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Hume, Holism, and Miracles (Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion)

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Johnson's bottom line is that insofar as Hume's argument against miracles is persuasive, it's a triumph of rhetoric over reason. What's surprising, in Johnson's view, is just how wide the triumph has been. Nonetheless, Johnson argues convincingly, when Hume and his followers argue that no testimony could ever establish a miracle, they invariably end up begging one question or another. For example, Flew argues that in interpreting the "detritus of the past" -- including reports of miracles -- the "critical historian" must always give priority to the stock of natural laws we take ourselves to have established. The upshot is supposed to be that in any contest between science and history, history is bound to lose. But as Johhson points out, the experimental reports underlying our beliefs about the laws of nature are themselves part of this "detritus of the past." That means our belief in laws of nature depends on our belief that certain historical events have actually occurred -- a belief based on testimony.

Johnson himself accepts that various biblical miracles actually occurred, but one need not be a believer to take his point. And his point is that if we are allowed to take all our knowledge into account (that's the bit about holism), it would be very strange if a purely philosophical argument could show that NO testimony could possibly make it reasonable to believe in a miracle.

When you think about it, this is a rather modest conclusion. It's similar to the conclusion that John Earman arrives at in _Hume's Abject Failure_, though Earman's issues and arguments are more technical. Indeed, one is inclined to apply Hume's own slogan and say that a those who accept the Humean view ought to be conscious of a continuing miracle in their own persons, persuading them to accept something contrary to philosophical good sense, if not to custom and experience.

In this masterful work, David Johnson, philosopher, logician and pedagogue par excellence delivers a coup de grace to Hume's well known argument against miracles and religious testimony. This book offers invaluable insights into the philosophy of religion, philosophy of testimony, probability theory and beyond. A must read for any serious student of philosophy. Johnson's clarity and meticulousness in philosophical method and writing is rare in todays philosophical arena, an arena characterized by the very same ambiguous rhetoric devoid of cogent logic which led David Hume to the abject failures elucidated in this expert analysis.

The author claims that Hume's arguments in his discussion of miracles are circular. I find no merit in them author's claim whatsoever. It is utterly unconvincing. All Hume claimed was that hearsay regarding a miracle's occurrence is weaker evidence than our collective and universal experience to the contrary. His second point is that weaker evidence cannot overthrow stronger.

Hume claims that, given what we know about the world, people don't come back from the dead. Hearsay evidence of a claim to the contrary is weaker evidence than the collective and universal experience of mankind, that people don't come back from the dead. It seems awfully risky to put people to death if they're just going to get right back up after a couple days and come after you. "Dead men tell no tales" is not an old maxim without good reason. The debate over capital punishment would seem somehow less urgent if we could have resurrections at will. Yet Johnson somehow sees Hume's argument as "circular". Hmmmmm. Really? Now how is that again, Mr Johnson? Circular? The universal and collective experience of mankind is that dead is dead. Hearsay to the contrary is meaningless in the face of such. Dracula and zombie undead are fictional, and they are entertaining fictions, but fictions they remain.