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Monongahela 1754-55: "Washington's defeat, Braddock's disaster" (Campaign)

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René Chartrand's Monongahela 1754-1755, #140 in Osprey's Campaign series, is another excellent volume on the Seven Years War in North America from the French perspective. Chartrand brings his extensive knowledge on the subject, combined with an insightful writing style, to produce a fresh look on how the war started. American readers will find this volume particularly interesting due to the critical role played by young Colonel George Washington. Furthermore, readers will find that the standard succinct descriptions of Braddock's defeat have left out many important details, which Chartrand assiduously fills in.

The initial sections on background to the war, opposing leaders and opposing armies are good, and cover about 20 pages. In the section on opposing plans, Chartrand notes how the French relied on a defensive strategy based on "Wilderness Power" to deny the Ohio River valley to the British. Essentially, the French center of gravity - in modern military parlance - was based upon their close relationship with the local Indian tribes. The limited French military capabilities in the region were enhanced by adoption of local tactics and fast-moving river-borne communications; taken together, the Indian connections and willingness to adapt to local conditions gave the French military "Wilderness Power" that the conventional-minded British lacked. On the other hand, Chartrand points out that the British relied on the doctrine of overwhelming force and the commitment of Braddock's army to western Pennsylvania represented an unprecedented act that was intended to overawe both the French and Indians. Chartrand includes five 2-D maps (Situation in North America 1753-4; French forts in Ohio; Route of Braddock's army; the Monongahela, 9 July 1755; Situation in North America, Fall 1755) and three 3-D maps (Jumonville Glen and Fort Necessity; Monongahela ambush; Monongahela - the rout). The three battle scenes are excellent: Fort Necessity, Braddock's defeat and Washington's rearguard. The 3-D maps utilize the new format, with grid lines and all text sequenced on one side of the page. Chartrand also includes an excellent order of battle, as well as interesting notes and photographs on the sites today.

Chartrand begins his campaign narrative by describing the Jumonville incident and the surrender of Fort Necessity in 1754, both incidents in which Washington was in command and failed. Although the defeat at Fort Necessity was probably inevitable, the Jumonville incident is highly controversial and Chartrand treats this incident carefully (some other authors use this incident to denigrate Washington's integrity). Chartrand covers Braddock's march westward in great detail and it is clear that despite the disastrous tactical outcome, Braddock and his staff were to be commended for the impressive logistic in moving an army with artillery over such terrain. It is also clear that the French had little tactical plan to deal with Braddock's army, but they realized that if he got within artillery range of Fort Duquesne - their main base of operations in the area - that British victory was virtually assured.

As Chartrand interprets the battle that occurred on 9 July 1755 near the Monongahela River, both sides blundered into the fight due to poor reconnaissance. Few other accounts mention that the British even had the better of the initial exchange and killed the French commander at the outset. However, the British were caught in column and the Indians and Canadian militia swarmed down its flanks, ripping into the packed infantry masses with well-aimed fire. In relatively short order, the British unit cohesion began to fall apart as casualties rapidly mounted and what began as a relatively simple ambush soon became a rout. Nearly one-third of the Anglo-American army was killed, with most of the rest wounded. Amazingly, Washington was the only senior officer unwounded and he held together a rearguard that allowed many of the survivors to escape. Although the French won a complete victory, most of their Indian friends quickly went home with their spoils, leaving only a handful of Frenchmen to hold the area. Furthermore, French regular officers began to arrive in Canada and they preferred conventional tactics to the militia's "wilderness tactics." The defeated British had also learned the lesson that more light forces were needed in this type of terrain and started to raise such units for the next effort, which would ultimately be successful. Thus, the French advantage of "Wilderness power" was relatively short-lived.

Written by a Canadian, this is a balanced look at the opening events of the French and Indian War, which sparked a world war. Starting with the French move into western Pennsylvania, Chartrand explains the French-Canadian defense strategy and the British-Colonial response. Washington is sent to take and fortify the forks of the Ohio River, but is pushed out of the forks. He fires on a French diplomatic mission, the Jumonville affair, and the French and Indians then force him to surrender at Ft. Necessity. The British respond in part by sending two regiments to America under Braddock. Braddock's force does no long range scouting and stumbles into an ambush. On the day of the battle, the French and Indian force lacks good recon and nearly crumbled when it first met Braddock's advance guard, but they rally and move along either side of the enemy column, picking off the enemy from behind trees. Trying to fight in lines, and with most of its officers hit, the British-Colonial column panics and flees back across the river, with Washington leading the rear guard. Chartrand gives a good detailed account of the fight, with analysis of the battle and campaign. One of the many interesting sections is the discussion of the British army wagons, and how they were unsuited to conditions in America. Battlefield photos are a regular feature of the Osprey Campaign Series, and this one is no different, even showing interesting views of the forks, and the battlefield, which is now a steel factory!

When I saw this book come out, I snatched it up as I try and read everything on the subject in the hopes of gathering some new tidbit to relate to the visitors. With Rene Chartrand's reputation, I was hoping for the best as I volunteer at the Fort Necessity battlefield as an interpreter but was terribly disappointed. Here are a few of my thoughts.

The opening line describing the British commanders has much in it's few words to take exception to. It reads "Captain James McKay, who commanded the first British regular Troops in the Ohio Valley, could barely tolerate Washington's Virginians and was captured at Fort Necessity". First off, his name is spelled Mackay (pronounce MACK-ee). Easy enough detail to miss but this is a book I paid for. It then states that he could barely tolerate the Virginians. I have never read anything that ever suggested this except that Mackay did not make his men do the labor that would require extra pay be given to his men. He might have, had the governor of Virginia provided the funds but they weren't made available during the campaign. Mackay also didn't take orders from a provincial Lieutenant colonel as a royal commission superseded any provincial commission. This was standard for the period and the location. It shouldn't imply that there was contempt. In fact, by the time this was over, Mackay and Washington were good friends. The last part of the sentence is most glaring as Mackay was NOT captured at Fort Necessity, In fact, he accompanied Washington on his return to Cumberland. No one was captured at Fort Necessity. Van Braam and Captain Stobo were taken hostages as part of the capitulation agreement. A fact that Chartrand details on page 40.

The next thing that jumped out at me was refuting the claim of Jumonville for being a spy with this logic. "A drummer named La Batterie was also part of the detachment. This appears to confirm that Jumonville was not leading a war party. A drummer was considered necessary to deliver an ultimatum according to the protocol in force amonst European armies of the time". This one was really interesting since it has been known that Jumonvilles orders from Contrecour contained two objectives. As detailed by Marcel Trudel (note the French name) in his 1952 treatise entitled "The Jumonville Affair", Jumonville was to find out if the English were on French territory and "in that case present a summons to them". Fair enough so far, but the instructions go on to state "before making the summons, to send us a good pair of legs in order to inform us about what he has learned on the day he expects to make the summons". There are two things going on here. He is presenting a summons but only after he reconnoiters the English position and informs his commander back at Fort Duquesne. How can a historian of Chartand's reputation ignore what has been long documented.

Granted, Washington didn't know about the orders until after the engagement but one must understand that the advance Virginian party under Capt Trent had just been forcibly ejected from the forks of the Ohio the previous month. There was a French war party under the command of Captain La Force that had ransacked Christopher Gists plantation just a few miles from Fort Necessity a few days before the Affair with Jumonville. Not to mention the massacre Pickawillany, Ohio in 1752 that surely had an effect on young Washington. Also keep in mind, Washington's own embassy made in December of 1753 to the French. George made this trip in the open and without an armed contingent. True, he did make notes of the fortifications and troop disposition but he didn't skulk in the woods for days in the same place. Chartrand also tried to explain why Jumonville stayed concealed in one place for several days by reason that the weather was bad. This is odd since Washington, Half King and even La Forces own party was able to move around in the same bad weather quite well. Thats like saying that the reason your favorite team lost the game is because the weather was bad, even thought the winning team played in the same weather.

I continued reading. Next the author started describing the action around the fort on July 3rd. Chartrand describes "The French and Indian force was now in the hills overlooking Fort Necessity whose swivel guns opened fire, while a body of 50 Anglo-Americans were sighed to the South in battle formation". First off, the entire garrison that was capable of standing in a battle line were out of the entrenchments. This was roughly 250 men with Captain Kackays 100 strong Independent company on the right.

When I got to the part about Braddock, I was stunned to see the headline calling the battle of Monongahela an ambush. It wasn't an ambush. The two parties bumped into each other. After this, I admit I put the book down and have never bothered to finish the part about Braddock as I didn't see the need.

Monongahela must go down in history as one of the continent's history's worst military blunders, though not unusual, as General S. Clair was to prove less than half a century later. And British ineptness must be deemd the primary cause.

Gearge Washington and the British learned from their mistakes and went on to win the war. The French failed to learn from their victory and lost, even though to the North, under one oftheir own Generals, they too committed a similar blunder and suffered defeat, which would make another nice book.

Rene Chartrand gives a good build up to the conflict and describes the action quite well. Especially in regards to the blundering of the British in battle. He also describes the forces and their relative strengths and weaknesses well.

However, though he mentions the Indians, he fails to name the tribes, which mars otherwise excellant work.

MONONGAHELA 1754-1755: "WASHINGTON'S DEFEAT, BRADDOCK'S DISASTER"
RENE CHARTRAND
OSPREY PUBLISHING, 2004
QUALITY SOFTCOVER, $19.95, 98 PAGES, PHOTOGRAPHS, MAPS, ILLUSTRATIONS


Rene Chartrand's MONONGAHELA 1754-1755: "WASHINGTON'S DEFEAT, BRADDOCK's DISASTER" is a very good account of Washington's Ohio Expedition of 1754 and Braddock's Expedition of 1755. While it gives the reader a detailed overview of both campaigns (the review by Paul Mackowick is informative), the author leaves out a number of historical points and makes some mistakes. They are listed below:

*Page 16-During this time, the British Army had the practice of individuals "purchasing" an officer's commission. Braddock was a product of this system and he had purchased his colonelcy in 1753. He was appointed commandant as well as acting governor of Gibraltar. Gibraltar was known for its isolation, disease, and cramped quarters. The rank-and-file British soldiers would desert rather than serve on Gibraltar. Braddock had no combat experience and there were hints that Braddock wasn't the obvious or unanimous choice for commanding all British forces in North America (not a plum assignment). He had the reputation of a brute. In spite of this, he was recommended by the Duke of Cumberland and the Earl of Albemarle more for his proven administrative abilities than anything else. After landing in Hampton, Virginia on February 20, 1755, Braddock moves into the Carlyle House in Alexndria, Virginia where on 14 April 1755, he convenes the first successful pan-colonial conference in U.S. history. This conference was a precursor to the Continental Congress that would first meet in 1775. The Congress of Alexandria was held in Braddock's headquarters, the Carlyle House and in attendance were Governors Sharpe of Maryland, DeLancey of New York, Shirley of Massachusetts, Morris of Pennsylvania, and Dinwiddie of Virginia. It was here that Braddock outlined the British strategy in North America and the upcoming campaign of 1755.

*Page 22-Both the 44th and 48th Regiments of Foot were from the Irish Establishment and were hastily brought up to strength by drafting other men from no less than six other regiments. They were still short upon their arrival in the colonies and were authorized to recruit 700 not 300 American colonists.

*Page 49-The author writes nothing about the hardships of the 120 mile march from Alexandria, Virginia to Fort Cumberland, Maryland On May 18, 1755, Braddock was growing frustrated and increasingly despondent over the lack of cattle, food, wagons, horses, and equipment promised by Virginia Governor Dinwiddie. This led Braddock to make the decision to cancel the expedition on 20 May 1755 and return to Alexandria, Virginia if the promised supplies didn't arrive at Fort Cumberland, Maryland. On the morning of 20 May 1755, five Pennsylvania Quakers (so much for being called pacifists by the author) with Benjamin Franklin met Braddock and told him that the colonials had been cutting a road to meet him and deliver a number of wagons loaded with flour, cheese, bacon, and other provisions. There wee a total of 80 wagons of which 11 contained the provisions. This was arranged by Benjamin Franklin and he stated more wagons would follow in the coming days. He was good friends with Braddock. Some of the wagons were of the Conestoga type-these originated in the Conestoga Valley, Pennsylvania. Braddock's expedition was the first time that wheeled vehicles would cross the Appalachian Mountains. The wagons from Virgina could be disassembled and hauled over mountains while the Conestoga wagons had to be emptied and then pushed or pulled up the mountains by men and horses. On the descent, the wagons were controlled by brakes and drag ropes. Braddock would have to travel over 7 ridges of mountains and the march would take 42 days-May 29, 1755 to 9 July 1755. The expedition was to make 2 to 8 miles a day and would stop at 21 encampments in western Maryland and Pennsylvania. Franklin used both guile and greed to secure the necessary number of wagons. Also, there was a problem of Indian recruitment. Governor Glen of South Carolina personally stepped in to prevent a contingent of Catawbas and Cherokees from being sent to Braddock. Glen saw the priority of South Carolina's frontier defense more important than Braddock's need for Native Americans. This left Braddock with only eight Native Americans to use in his campaign against Fort Duquesne.

*Page 50-The author fails to include the four iron naval 12-pounders which were left at Fort Cumberland, Maryland. There were 600 pack horses provided by Pennsylvania not 510.

*Page 51-Braddock's force included 2,500 people not 2,000.

*Page 52-There weren't several sailors but six sailors as well as several Native Americans. Major Russell Chapman's strong vanguard included two fieldpieces.

*Page 54-The map on this page leaves out a number of important points: Halket and the 44th Regiment of Foot departed from Alexandria, Virginia between April 11-26, 1755 while the 48th Regiment of Foot departed from Georgetown on 12 April 1755 and Braddock departed from Georgetown on 20 April 1755. Braddock was diverted to Frederick, Maryland at the request of Governor Sharpe where Washington joins Braddock. From Frederick, Maryland, the 48th Regiment of Foot and Dunbar marched to Conococheague and crossed the Potomac on May 1, 1755 where they arrived at Widow Beringer's (not Widow) on 3 May 1755. The 44th Regiment of Foot arrived at Widow Beringer's also on 3 May 1755 and then marched to Gordon Pott's (not Pott's) while the 48th Regiment of Foot and Dunbar marched on to just outside Winchester and then on to George Pott's. Both Braddock and Washington arrived on 4 May 1755 at Winchester, Virginia and left on 8 May 1755 for George Pott's. Braddock and Washington would later rejoin both the 44th and 48th Regiments of Foot at Fort Cumberland, Maryland on 10 May 1755.

*Page 59-Commandant de Beaujeu's force consisted of 637 Native Americans, 146 Canadian militiamen, and 72 French regulars not 108 as written by the author.

*Page 65-In the hours before battle, and during the early action, Lt. Colonel Gage was guilty of several major blunders. First, whereas early in the day he was given charge of two small field pieces, he left them behind after his men had forded the Monongahela, a decision that prevented them from being used in the first moments of battle. Second, he failed to secure a hill to the right of the line of march, and early in the battle it was captured by the enemy, who used it as a vantage point from which to fire on the British. When the advance guard was attacked, Gage seems to have failed to send a messanger to inform Braddock (who was to the rear, with the main body) of what was happening. Nor does he appear to have attempted to reinforce the flanking parties. These errors probably didn't cause the defeat of Braddock's expedition, but they speak poorly of Gage as a leader in the field. Sir Peter Halket (who commanded the 44th Regiment of Foot) wasn't left in command of the remaining 100 troops, artillery, and baggage in the rear area but quickly rode up after the first volley by Lt. Colonel Gage's grenadiers. A wounded Native American saw him and shot him before Christopher Gist could re-load and kill the Native American. Halket's youngest son James, a lieutenant in the 44th Regiment of Foot, went to his father's aid but was also killed. Both bodies were later found and given full military honors in October, 1758 by Halket's eldest son Francis, the Third Baronet Pitfirrane and a major in the 42nd Highland Regiment. Although Lt. Colonel Gage was unsuccessful in his campaign for the now vacant colonelcy (due to Lt. Orme's accusations of bad leadership) of the 44th Regiment of Foot, he would later raise and command the 80th Regiment of Light Infantry Foot (Gage's Light Infantry) in May, 1758. He was also a good friend of then Colonel George Washington.

*Page 69-A number of casualties among the British officers were from "friendly fire".

*Page 72-Sir Peter Halket's death as written by the author is wrong. See above in remarks on Page 65. Both Daniel Boone and Daniel Morgan were wagoneers in Braddock's rear area.

*Page 74-Lt. Robert Orme, on his exchange into the Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards in September, 1745 and his subsequent lieutenancy in April, 1751, he assumed the title of captain, although it is unclear whether he ever actually attained that rank. Orme's background and what commanded him to the Duke of Cumberland for so intimate a position as ADC to Braddock still remains shrouded in mystery. Orme had a penchant for contentiousness and plotting, which was to prove him a problematic choice. This portrait of Orme, now hangs in the National Gallery in London was done by Sir Joshua Reynolds. It was completed in 1756 but Orme never took possession of the portrait. He subsequently resigned his commission in 1756 and eloped with Audrey Thompson, daughter of Charles Townshend, third Viscount Raynham. This elopement caused a scandal because he was already married and was a father.

*Page 83-Among those killed in Braddock's force was William Shirley, Jr., personal secretary to Braddock and son of then Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts. In light of the casualties suffered by Braddock's force, it was 73% of his total force. This would have been higher if you included the non-combatants. The next highest was the charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War at 71%.


Lt. Colonel Robert A. Lynn, Florida Guard
Orlando, Florida