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24 of 25 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A Welcome Reappraisal, April 20, 2010
This review is from: The Mons Myth: A Reassessment of the Battle (Hardcover)
"The Mons Myth" by Terence Zuber is a welcome addition to the historical literature of the Great War. In reading the book, I wondered, "Why didn't anybody write this book before?" All the sources were there. But only Zuber set out to collect and review them. "Why aren't other historians doing this?" For this reason, I think Zuber is the most significant military historian writing about World War One today. His work seems to have the pattern of digging out obscure (at least in English) sources and presenting a fresh look at what they provide (consider his challenge to the dogma of the Schlieffen Plan as a warplan). However, his polemic, in your face, writing style will prevent him from winning academic awards and acclaim for his work. Those invested in history as written will not appreciate Zuber's work. "The Mons Myth" begins with a survey of sources, both British & German. Zuber looks at German regimental histories in a systematic way to present an account of the Mons and LeCateau very different than presented in British histories. J.E. Edmonds, author of the British official history, called Mons & LeCateau British military victories (Shades of "The Princess Bride," I had always wondered if Edmonds knew what those words meant). Following the opening chapter is a presentation on tactical doctrine and training comparing the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) with the German Army. This chapter will be familiar to readers of Zuber's prior book, "Ardennes 1914 - The Battle of the Frontiers." Then we get to the meat of the work, a thorough description of the German First Army's march through Belgium, and a day-by-day detailed look at the clash of the First Army with the BEF. Zuber presents a telling case: The German Army of 1914 possessed a more mature tactical doctrine than the Belgians, French, or British; and trained it; the German Army of 1914 was better trained than the Belgians, French, or British. The static, linear defense of the BEF at Mons and LeCateau was inadequate in the face of well-applied German combined arms doctrine. Despite my praise for the book, I rate it with only four-stars. I downgrade it due to the maps presented to support the text. I spent too much time searching for locations mentioned in the text, that were not to be found on the maps. However, I found the black and white photographs to be very illustrative of the open ground the German attacks had to cross - they were well worth including, as were the contemporary line sketches showing the German Army in action. I recommend this book. If you have an interest in the Great War, read it.
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14 of 16 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Valuable examination of German tactics, April 23, 2010
This review is from: The Mons Myth: A Reassessment of the Battle (Hardcover)
I'll confine my comments primarily to the author's treatment of German infantry tactics and tacitcal peformance. The author generalises a bit, taking examples from one, or a few units, and making sweeping statements about German effectiveness. For example, he sings the praises of the German "combined arms team" (a jarring modern term) but cooperation between artillery and infantry was, and remained, a problem in the German Army--especially during this phase of the war. Would have liked to see him use a broader selection of sources, as German tactical performance varied widely from unit to unit--especially in 1914. He provides a pretty solid explanation of tactical ideas and procedures from the German perspective. The material used in the first 60 pages cover the topic of German tactics and will be valuable to non-German speakers--the material extracted from the regulations will be a valuable reference as well. Many German writers lamented that the lessons of these regulations were not learned (or accepted) by company-level officers, exactly those who would have to use them in the field in 1914. I believe he has a higher opinion of German tactical prowess than the German had of themselves. There are numerous German inter-war articles detailing the shortcomings of German tactical performance. He's a bit harsh in his judgements, especially of von Kuhl. His rather odd commentary will most likely irritate many readers, but this overlooked, and with some watering down his black and white declarations, a valuable book for describing German tactical doctrine and techniques (especially in English)--read the conclusions with caution.
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5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A detailed analysis of how and why Germany won at Mons and LeCateau, August 23, 2010
This review is from: The Mons Myth: A Reassessment of the Battle (Hardcover)
Professor Zuber grew up as an US Army Infantry officer, spending most of his time in Germany. For a military history buff, soon to be military history professor, he had access to the battlefields. Europe is great that way. He could walk the terrain and stand on the ground. He also had access to the portions of the German military archives that survived WW-II. The latter is invaluable, as the earlier histories either didn't know the work existed or ignored it. As a grunt, he understands how the infantry, of any era, operates. This is something often missing in military history and analysis. Germany had been training for a Continental war since the late 1800s, and made training into a near fetish. MAJ Zuber analyzes the German training based on German training manuals and orders, and shows how it applied to Mons and LeCateau. He analyzed how the training worked in the field and how the British failed to appreciate how the Germans fought. Mons could never have won the war, nor lose it for either side, but it was Britain's first battle of WW-I. They desperately needed a victory, yet even they admit the Germans achieved all their tactical objectives and drove the British from the field. The British victory was created through a need for a morale building success and the misinterpretation of German tactics and combat techniques. And wishful thinking. Zuber shows how the British, largely through command ineptitude, wasted countless lives through unpreparedness and inability to control their own operations. This, incidentally, was a problem that continued through 1916. He shows, from German casualty records and operational histories, that the British story of vast German casualties and human wave attacks did not and could not occur. The British soldier was an admirable rifleman, just ask the Germans, but he was no superman, and improperly led, he could not prevail. The Germans don't escape MAJ Zuber's pen. He shows how serious, unforced command decisions cost Germany an even greater victory. The book is charmingly illustrated with sketches of German infantry, similar to the cover art. You just can't find stuff like that, anywhere else. This is a detailed analysis, following the operations at battalion and sometimes down to platoon level on an almost hour-by-hour level. Not something to curl up before the fire with, but requiring attention and study, The Mons Myth provides a detailed study of the battle not available anywhere else.
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