Customer Reviews

The Mons Myth: A Reassessment of the Battle

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"The Mons Myth" by Terence Zuber is a welcome addition to the historical literature of the Great War. In reading the book, I wondered, "Why didn't anybody write this book before?" All the sources were there. But only Zuber set out to collect and review them. "Why aren't other historians doing this?"

For this reason, I think Zuber is the most significant military historian writing about World War One today. His work seems to have the pattern of digging out obscure (at least in English) sources and presenting a fresh look at what they provide (consider his challenge to the dogma of the Schlieffen Plan as a warplan). However, his polemic, in your face, writing style will prevent him from winning academic awards and acclaim for his work. Those invested in history as written will not appreciate Zuber's work.

"The Mons Myth" begins with a survey of sources, both British & German. Zuber looks at German regimental histories in a systematic way to present an account of the Mons and LeCateau very different than presented in British histories. J.E. Edmonds, author of the British official history, called Mons & LeCateau British military victories (Shades of "The Princess Bride," I had always wondered if Edmonds knew what those words meant).

Following the opening chapter is a presentation on tactical doctrine and training comparing the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) with the German Army. This chapter will be familiar to readers of Zuber's prior book, "Ardennes 1914 - The Battle of the Frontiers."

Then we get to the meat of the work, a thorough description of the German First Army's march through Belgium, and a day-by-day detailed look at the clash of the First Army with the BEF. Zuber presents a telling case: The German Army of 1914 possessed a more mature tactical doctrine than the Belgians, French, or British; and trained it; the German Army of 1914 was better trained than the Belgians, French, or British. The static, linear defense of the BEF at Mons and LeCateau was inadequate in the face of well-applied German combined arms doctrine.

Despite my praise for the book, I rate it with only four-stars. I downgrade it due to the maps presented to support the text. I spent too much time searching for locations mentioned in the text, that were not to be found on the maps. However, I found the black and white photographs to be very illustrative of the open ground the German attacks had to cross - they were well worth including, as were the contemporary line sketches showing the German Army in action.

I recommend this book. If you have an interest in the Great War, read it.

I'll confine my comments primarily to the author's treatment of German infantry tactics and tacitcal peformance.

The author generalises a bit, taking examples from one, or a few units, and making sweeping statements about German effectiveness. For example, he sings the praises of the German "combined arms team" (a jarring modern term) but cooperation between artillery and infantry was, and remained, a problem in the German Army--especially during this phase of the war. Would have liked to see him use a broader selection of sources, as German tactical performance varied widely from unit to unit--especially in 1914.

He provides a pretty solid explanation of tactical ideas and procedures from the German perspective. The material used in the first 60 pages cover the topic of German tactics and will be valuable to non-German speakers--the material extracted from the regulations will be a valuable reference as well. Many German writers lamented that the lessons of these regulations were not learned (or accepted) by company-level officers, exactly those who would have to use them in the field in 1914.

I believe he has a higher opinion of German tactical prowess than the German had of themselves. There are numerous German inter-war articles detailing the shortcomings of German tactical performance. He's a bit harsh in his judgements, especially of von Kuhl.

His rather odd commentary will most likely irritate many readers, but this overlooked, and with some watering down his black and white declarations, a valuable book for describing German tactical doctrine and techniques (especially in English)--read the conclusions with caution.

Professor Zuber grew up as an US Army Infantry officer, spending most of his time in Germany. For a military history buff, soon to be military history professor, he had access to the battlefields. Europe is great that way. He could walk the terrain and stand on the ground. He also had access to the portions of the German military archives that survived WW-II. The latter is invaluable, as the earlier histories either didn't know the work existed or ignored it. As a grunt, he understands how the infantry, of any era, operates. This is something often missing in military history and analysis.

Germany had been training for a Continental war since the late 1800s, and made training into a near fetish. MAJ Zuber analyzes the German training based on German training manuals and orders, and shows how it applied to Mons and LeCateau. He analyzed how the training worked in the field and how the British failed to appreciate how the Germans fought.

Mons could never have won the war, nor lose it for either side, but it was Britain's first battle of WW-I. They desperately needed a victory, yet even they admit the Germans achieved all their tactical objectives and drove the British from the field. The British victory was created through a need for a morale building success and the misinterpretation of German tactics and combat techniques. And wishful thinking.

Zuber shows how the British, largely through command ineptitude, wasted countless lives through unpreparedness and inability to control their own operations. This, incidentally, was a problem that continued through 1916. He shows, from German casualty records and operational histories, that the British story of vast German casualties and human wave attacks did not and could not occur. The British soldier was an admirable rifleman, just ask the Germans, but he was no superman, and improperly led, he could not prevail.

The Germans don't escape MAJ Zuber's pen. He shows how serious, unforced command decisions cost Germany an even greater victory.

The book is charmingly illustrated with sketches of German infantry, similar to the cover art. You just can't find stuff like that, anywhere else.

This is a detailed analysis, following the operations at battalion and sometimes down to platoon level on an almost hour-by-hour level. Not something to curl up before the fire with, but requiring attention and study, The Mons Myth provides a detailed study of the battle not available anywhere else.

Zuber's book is a bit dry - and I love detailed histories - but his research into the actual casualties and the impact of forces engaged shows that the post-war British assertions do not add up. One review criticizes Zuber for not detailing the Rape of Belgium. Fair enough. Zuber's work does, however, cast real doubt on the canard of "the Germans thought that the BEF was all machine guns" myth that was first promulgated in an unsourced assertion in the British official history. In some times numbing detail, Zuber demonstrates that at Mons the forces engaged were roughly equal - as were the casualties. At Le Cateau the British out numbered the Germans but were soundly beaten. In tandem with his book on the Ardennes battles, Zuber shows that the French inflicted as many casualties on the Germans as did the vaunted BEF. The British tactical triumph was as much a patriotic myth as were the archers of Agincourt/Angel of Mons stories. Fortuntely, however, German tactical expertise and flexibility were undone by unforced errors in German generalship. As with 1918, tactical superiority could not make up for strategic incompetence. Something the Germans never learned. So, well worth the read, if a bit dry.

Colonel DuPuy in his excellent book, "Numbers, Predictions & War" gives the average advance rate of the German Army in the 1914 Marne Campaign as 20 kilometers per day. A considerable achievement by a horse drawn and foot driven army. In contrast, the Normandy Breakout averaged 28 kilometers per day--and this was a fully mechanized army. Comparing other advance rates in Colonel DuPuy' book, one can readily see that a 20 kilometers per day advance rate (or 28 kilometers per day at Normandy) is excellent military performance.

Herbert Sulzbach in his excellent book "With the German Guns" (1914-1918) often mentions combined tactics (artillery, infantry, motorized, air). In fact, he attended schools during that war to learn these tactics. The book is written in diary form, and one could probably pinpoint the date combined arms came to be for the German Army, certainly it was in the 1914-1918 time frame.

Mr. Zuber, the perennial bad boy of WW 1 History has fashioned yet another ill thought treatise on the War.
Mr. Zuber claims to have read the available histories of German units still extant after the destruction of the Potsdam Archives by the British in 1945.

Based on his stated source material, that is not correct. Mr. Zuber, for whatever reason, fails to include the archival material available from the former East Germany and returned to Germany by the Russian Government in the mid-1990s.
The relevant documents can be found at Freiburg in the BA-MA collection. They are catalogued as Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsansalt des Heeres, Teil 1 and Teil 2.

One of the more egregious portions of his book is the section relating to Franc-Tireur (pp. 86-89). He excuses German atrocities perpetrated on Belgian civilians because Belgian civilians fired upon the German troops.
He is apparently unaware or chooses not to divulge the massacre of 625 innocents at Dinant and this is just the tip of the iceberg.

Mr. Zuber casts scorn upon two books that document the atrocities perpetrated by the German Army, namely Horne and Kramer German Atrocities and Zuckerman's The Rape of Belgium.

Mr. Zuber ignores the ground breaking work of Jeff Lipkes and his book Rehearsals, which documents the bestial behavior of the German army in Belgium in 1914.

Interestingly Mr.Zuber bases his argument concerning the relationship of combatants to non-combatants on the Geneva Conventions. What he meant to say was that the Hague Conventions defined the conduct of war.

The Geneva Conventions comprise four treaties and three additional protocols that set the standards in international law for humanitarian treatment of the victims of war. The singular term Geneva Convention refers to the agreements of 1949, negotiated in the aftermath of World War II, updating the terms of the first three treaties and adding a fourth treaty

The Hague Conventions were two international treaties negotiated at international peace conferences at The Hague in the Netherlands: The First Hague Conference in 1899 and the Second Hague Conference in 1907. Along with the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions were among the first formal statements of the laws of war and war crimes in the nascent body of secular international law. A third conference was planned for 1914 and later rescheduled for 1915, but never took place due to the start of World War I

Mr. Zuber also casts aspersions upon leading academics associated with WW 1. On pages 85 and 86, he castigates Annika Mombauer because of her absurd assertions in the Journal of Strategic Studies. The Journal is refereed yet Mr. Zuber attacks not only the author but both the editor and the referees.

A note is required regarding the buildup of German troops on the border with Belgium in August 1914.
Mr. Zuber forgets the contribution of the Vennbaum. The Vennbaum was a rural railway system stretching south from Aachen and capable of massive troop movements.

The stations and tracks were constructed such that trains moving east to west looped around the station after depositing their troops. They then crossed a switch and headed back east to entrain more soldiers.

In the early days of August 1914, numerous troop trains had deposited their troops on the Belgian border.

Mr. Zuber uses numerous German Unit Histories. Are they to be taken at face value? I think not
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Another point that Mr. Zuber makes is that the Germans did not confuse British rapid fire with machine guns.

The British Army of 1914 prided itself on its ability to deliver 15 rounds per man per minute. A normal battalion in 1914 comprised 800 souls. Therefore, the rate of fire would be 12,000 rounds per minute and the equivalent of 27 Maxims firing at a rate of 450 rpm.

One has to remember that both Mons and Le Cateau (as an aside Wilfred Owen is buried there. A 1918 casualty) were delaying actions. The BEF trying to survive and they achieved their goal.

There are two books that come to mind that provide insight into the German and British method of war making.
The first is The Kaiser's Army by Eric Brose and the second is Command or Control by Martin Samuels.

Neither book is Anglo-centric: however, both provide a balanced assessment of German and British tactical doctrine. Samuel's book is quite negative regarding the British tactical doctrine and closely follows Capt. Wynne's assessment published in 1939 after consideral expurgation. The unexpurgated version is now available in book form.

A note of caution: Mr. Zuber presents German military training to be a single entity applied to all German forces. This is simply not true. Corps commanders were responsible for training. Some followed the directives of the General Staff and some did not. Some supported mass attacks and some did not.
Mr. Zuber fails to differentiate.

It has to be remembered that prior to War, the General Staff did not have operational control of any unit. They could recommend but not order.

Having monitored Mr. Zuber's writings in Historical Journals, the same ones whose veracity he questions, since he first began publishing, it is clear that Mr. Zuber relishes the role of the outcast: The one who holds the truth that no one else is privy to.

One final note that I believe must be addressed and that is the portfolio that Mr. Zuber brings to the table.
Mr. Zuber claims on his website [...] that he alone, because of his 20 years experience in the US Army, is capable of accurately assessing the tactical situation on the Western Front 1914 as well as the buildup and deployment of those forces. He is in turn an expert on what happened in Belgium in 1914.

Mr. Zuber has by definition excluded excellent historians such as John Keegan, Martin Samuels and Eric Brose to name a few.
So we are left with the all-knowing TERENCE.

When Terence Zuber purports to be so knowledgeable, one must look closely at Terence's background.
After 20 years of service, Terence Zuber retired with the rank of Major in the US Army. The question arises as to why Terence retired as a Major with a PhD in History.

Was Terence past over three times for promotion to Lt. Colonel or did he simply opt to retire after 20 years? I don't know the answer, but an answer interesting to know.

Best regards,

James