Customer Reviews

The Mongol Invasions of Japan 1274 and 1281 (Campaign)

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Samurai vs. Mongols...what could be better? If you appreciate the Samurai-centric writing of Dr. Stephen Turnbull, then Osprey Campaign No. 217, The Mongol Invasions of Japan 1274 and 1281, will be another great addition to his historical output on Samurai military history. I've been reading Turnbull now for thirty years, since he wrote Samurai: A Military History. All in all, this is a good volume, solidly written and with new research, although if you've read any of Turnbull's previous works, a good amount of the material is familiar. To his credit, the author provides new information here from recent underwater archaeology that provides insight into the construction and destruction of Mongol warships off Japan (some of which is very interesting) and it is also clear that he made the effort to visit out-of-the-way places like the islands of Iki, Tsushima and Takashima to gather information. While the defeat of the two Mongol invasions has long resided in popular mythology as a result of the divine Kamikaze (divine Wind, i.e. a typhoon), Turnbull takes a hard look at the available data to provide a military appraisal of the campaign. In short, he assesses the first Mongol operation as a two-day raid and the second as undermined by poor planning. Overall, a fine piece of historical research.

The author begins with an unusually long, 13-page introduction that outlines the reasons for the Mongol effort to invade Japan. He also puts it in strategic context that it was essentially a sideshow, while the Mongols' main effort was focused on the defeat of China. Mongol efforts to negotiate with the Japanese - to reduce them to a tributary status - were ignored, which led to preparations for a naval expedition. As the author points out several times, lacking their own naval forces or heritage, the Mongols were forced to employ recently subjugated Korean and Chinese naval forces to invade Japan. His 7-page section on opposing armies also notes a different tactical dynamic that readers accustomed to late-period Samurai armies expect; rather than tactics dominated by sword, the Samurai of the 13th Century preferred the bow and arrow, particularly fired from horseback. Samurai tactics at this point preferred small tactical groups, which were useless against huge blocks of Mongol/Korean infantry armed with spears. The Mongols also enjoyed a one-sided advantage in gunpowder, which they used in exploding bombs (presumably delivered by catapult) and an ability to direct their troops with audible commands delivered by drums. Although the author makes clear that the Japanese held an advantage in man-to-man combat, they were clearly up against an unfamiliar enemy who held important tactical `combat multipliers' that could tip a battle in their favor.

The first invasion, which the author labels as a raid, is covered in 18 pages. Although a lot of details about this operation are obscure due to the paucity of sources, it is clear that the Mongols landed at Hakata Bay in Kyushu, pushed the Japanese back in hard fighting, but then curiously withdrew after a senior Mongol commander was wounded. I'm not sure I agree with Dr. Turnbull's depiction of this operation as a raid, since amphibious raids typically land where the enemy is weak, not where they are waiting with an army. If it was a raiding force, dispersing to strike multiple coastal targets would have been more appropriate than all landing at one spot. Furthermore, the fact that the Mongols went to the effort to capture the off-shore islands of Tsushima and Iki - but then curiously did not garrison them - is odd (I wish the author had addressed this). Based on their actions, it looks more like the Mongols were trying to establish a foothold in Kyushu, to be followed by a larger expedition once they were done with the war in China. Hakata Bay would have given them a nice, fortified bay as a beachhead. Leaving precipitously as they did, one suspects that they took a fair drubbing at the hands of the Samurai.

The second invasion is covered in 35 pages. The author discusses Japan counter-invasion preparations (building defensive walls at Hakata Bay, coast watchers, Buddhist prayers) and the apparent difficulty that the Mongols had in coordinating two separate invasion fleets, one from Korea and one from China. He provides significant detail on the Mongol landing at Hakata Bay and their inability to break through the Japanese defensive wall, as well as the Japanese small boat raids on the Mongol fleet. This section is well done, but it is clear that the limited number of contemporary sources severely restricts what we know about this battle. In the end, the Mongol's can't get a firm foothold ashore and the typhoon wrecks enough of their fleet to force them to abandon the expedition. The Japanese took the typhoon as divine deliverance from their enemy, which eventually grew into a potent nationalistic mythology.

The maps in this volume are good and the 3-D BEV maps are quite attractive. There is no order of battle for either side and the names and backgrounds of most commanders is minimal. As usual, it is clear that the author knows his stuff, which is what makes this volume work - in the hands of a lesser authority it would probably devolve into a speculative mush. The three battle scenes by Richard Hook are decent, but lack the eye-grabbing detail that Peter Dennis provides. Although the author provides a very nice "The Battlefield Today" section, the post-Typhoon denouement is a bit tedious, with various samurai and Buddhist monks arguing about who should get credit for defeating the Mongol invasion. Overall, a good volume.

Stephen Turnbull continues to write excellent books on Japanese military history regarding the samurai period. This book deals with the two Mongolian invasion attempts of Japan during the Kamakura Period. The book is laid out in your typical Osprey Campaign series format but it is amazing how much information is packed into this short book. It is interesting to note the difference style of the two armies and how they fought. Unit formations for the Mongols and individualism of the samurai warriors. The effects of kami kaze storms that scattered the first invasion fleet and destroyed the second invasion fleet is well told here. The maps and illustrations provided in this book proves to be quite helpful and very interesting. They definitely helped with the narrative account written by Stephen Turnbull. The book also went into the aftermath of the invasions that definitely led to the fall of the Japan's Kamakura Regency 52 years later.

Only part I thought was bit lacking was some more background history on behind the Japanese defense plan. From what I read, Kamakura leadership realized that if the invasion was not defeated at the beachhead, their nation would be lost as they may realized that once the Mongol army got a firm beachhead, Japan would not be able to win the land war. Interesting that many German generals in Normandy must have felt the same. It is interesting that the Mongols attacked the same place twice, Hakata instead of finding a more suitable invasion spot. After all, samurai warriors cannot be everywhere. Why the Mongols choose to land right into the tiger's jaw the second time is not explained all that clearly.

But overall, this is a pretty good book on a subject matter rarely bestowing its own book in the English language. Stephen Turnbull has once again written a superlative account that should be a mandatory reading for anyone interested in Japanese military history of the samurai period.