition is nothing if not a technical treatise.

If the author of Mipham's Beacon of Certainty had been perfectly literal in his translation of the term "zung-'jug", for example, he might have used "pair-joined" instead of "coalescent". But what makes more sense in plain English: "pair-joined", or "coalescent"? What translation of " 'dra-bcom" more readable: the ungainly, literal "Foe Destroyer" or the elegant Sanskrit term, "Arhat"? And which is more evocative of the Tibetan "ye-shes": the venerable Greek "gnosis", the numbingly commonplace "wisdom", or the rather literal "timeless awareness"?

A solid case could be built for using any of these terms. In the Beacon of Certainty it appears that "gnosis" was chosen because in the philosophical and mystical literature of the West "gnosis" has been used in ways very much analogous to how "ye-shes" is used in Nyingma philosophical commentaries. Perhaps not coincidentally, "ye-shes" translates the Sanskrit "jñana", which is closely cognate to the Greek "gnosis". While "gnosis" and "gnoseology" (the "logic of gnosis") might appear stilted or artificial to the uninquisitive reader, it turns out that the use of these and other Greek- and Latin-based technical terms in the Beacon of Certainty is hardly unwarranted. If Pettit is to be faulted for using Latin and Greek terms, he might as well be faulted for using Sanskrit terms like "samsara" and "nirvana". Those haven't been included in Webster's American Dictionary for as long as the words "coalescent" and "gnosis".

If by using such technical, non-literal or unconventional terms the author has rendered Mipham's Beacon of Certainty less than accessible to some readers, he ought to apologize on that account. However we should not forget that the original Tibetan text of the Beacon of Certainty was not written in a "literal" or "conventional" style. It is a highly technical work that, by Tibetan standards, is highly original in its presentation. Why then shouldn't a translation of a highly technical and original Tibetan treatise also be technical and innovative by English-language standards? A technical philosophical commentary should be translated and commented upon by the standards of technical philosophical commentary. It should not strive to conform to the philosophical and literary standards of Cliff Notes or Reader's Digest.

Most readers of Buddhist philosophical commentaries in English translation cannot expect to go cover-to-cover without also having to consult an excellent English-language dictionary, or without studying the footnotes. Tibetan monk-scholars face a similar challenge when they first study a treatise like the Beacon of Certainty. They cannot make sense of it without the learned commentary of their professor-Khenpos, who serve as interactive encyclopedias.

I would suggest that the inaccessibility of learned studies and translations of Tibetan philosophical commentaries is not necessarily a fault on the translators' part. It might also be the fault of the reader for expecting an intrinsically difficult and profound subject to come in a predigested format. If inaccessibility really is a fault in Pettit's case, then the great Tibetan translators and philosophical commentators are also of fault, because their writings are so technical as to be almost completely inaccessible to the literate Tibetan layman. If Pettit's translation and writing are somewhat inaccessible to the average reader, so are those of Vairotsana, Tsongkhapa, Lonchenpa and Mipham.

I think the same rule applies to reading these authors as to weight training: "No Pain, No Gain". Which sales pitch will you believe: the one that says you can look like Arnold in just fifteen minutes a day, or the one that says you have to bust your behind?

A translation that needs to be studied carefully, and read repeatedly, in order to yield the depth of the original text, may do greater justice to the original than a translation that seems "obvious" the first time through. This would seem especially true in the case of the Beacon of Certainty and its commentary, which are difficult and subtle texts that are memorized, studied and debated for a year or more in Tibetan monastic colleges.

That does not mean that the quintessential points of the Beacon of Certainty cannot be made more accessible for the layman. The Beacon can and should be rendered more accessible, but that I believe is the job of the kind and learned teacher who discourses on the text (which is the traditional way of studying). The translator's job, on the other hand, is to be as faithful and precise as possible regarding the original author's intention.

This study and translation of one of the more advanced texts on madhyamaka in the nyingma school is a welcome relief amid the overabundance of geluk-oriented material on the subject. Written by arguably the most influential philosopher and master practitioner of the last 20 years of nyingma history, the translated text alone makes this a valuable book. Add to that the highly readable analysis and background information, as well as the translation of another, shorter text by Mipham Rinpoche written from a contrasting point of view and you have a very well-rounded read certain to leave you with some enlightening and decidedly nyingma perspectives. Long overdue!

Go for it. If you're thinking of taking the plunge here, go for it.

I won't bother explaining the virtues of Mipham's text, or of the supporting Tibetan materials Pettit supplements it with here. They speak for themselves. (Incidentally, the 19th Century Mipham Rinpoche who wrote the Beacon and plenty of other invaluable texts, including advice on Kalachakra, is reputedly reincarnated as the cheerful marathon-running Saykyong Mipham Rinpoche who teaches in North America. I'd like the chance to meet him.)

Pettit's translation seems to be an issue for some reviewers at amazon. It may be an issue for some. As a serious reader but no academic specialist, I did not find it distracting and I had no trouble following what Pettit was up to with his choices in terms. Also, I found his substantial introductory materials and glosses to be really useful in understanding the philosophical context in which Mipham wrote and taught. The read-it-cover-to-cover strategy reaps its rewards.

A short but very enthusiastic recommendation. Enjoy! Om Vajra Samantabhadra Om!

Translation of Tibetan texts is notoriously difficult, both for the precise nature of some of the technical terms and for some idiosyncracies of the Tibetan language. And within Tibetan literature, two of the most difficult genres to translate are Madhyamaka and Dzogchen. John Pettit here translates a text that is a cross-section of these genres. Many other translators have approached this material and have created texts that are either turgid or so full of literary flights of fancy that the results just do not communicate. John, however, is a good English-language stylist and understands the need to balance readability and precision. Some may object to his choices for certain terms, but that loses the forest for the trees. Although the approach is academic, John has created a very readable book. Mipham's text is terse and in need of unpacking even for Tibetans. That John makes it as intellible as he does, with an intellectual backdrop that is satisfyingly rich and insightful, is a testament to his great skill as a writer and thinker.

This study and translation of one of the more advanced texts on madhyamaka in the nyingma school is a welcome relief amid the overabundance of geluk-oriented material on the subject. Written by arguably the most influential philosopher and master practitioner of the last 20 years of nyingma history, the translated text alone makes this a valuable book. Add to that the highly readable analysis and background information, as well as the translation of another, shorter text by Mipham Rinpoche written from a contrasting point of view and you have a very well-rounded read certain to leave you with some enlightening and decidedly nyingma perspectives. Long overdue!

(Disclaimer: everything said below is based on my limited and biased understanding. Feel free to ignore or criticize.)

At its core Beacon of Certainty is a written polemics addressing most common questions & misconceptions about Emptiness. Here is a bold attempt to recover the implied questions and re-structure the answers to match modern thinking patterns. The original is infinitely more subtle than my crude digest, but this should give you a hint at what this book is about.

1. Q: How to explain emptiness: literally or figuratively?
A: Literally. Although the emptiness can be explained as the virtual existence, explaining that the snake virtually exists is confusing, since it still leaves the mind clinging to the entity called "snake". There's no snake [there's only the rope confused for the snake].
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2. Q: What are the two kinds of emptiness?

A: The two kinds of emptiness are emptiness of self and emptiness of phenomena.
To realize emptiness of I -- aka personal emptiness -- is to abandon instinctive apprehension of the aggregates as "I". This liberates from emotional obscurations.
The other one is phenomenal emptiness -- to realize it liberates from cognitive obscurations.

While working on the two kinds of emptiness it is important to understand that one also needs complete collection of internal and external causes and conditions.
Besides the emptiness, complete cultivation includes: accumulation of good causes, practice of various modes of reasoning, bodhicitta, the conduct based on the bodhicitta, dedication of merit to other beings, training in suchness etc.

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3. Q: Should meditation on emptiness be understood as meditation free of any apprehension (thoughts)?

A: This topic is often misunderstood. Buddha mind is free from apprehension as a result of the great understanding being so complete that it does not require apprehension, but lack of apprehension is not the cause for achieving Buddha mind. Sitting without thoughts is merely the state of a rock.

Other similar misunderstandings:
Some understand emptiness as "there's nothing to attain, so there's no need to work on awakening".
Some say that they already understand personal emptiness -- merely based on their inability to see/catch the mind or the I.

When realization of emptiness is explained as "not apprehending self/phenomena as either existing nor as non existing" it is not to be simply understood as apprehending self/phenomena as having dual appearance e.g. "while it looks like "I" exists but since it can't be nailed down therefore at the same time it does not exist"; Furthermore -- this "neither-not" should not be taken as just another concept for the mind. What is really meant is freedom from the apprehension of forms, deep understanding of relativity of appearances, beyond thought and simplistic expressions like exist/non-exist.

Alright, now that we're done with mistakes let's get to the correct meditation.

The antidote for apprehension of forms is modal apprehension of selflessness (emptiness). First of all you need to understand what selflessness means. Just imagining it is not enough. If you mistake rope for a snake, it does not help to think "there's no snake", but if you see how it does not exist, it disappears. Having understood selflessness through analysis, meditate again and again on it, to uproot the habit of the apprehension of forms to the point of certainty.

But achieving certainty based on the apprehension of nonexistance of self and phenomena is not the ultimate result. Modal apprehension of nonexistence eventually induces the real emptiness - certainty of truthlessness, great relatively w/o apprehension of either form, or emptiness. This emptiness is really worthy of your confidence. But whoever says this can be achieved in an instance and does not require long effort and gradual progress is an idiot.

In short, meditation on emptiness means: Study and reflect, analyze and observe, work in stages, grow accustomed to emptiness. Final meditation on emptiness means state of certainty of this emptiness (in the sense explained above), with nothing else apprehended.

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4. Q: So, in light of the above, is meditation an analytical activity or a trance?

A: Some say analysis obscures true nature of things, but others criticize trance, saying it is just like sleeping.
Actually, meditation needs both.

No analysis -- no certainty. No certainty -- no freedom from obscurations. Need to investigate the nature of things with hundred methods of reasoning. Cutting through emotional and cognitive obscurations, back to primordial purity, requires perfecting the view.

As for the trance aspect, this is the great bliss, clarity, awareness [of the right brain?] made visible through the removal of emotional and cognitive obscurations due to the non-apprehension of self, phenomena, emptiness, existence, non-existence, or any other form, it [non-apprehension] being caused in its turn by the certainty induced by the analysis.

Until certainty is born, one should induce it with exercises and analysis. When certainty is born, one should meditate in that state without analysis. While certainty exists, false conceptuality does not. If certainty is lost, then induce it again through analysis.

Alternate between analysis and certainty. Certainty of emptiness and the mind projecting the forms are mutually exclusive. Finally, when certainty arises by itself, w/o analysis, there's no need to go through analysis again. When you see that rope is not a snake, there's no sense in doing the analysis of the absence of the snake.

As you see, both apprehension and non-apprehension play their parts.

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5: Q: which of the two realities (truths) is more important: ultimate ("emptiness") or deceptive (normal appearance)?
A: Some say emptiness is pure, while appearance is impure. Based on this they say that appearance should be abandoned. Others pretend that appearance is pure, without having understood the inseparability of appearance from emptiness. This is like perfuming a vase full of vomit.
The truth is: there are no two realities. Substance and non-substance are merely relative aspects describing same underlying essence. It is only for beginners they appear as negation and negandum.
In reality there's no evil / no good in samsara or nirvana. Nirvana is not attained by abandoning samsara.

Even when the equality of the two realities is understood there's a room for mistakes. Two typical mistakes are:
1) having understood correct view but not taking advantage of it, still seeing yourself as inferior or superior to somebody, or
2) having understood correct view but being still attached to old habits, to "practice equality" by eating meat, drinking alcohol, accumulating wealth etc.

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6: Q: What is the nature of an object commonly perceived by different observers?
A: Traditional materialistic philosophy, as well as people's instinctive worldview presumes existence of external objects. Various idealistic philosophies presume the primacy of mind. Both fall into extremes.

The key is to understand that different people (and same people at different time) have different perceptions. Common "object" is merely an abstraction of these different perceptions. The perception of each observer (and of the same observer at different times) includes unique elements: observer's perspective, context, preconceptions, obscurations, differences in the capabilities of sensory organs, as well as circumstances when the observation is made etc. The phenomena perceived by the observer cannot be considered in isolation of these other elements, since they may (and often do) radically change the perceived "object". This is the sense in which the statement "subject is not separate from object" is made. From evolutionary perspective, the invention of "object" by the evolving mind is an obvious step since it allows the mind to easily attribute repeating patterns of its perceptions to the common identity of the object. However, the mind tends to assume that these entities are concrete and stable, while in reality they are merely temporary combinations of various factors. This obsession with quasi-stable entities creates all kinds of problems, the most infamous of which is the ego-centrism. As to the question whether there's such thing as "valid" cognition it should be said that although all cognitions are constructed on the bases of perceptions of temporarily combined elements (so in this sense no one cognition is better than any other), however, since there's a case of observer being aware or unaware of the compound nature of objects of perception, there's a sense in which such cognitions can be called "valid" or "invalid" correspondingly.

This topic (inseparability of the basis of appearances from appearances themselves) is just one of many ways to approach the same fundamental truth. Other ways to reason about the nature of reality include:
- the absence of partiality and extremes
- the coalescence of form and emptiness
- objects (and self) nether existing nor non-existing
- nature of causation and freedom of will
- dependent co-arising
- prajna-paramita
etc.
but their all have the same taste and revolve around the same basic idea.

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7: Q: Does Madhyamika have a philosophical position or not?
A: Saying either that it has or that it doesn't have a position would itself be a position. The fruition of the teaching is establishing of inseparability (coalescence) of the two realities (known as "appearance" and "emptiness"). The Great Gnosis of Equipoise, transcends the conceptual mind, therefore it transcends any position, including the notions of appearance, emptiness and even coalescence. However, this Gnosis should not be understood as something only existing theoretically and being impossible to be experienced. Instead, when the practitioner attains certainty free of doubt, this Gnosis appears to such practitioner as the ultimate meaning, beyond all positions, the state of awareness without an object, without any "this" or "that".

While the mere availability of this text in english is certainly extraordinary and invaluable, the translation and writing will obstruct some of its benefit for most readers. The author's reliance on latin terminology, as well as an unwillingness to use conventional and/or literal tranlations of sanskrit and tibetan terms, makes this a difficult read. I would never describe this book as "readable"- just the opposite. As noted in other reviews, there is a wealth of information in the chapters leading up to the translation, but they suffer from the same faults. While I am grateful to Dr. Pettit for publishing this work, I look forward to the release of a new translation.

previous review should say "200 years" NOT "20 years"

thank you, and apologies!