Customer Reviews

Modern Strategy

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This book is not light reading. A good background in 20th Century military history as well as Clausewitz is necessary to get the most from this very impressive work. So why bother? What are the uses of Neo-Clausewitzian Strategic Thought?

In the post 9-11 world there is no better way in my opinion to understand the Al Qaida threat. Professor Gray published this work in 1999, but his views and methodology remain as important as ever.

The reason for this is that the grammar of war changes (the ways we fight it, the increasingly complex "elements"), while the nature of war remains the same. Politics and political goals have always been the core reasons for the violent struggle of wills between polities which we call war. That was true in ancient times and remains true today.

Following Clausewitz and Gray I think one could make a very convincing case that Al Qaida is waging war in three forms simultaneously-- guerrilla war, terrorist war and revolutionary war which all put heavy emphasis on the political. With this in mind our MAIN weapon against Al Qaida should be our foreign (political) policy, not an emphasis on high-tech, military responses against obscure targets, the resulting "colateral" destruction only hurting our political policy and playing to the goals of our enemies. Such are the nuances of Clausewitzian strategic thought, far from the "war-as-ideal Mahdi of Mass" strawman usually portrayed by the great strategic theorist's detractors.

Of interest also are Gray's appreciation of the contributions of John R. Boyd, his untangling of the confusion surrounding the term "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and his comments on the little known (or understood) impact of the Second Smuts Report of 1917.

In all this book is a great work in strategic thought of high intellectual merit. Of interest also is a recent article in the Spring issue of Parameters by Gray on Asymmetrical Warfare.

Edit of 23 Feb 08 to add links. This book remains priceless & relevant.

First published in 1999, this is an original tour d-horizon that is essential to any discussion of the theory and practice of conflict in the 21st Century, to include all those discussions of the alleged Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the need for "defense transformation", and the changing nature of civil-military relations.

I am much impressed by this book and the decades of thinking that have gone into it, and will outline below a few of its many signal contributions to the rather important questions of how one must devise and manage national power in an increasingly complex world.

First, the author is quite clear on the point that technology does not a revolution make-nor can technology dominate a national strategy. If anything-and he cites Luttwak, among others, with great regard-an excessive emphasis on technology will be very expensive, susceptible to asymmetric attack, and subversive of other elements of the national strategy that must be managed in harmony. People matter most.

Second, and this is the point that hit me hardest, it is clear that security strategy requires a holistic approach and the rather renaissance capability of managing a multiplicity of capabilities-diplomatic, economic, cultural, military, psychological, information-in a balanced manner and under the over-arching umbrella of a strategy.

Third, and consistent with the second, "war proper" is not exclusively about force of arms, but rather about achieving the national political objective by imposing one's will on another. Those that would skew their net assessments and force structure capabilities toward "real war" writ in their conventional terms are demeaning Clausewitz rather than honoring him.

Fourth, as I contemplate in this and other readings how best to achieve lasting peace and prosperity, I see implicit in all that the author puts forward, but especially in a quote from Donald Kegan, the raw fact that it is not enough for America to have a preponderance of the traditional military and economic power in the world-we must also accept the burden and responsibility of preserving the peace and responding to the complex emergencies around the globe that must inevitably undermine our stability and prosperity at home.

Fifth, it is noteworthy that of all the dimensions of strategy that are brought forward, one-time-is unique for being unimprovable. Use it or lose it. Time is a strategic dimension too little understood and consequently too little valued by Americans in particular and the Western alliance in general.

Sixth, it merits comment that the author, perhaps the greatest authority on Clausewitz in this era, clarifies the fact that the "trinity" is less about people, government, and an army, than about primordial violence, hatred, and enmity (the people); chance and probability on the battlefield, most akin to a game of cards (the army); and instrumental rationality (the government)-and that these are not fixed isolated elements, but interpenetrate one another and interact in changing ways over time and space.

Seventh, the author devotes an entire chapter to "Strategic Culture as Context" and this is most helpful, particularly in so far as it brings forward the weakness of the American strategic culture, notably a pre-disposition to isolationism and to technical solutions in the abstract. Perhaps more importantly, a good strategic culture with inferior weapons can defeat a weak strategic culture with an abundance of technology and economic power.

Eighth, and finally, the author courageously takes on the issue of small wars and other savage violence, seeking to demonstrate that grand strategy applies equally well to the savage criminal and warlord parasites that Ralph Peters has noted are not susceptible to our traditional legal and military conventions. While he does not succeed (and notes in passing that Clausewitz's own largest weakness was a failure to catalogue the enemy and the dialog with the enemy as a major factor in strategic success and failure), the coverage is acceptable in making three key points:

1) small wars and sub-national conflicts are generally not resolved decisively at the irregular level-conventional forces are required at some point;

2) special operations forces have a role to play but lack a strategic context (that is to say, current political and military leaders have no appreciation for the strategic value of special operations forces); and

3) small wars and non-traditional threats-asymmetrical threats-must be taken seriously and co-equally with symmetrical regular conflicts.

At the end of the day, this erudite scholar finds common cause with gutter warrior Ralph Peters and gang-warfare iconoclast Martin Van Crevald by concluding his book with a quote from Alexander Solzhenitsyn: "In the Computer Age we will live by the law of the Stone Age: the man with the bigger club is right. But we pretend this isn't so. We don't notice or even suspect it-why surely our morality progresses together with our civilization."

See also (and also my lists):

The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century
Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations
Security Studies for the 21st Century
War, Peace, and Victory Strategy and Statecraft for The Next Century
Strategy: Process, Content, Context: An International Perspective
War and Peace and War: The Life Cycles of Imperial Nations
Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition
Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (International Series on Materials Science and Technology)
On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War
The Systems View of the World: A Holistic Vision for Our Time (Advances in Systems Theory, Complexity, and the Human Sciences)

This is an outstanding contribution to strategic studies, a comprehensive placing of virtually all theorists and historians of war and strategy, and hugely thought-provoking. Yet Gray never forgets that practice is primary, noting the `authority of practice over theory'.

He uses Clausewitz's method, defining strategy as `the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy': it is about objectives, effects. The nature and function of strategy and war are unchanging, though their characters change constantly. "Every war is both unique yet also similar to other wars." Strategy is in every conflict everywhere.

Tactics, by contrast, is the use of instruments of power in action. Strategy proposes; tactics dispose. "War is not `about' economics, morality, or fighting. Instead, it is about politics."

Strategy's dimension are politics, ethics, military preparations, people, technology, time, war proper. Technological changes alter the character not the nature of war: "Technology is important, but in war and strategy people matter most."

Gray analyses strategy's components, its various environments, land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Seapower, airpower and spacepower function strategically as enabling factors: a war's outcome may be decided by action at sea, in the air or in space, but all conflicts have to be finally resolved on land, where people are.

He illuminates wars from the Punic to the Boer, but focuses mainly on the 20th century's excessive amount of war experience: wars between empires, still all too possible, and wars against nations, opposed by wars for national liberation and independence. He writes, "how truly heroic is Mao's message of eventual success through the conduct of protracted revolutionary warfare." Success can mean just stopping the enemy from winning.

We can check the quality of his approach by assessing the strategic conclusions it generates, despite his overmuch reliance on histories emanating from State Department and Foreign Office. He shows that bombing Germany before defeating the Luftwaffe was a costly error. He proves that the atomic bomb did not defeat Japan in 1945; Japan was already defeated. He praises the Soviet Union's prudent and successful practice of nuclear deterrence.

Colin Gray's "Modern Strategy" is essentially an attempt to update and amend the strategic theory of Clausewitz in response to the developments of the last century and to make his strategic lessons more accessible to modern readers by illuminating its main points in light of 20th century events that those readers are likely to already be familiar with. Gray is unapologetically a Clausewitzian strategist, war must be studied holistically and strategy is the linking of military efforts to deliberate, although not necessarily concrete, political goals.

Gray has undertaken a massive endeavor with this work. Clausewitz himself set out to do the impossible by trying to explain the nature of war, something no single person is likely intellectually capable of understanding, in his seminal work "On War" which was actually a set of notes that was never finished before his pre-mature death let alone sufficiently organized into coherent book form. Picking up from this stepping stone, the brightest shining gem to guide us in strategic affairs we have, Gray tries to continue organizing Clausewitz's thoughts and to account for the additional layers of complexity introduced since his time or ignored by the great man, namely seapower, airpower, electromagnetic warfare, cyberwar, nuclear war, the modern resurgence of irregular warriors versus regular combatants, and spacepower. As such, combined with reading "On War" first, this is probably the best book to ground anyone with an interest in strategy and give them the tools to actually learn strategy from analyzing history using the tenets of Clausewitzian thought spelled out in here. It is also good history of the strategic thoughts and their contribution to the whole of strategic theory of many luminaries since Clausewitz, including figures as diverse as Jomini, Mahan, Ludendorff, Corbett, Smuts, Boyd, and Ralph Peters.

Gray also makes a consistent and persuasive case that the nature of warfare does not change, only it's character. Like the costumes or set pieces changing in different productions of a play, the look and feel may be different but the underlying story is the same. Much of this book represents his fight against modern trends to be allured by the chimerical promises of "new" warfare, i.e. 4th gen or bloodless cyberwar, and the consequential folly of abandoning the lessons of history.

If nothing else Gray is extremely widely read and comprehensive, and there is scarcely a sentence in this book that isn't footnoted. He has certainly done his homework, and after reading it you will be armed with a set of references you can read to bring yourself up to speed with practically any topic in the pantheon of modern war.

My only criticism of this book is that Gray's writing style is dense and repetitive, which of course is not made easier by the complexity and difficulty of his subject. This book is not light or fun reading! It requires a lot of time and patience to get through it, and it will not deliver enlightenment nor free people from being beholden to ideology. But it will give you the strategic tools to analyze history and strategic options more effectively and efficiently, or at least make your ideological case more elegantly.

Recommended for military officers, and especially for defense industry officials and politicians involved in defense.

From what i have read Grey is a very intelligent writer who really has some great nuggets of information but i wish more of his material was original instead of expanding on other's writings so often.