3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Not bad, needs editing, June 1, 2011
This review is from: Montgomery: Lessons in Leadership from the Soldier's General (World Generals) (Hardcover)
This is a fairly decent introduction to Field Marshall Viscount Montgomery. There is a good deal of information in its 185 pages, and although one could have wished for more detail about Monty's experiences in the Great War, the greater part of the story must of course concern WWII, and therein author does attempt to balance the extremes of British Monty-worship and American Monty-bashing.
Monty's generalship - and character - continue to be controversial, perhaps most particularly in regard to Operation Market-Garden (his brain-child), and the Battle of the Bulge. As to the former, the author judiciously distributes blame for this grand failure between Monty's uncharacteristically risk-laden concept, Gen. Browning's staff work, Gen. Horrock's tactical leadership, and Supreme Commander Eisenhower's approval of the whole bloody thing, against his own stated preference for a broad-front strategy. I do wonder if the author is rather too stern on XXX Corps on the ground (where, I ask, was their tactical air support?) and also on the Red Devils themselves at Arnhem - I have never been dropped on top of an SS Panzer division, but I cannot imagine it to be a very pleasant experience.
As for the "Bulge", the author inexplicably refrains from quoting Monty's actual remarks at the infamous press-conference after the battle. The spectacle of Monty ostensibly taking credit for turning the tide, winning the battle, and saving the US Army, certainly should be the high-(or low-)light in any account of the rivalries and jealousies that riddled the Allied high command. More seriously, one wonders if a truly objective, impartial, and comprehensive account of the Battle, that treats of the British role with neither dismissal nor exaggeration, is even possible? One senses the possibility here, not quite realised.
The text, though mostly well written, is hindered by certain factual and editorial glitches, of which the following were most striking:
p38: "Hitler had come to power in Germany in 1934..." Twas 1933, actually.
p74: Churchill is quoted as saying that the battle of El Alamein marked the beginning of the end. What he actually said was "it is not the end, it is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning."
p106: in discussing the question of who would lead the June 1944 Normandy landings, we are told that Churchill preferred General Alexander for the role "as late as January 1945", which makes little sense and presumably should read January 1944.
p108: an entire passage "the plan called for an invasion force...success would depend...destroy their road and rail..." is repeated virtually verbatim on the very next page, needlessly so.
p150: Bastogne is referred to as "the beleaguered town" twice in he same paragraph - a petty peeve, perhaps, but one any teacher would red-line.
p152 "In early January, at the beginning of 1945..." I would be interested to know of a year in which January did not occur at the beginning.
Finally, the author sees fit to employ, near the end of the book, two bits of German terminology: "schwerpunkt" and "materielschlacht", without bothering to provide any definition. Certainly in a work aimed at the non-specialist, such seemingly gratuitous inclusion of foreign military jargon begs justification. (A schwerpunkt is the point of most forceful thrust of an attack; materielschlacht refers to the "battle of supply" which must be attended to as well as the actual combat aspect of a military operation or campaign.)
Withal, not entirely unworthy of the relatively short time it took to read.
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