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22 of 23 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Wilderness Power, November 12, 2004
This review is from: Monongahela 1754-55: "Washington's defeat, Braddock's disaster" (Campaign) (Paperback)
René Chartrand's Monongahela 1754-1755, #140 in Osprey's Campaign series, is another excellent volume on the Seven Years War in North America from the French perspective. Chartrand brings his extensive knowledge on the subject, combined with an insightful writing style, to produce a fresh look on how the war started. American readers will find this volume particularly interesting due to the critical role played by young Colonel George Washington. Furthermore, readers will find that the standard succinct descriptions of Braddock's defeat have left out many important details, which Chartrand assiduously fills in.
The initial sections on background to the war, opposing leaders and opposing armies are good, and cover about 20 pages. In the section on opposing plans, Chartrand notes how the French relied on a defensive strategy based on "Wilderness Power" to deny the Ohio River valley to the British. Essentially, the French center of gravity - in modern military parlance - was based upon their close relationship with the local Indian tribes. The limited French military capabilities in the region were enhanced by adoption of local tactics and fast-moving river-borne communications; taken together, the Indian connections and willingness to adapt to local conditions gave the French military "Wilderness Power" that the conventional-minded British lacked. On the other hand, Chartrand points out that the British relied on the doctrine of overwhelming force and the commitment of Braddock's army to western Pennsylvania represented an unprecedented act that was intended to overawe both the French and Indians. Chartrand includes five 2-D maps (Situation in North America 1753-4; French forts in Ohio; Route of Braddock's army; the Monongahela, 9 July 1755; Situation in North America, Fall 1755) and three 3-D maps (Jumonville Glen and Fort Necessity; Monongahela ambush; Monongahela - the rout). The three battle scenes are excellent: Fort Necessity, Braddock's defeat and Washington's rearguard. The 3-D maps utilize the new format, with grid lines and all text sequenced on one side of the page. Chartrand also includes an excellent order of battle, as well as interesting notes and photographs on the sites today.
Chartrand begins his campaign narrative by describing the Jumonville incident and the surrender of Fort Necessity in 1754, both incidents in which Washington was in command and failed. Although the defeat at Fort Necessity was probably inevitable, the Jumonville incident is highly controversial and Chartrand treats this incident carefully (some other authors use this incident to denigrate Washington's integrity). Chartrand covers Braddock's march westward in great detail and it is clear that despite the disastrous tactical outcome, Braddock and his staff were to be commended for the impressive logistic in moving an army with artillery over such terrain. It is also clear that the French had little tactical plan to deal with Braddock's army, but they realized that if he got within artillery range of Fort Duquesne - their main base of operations in the area - that British victory was virtually assured.
As Chartrand interprets the battle that occurred on 9 July 1755 near the Monongahela River, both sides blundered into the fight due to poor reconnaissance. Few other accounts mention that the British even had the better of the initial exchange and killed the French commander at the outset. However, the British were caught in column and the Indians and Canadian militia swarmed down its flanks, ripping into the packed infantry masses with well-aimed fire. In relatively short order, the British unit cohesion began to fall apart as casualties rapidly mounted and what began as a relatively simple ambush soon became a rout. Nearly one-third of the Anglo-American army was killed, with most of the rest wounded. Amazingly, Washington was the only senior officer unwounded and he held together a rearguard that allowed many of the survivors to escape. Although the French won a complete victory, most of their Indian friends quickly went home with their spoils, leaving only a handful of Frenchmen to hold the area. Furthermore, French regular officers began to arrive in Canada and they preferred conventional tactics to the militia's "wilderness tactics." The defeated British had also learned the lesson that more light forces were needed in this type of terrain and started to raise such units for the next effort, which would ultimately be successful. Thus, the French advantage of "Wilderness power" was relatively short-lived.
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7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Balanced, Good Account of Battle, February 12, 2006
This review is from: Monongahela 1754-55: "Washington's defeat, Braddock's disaster" (Campaign) (Paperback)
Written by a Canadian, this is a balanced look at the opening events of the French and Indian War, which sparked a world war. Starting with the French move into western Pennsylvania, Chartrand explains the French-Canadian defense strategy and the British-Colonial response. Washington is sent to take and fortify the forks of the Ohio River, but is pushed out of the forks. He fires on a French diplomatic mission, the Jumonville affair, and the French and Indians then force him to surrender at Ft. Necessity. The British respond in part by sending two regiments to America under Braddock. Braddock's force does no long range scouting and stumbles into an ambush. On the day of the battle, the French and Indian force lacks good recon and nearly crumbled when it first met Braddock's advance guard, but they rally and move along either side of the enemy column, picking off the enemy from behind trees. Trying to fight in lines, and with most of its officers hit, the British-Colonial column panics and flees back across the river, with Washington leading the rear guard. Chartrand gives a good detailed account of the fight, with analysis of the battle and campaign. One of the many interesting sections is the discussion of the British army wagons, and how they were unsuited to conditions in America. Battlefield photos are a regular feature of the Osprey Campaign Series, and this one is no different, even showing interesting views of the forks, and the battlefield, which is now a steel factory!
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11 of 15 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
Poorly researched, November 11, 2007
This review is from: Monongahela 1754-55: "Washington's defeat, Braddock's disaster" (Campaign) (Paperback)
When I saw this book come out, I snatched it up as I try and read everything on the subject in the hopes of gathering some new tidbit to relate to the visitors. With Rene Chartrand's reputation, I was hoping for the best as I volunteer at the Fort Necessity battlefield as an interpreter but was terribly disappointed. Here are a few of my thoughts.
The opening line describing the British commanders has much in it's few words to take exception to. It reads "Captain James McKay, who commanded the first British regular Troops in the Ohio Valley, could barely tolerate Washington's Virginians and was captured at Fort Necessity". First off, his name is spelled Mackay (pronounce MACK-ee). Easy enough detail to miss but this is a book I paid for. It then states that he could barely tolerate the Virginians. I have never read anything that ever suggested this except that Mackay did not make his men do the labor that would require extra pay be given to his men. He might have, had the governor of Virginia provided the funds but they weren't made available during the campaign. Mackay also didn't take orders from a provincial Lieutenant colonel as a royal commission superseded any provincial commission. This was standard for the period and the location. It shouldn't imply that there was contempt. In fact, by the time this was over, Mackay and Washington were good friends. The last part of the sentence is most glaring as Mackay was NOT captured at Fort Necessity, In fact, he accompanied Washington on his return to Cumberland. No one was captured at Fort Necessity. Van Braam and Captain Stobo were taken hostages as part of the capitulation agreement. A fact that Chartrand details on page 40.
The next thing that jumped out at me was refuting the claim of Jumonville for being a spy with this logic. "A drummer named La Batterie was also part of the detachment. This appears to confirm that Jumonville was not leading a war party. A drummer was considered necessary to deliver an ultimatum according to the protocol in force amonst European armies of the time". This one was really interesting since it has been known that Jumonvilles orders from Contrecour contained two objectives. As detailed by Marcel Trudel (note the French name) in his 1952 treatise entitled "The Jumonville Affair", Jumonville was to find out if the English were on French territory and "in that case present a summons to them". Fair enough so far, but the instructions go on to state "before making the summons, to send us a good pair of legs in order to inform us about what he has learned on the day he expects to make the summons". There are two things going on here. He is presenting a summons but only after he reconnoiters the English position and informs his commander back at Fort Duquesne. How can a historian of Chartand's reputation ignore what has been long documented.
Granted, Washington didn't know about the orders until after the engagement but one must understand that the advance Virginian party under Capt Trent had just been forcibly ejected from the forks of the Ohio the previous month. There was a French war party under the command of Captain La Force that had ransacked Christopher Gists plantation just a few miles from Fort Necessity a few days before the Affair with Jumonville. Not to mention the massacre Pickawillany, Ohio in 1752 that surely had an effect on young Washington. Also keep in mind, Washington's own embassy made in December of 1753 to the French. George made this trip in the open and without an armed contingent. True, he did make notes of the fortifications and troop disposition but he didn't skulk in the woods for days in the same place. Chartrand also tried to explain why Jumonville stayed concealed in one place for several days by reason that the weather was bad. This is odd since Washington, Half King and even La Forces own party was able to move around in the same bad weather quite well. Thats like saying that the reason your favorite team lost the game is because the weather was bad, even thought the winning team played in the same weather.
I continued reading. Next the author started describing the action around the fort on July 3rd. Chartrand describes "The French and Indian force was now in the hills overlooking Fort Necessity whose swivel guns opened fire, while a body of 50 Anglo-Americans were sighed to the South in battle formation". First off, the entire garrison that was capable of standing in a battle line were out of the entrenchments. This was roughly 250 men with Captain Kackays 100 strong Independent company on the right.
When I got to the part about Braddock, I was stunned to see the headline calling the battle of Monongahela an ambush. It wasn't an ambush. The two parties bumped into each other. After this, I admit I put the book down and have never bothered to finish the part about Braddock as I didn't see the need.
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