Customer Reviews

Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era)

5 star:		(6)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

This book was written in 1964, distilling the author's decades of counterinsurgency experience in Indochina and Algeria. However, as I was reading it, I found that he could have been speaking about Iraq in present day. In reading this book, a reader can realize exactly where we went wrong in Iraq and what we need to do in order to get it right. Unfortunately the generals still haven't learned from Trinquier's experience or apparently read the book. However, the planned "surge" (being discussed as of January 2007) would be in line with what Trinquier recommends.

I am also reading the Galula book. I find the Trinquier book to be an easier read, and possibly a better book (although Galula gets all the recognition).

Col. Roger Trinquier served in Indochina during and after the Second World War, including the French Indochina war, culminating in the defeat in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu. This book, written subsequent to his later experience in the French Algerian War distills his theories for combating insurgencies. The book, long out-of-print but available on-line (through the US Army, Carlisle Barracks) became de rigeur reading when the US took military action in Central Asia and in Iraq. The book was re-issued by Praeger-Greenwood as part of a series on "classics" of counterinsurgency warfare, along with David Galula's superb monograph.

Trinquier, along with General Paul Aussaresses, both serving under General Massu in Algeria, have been credited with defeating the urban insurgency of the FLN in the so-called, "Battle of Algiers". Because of the currency and acceptability of their views, Aussaresses waas later posted as the French military attache in the US and served from 1960-1969 at Ft. Bragg (10 Special Forces Group). Partially fictionalized portrayals of their methods were cinematically illustrated in the classic film, "Battle of Algiers" and were adopted by the US Government in Viet Nam in the "Phoenix" program and, presumably, in Iraq and Afghanistan by the CIA using "extraordinary rendition"; outsourcing torture, in other words.

Both Trinquier and Aussaresses argue for the use of torture to extract critical information from insurgents/terrorists. Trinquier argues that, once this information has been obtained, the insurgent should be treated as a standard military combattant and receive the usual protections. Trinquier also argued for grouping civilians in "protected" zones, thus depriving the rural guerilla of the "sea" in which he swims (to borrow a phrase from Mao). This approach was also attempted in Viet Nam to considerable criticism in the US press and on campus.

While a convincing argument can (and has been) made for the effectiveness of this approach, no counterinsurgency using these methods has been won, excepting the unique British effort during the Malayan Emergency. Because that war combated a primarily Chinese ethnic guerilla army, isolating the dominant ethnic Malays and judicious application of force balanced with assiduous attention to provision of civilian needs resulted in a "win". Unfortunately, the focus of many unsophisticated readers of these books is on the military/torture aspect and little attention is paid to it's necessary civil accompaniment. Galula's book, on the other hand, achieves a much more balanced and nuanced approach. General Sir Frank Kitson's, "Low Intensity Warfare" (re-issued by Hailer Press) is also worthy of attention, as it illustrates military methods in "first world" insurgencies (Northern Ireland).

Students of terrorism and the military response to it should devote considerable study to the French Algerian War. The OAS (a "terror" group comprised of French-Algerian non-Arabs, fighting to retain Algeria as an integral department of metropolitan France) was spawned from dissident elements of the French Army. The spread of their campaign to European France lead to the collapse of the Fourth Republic, the birth of the Fifth Republic and even the attempt on de Gaulle's life when he realized that the conflict could not be won. Alistair Horne's seminal book (recently reissued by NYRB) is critical to this subject.

In summary, the Ausaresses/Trinquier approach deserves careful study, if only because it is currently a focus of interest in US military circles and has attracted a number of influential advocates. Ausaresses' book in particular ("Services Speciiaux" published by Perrin in France) is particularly worthy of attention and comparison to Galula's work. In absorbing the lessons taught in these monographs, it should be recalled by armchair advocates that, once these methods have been endorsed by the US Government, our captured troops and ancillary personnel can expect treatment in kind. It should also be remembered that wars of this sort are usually lost when domestic "elites" turn to opposition; not when a military victory is in sight.

I was led to this source by the excellent paper on "Intelligence Gathering in a Counterinsurgency" by Captain Daniel J. Smith, U.S. Navy, as posted for public dissemination 15 March 2006. I have pulled the conclusions from that paper, and will be seeking permission to include them in a new book, they are as perfect and holistic as it gets. Capt Sullivan's paper is easily found online.

For a list of the books that I have decided to buy (this is not one of them), see my review and the ten links provided at Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. I had to draw the line someplace, and on balance, believe the wisdom of this book is best acquired second hand, while the penchant for torture and other unethical means is best left behind.

For an alternative perspective on how to win hearts and minds (apart from integrity and morality as core), see:
The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century
Uncomfortable Wars Revisited
The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People
A Power Governments Cannot Suppress
The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)
Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World
Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century
The leadership of civilization building: Administrative and civilization theory, symbolic dialogue, and citizen skills for the 21st century

The various books I offer free online as well as on Amazon could also be helpful. E Veritate Potens.

Trinquier's work on counterinsurgency is simply one of the best practical pieces of literature on defeating an insurgency. Trinquier was part of the Battle of Algiers which was a stunning victory over the FLN, despite the criticism of torture used by the Paras. When reading Trinquier, one benefits from his experience in Indochina where he lead 20,000 maquis successfully against the Viet-minh. He provides step-by-step details for setting up counterinsurgency intelligence networks and controlling the population in an insurgent strongholds. Trinquier has long been read by officers at the Command and General Staff College and School of Advanced Military Studies.

Although this book was written some time ago, it is not out of date. I suggest reading it along with Rupert Smith's book on the Utility of Force.

This should required reading for anyone about to deploy to OEF or OIF. The lessons taught in this book have direct applicability to today and the types of conflicts that we are currently engaged.

Obama & Bush,
better review this old and short classic before leaving the East Coast.

Excellent. Will ask author and introducing scientist for permission to quote.