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Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery

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I was an American History major in college and have been a WWII buff since the '50s first reading "Life's Picture History of WWII" at age 7 when it was published in 1950. I have read constantly and voraciously about the war since then. I've read biographies of FDR, Churchill, Marshall, Brooke, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, Stillwell and King, among others. Most of my reading has been by American authors and most have denigrated Montgomery. I have not read this condensed version of Montgomery's life but have read the first two volumes of the set by the author. It has been an eye-opening experience for me. I find the author to be extremely fair, so far (I have the last volume on order and am eager to read the author's take on th '44 to the end of the war given my knowledge of Arnhem, and the Antwerp estuaries which have always been Montgomery's two biggest blunders in my eyes.)

Having read other accounts of the Normandy invasion I found it eye-opening that the invasion was truly Montgomery's brainchild. He stepped in after the allies piddled around with an inadequate and unrealistic plan and applied his considerable knowledge and experience as the only truly successful allied general.The author is not at all hesitant to point out Montgomery's failings, which, as a person were considerable . However, Montgomery as a tactician, strategist and commander of the allied forces up to and through the Normandy landings was brilliant. American authors and Generals have criticized him and tried to puff up the American players but the Americans were inexperienced amateurs with truly inflated senses of their own competence. This is especially true given their lack or minimal amount of combat experience. The great Marshall felt that America should have immediately invaded Europe and felt hood-winked by the British who kept putting it off. However, had the Americans not gotten experience, the hard way, through their blundering in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, an early invasion would have been a catastrophe. Eisenhower, in particular, lacked combat experience and had an exaggerated sense of his own battle abilities. Witness the fiasco of planning for the invasions of Sicily and Italy. The Ardennes, Huertgen Forest and Patton's set battles, such as Metz, are further examples of American military leadership's overconfidence and arrogance.

Montgomery put his experience as the only successful allied commander into use by revamping and organizing the floundering Normandy invasion preparation. His strategic vision was perfect and his dedication to that vision against the vacillation of Eisenhower, Churchill and others and the plotting of rivals was exemplary and the reason for the success of the invasion. As Americans, our propaganda machinery has downplayed the Commonwealth effort, has glorified the American effort and it's leaders, and has made the invasion out to be solely the result of American planning and execution, with the Commonwealth armies present only as on-lookers. This book is a good dose of reality. As I said, I've read biographies and autobiographies of the other major players as well as other books on the war in the West and it is clear that this biography fills in the gaps, omissions, oversights and falsifications of the shared events recalled by these others.

It is a must read for anyone with a serious interest in WWII.

A well written if a some what biased history of one of the allies most famous WW2 Commanders. The book does give a good in-site into the mind and world of Field Marshal Montgomery as he viewed it but does little to examine the arguments from critics of him (there are many). When you see chapters named "In Marlborough's Footsteps", you know that you are reading another pro British Conservative view of the world, never the less there are some good insights that Hamilton has dugout. I do believe it help put into context Arnham (his only defeat), Monty in his arrogance believed it was 90% successful, in reality it was a flop, a secure crossing of the Rhine was not achieved and Monty knew it. However I do not believe he should shoulder the full blame alone for this, by late 1944 allied command believed the German war machines back was broken and a bold final push was all that was required. Bottom line is Ike liked the plan and approved the plan and like Monty and others had seriously underestimated the German army. I do not believe that he would have entertained a plan like Market-Garden in 1942-43 but if it had achieved its main goal Monty would be regarded as one of the greatest generals in history and most likely ended the war in 1944 saving many thousands of lives (including Soviets). I can't blame the allied high command for trying, the potential gain of capturing the Ruhr valley before Christmas was worth it. For all his failings, which he had many off, his successes cannot be discounted. In 1940 he understood combined arms theory more then many of the officers above him, he took a defeated army and turned it into a winning army, he was the first western commander to defeat the Wehrmacht in a major land battle, he rewrote the Normandy invasion plan to help ensure its success and helped free Europe from the Nazis. May 1945 Von Friedeburg on behalf of Donitz and Keitel surrendered to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery so ending WW2 says a lot.

Eminent historian, biographer and author Nigel Hamilton has produced a series of three books which trace Montgomery's entire life. They are; Monty - The Making of a General (1887-1942), Monty - Master of the Battlefield (1942-1944) and Monty - The Field Marshall (1944-1976). Confusingly, my original review for the first of these titles, however, also appeared against others! That review is now revised to include all three books and I hope the reader finds this useful.

No detail has been spared in providing as complete a picture as possible of this great man - with each volume being in the order of 400-500,000 words and standing pre-eminent because of previously unpublished supporting photographs and other material. With access to his private letters, diaries and other papers, in "The Making of a General" he takes the reader from the birth of Montgomery in 1887 to his promotion to Lt General and command the Eighth Army in 1942. This is a fine account of the years in question. Pictures of Montgomery as a child, boy, young officer, family man, and in every rank up to Lt General are an important part of the history of this man. As an example, of the many thousands of officers and soldiers present, how ironic that a "Lt Colonel" Montgomery should be photographed standing in front of Winston Churchill during a Victory Parade in 1918. Elsewhere, the numerous other historic photographs include a young Major A. E. Percival (who as Lt General Percival surrendered Singapore to inferior Japanese forces in 1942!) to name but one.

In "Master of the Battlefield," the depth of research and revelation continues as Hamilton provides a truly extraordinary analysis of Montgomery's time at the forefront of WW2 in Europe and the Mediterranean. From his time as Army Commander in charge of some 180,000 soldiers through to his responsibility for the planning of D-Day - which time he commanded over 2 million Allied Troops. As Hamilton freely admits; this story reveals "the true torment, frustration, misunderstanding and dissatisfactions that are the hand-maidens of those who make history." For me, the work is also an exceedingly fine account of what was easily Montgomery's most difficult, yet worthwhile, years on earth.

In the third and final part of the trilogy (Monty - the Field Marshall) we have the difficult years of Montgomery having to live with his achievements - from the closing stages of WW2 right up to his death in 1976. Montgomery was promoted Field Marshal on 1 September 1944 - in time to take command of the liberation of Europe. Nothing is overlooked in this exposé which provides an understanding of why there were the bitter disagreements with other senior Allied commanders. His time as Military Governor of post-war Germany, his appointment as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Head of the British Army), his attempts to provide the British Labour government obsessed with retreat from the country's Imperialist past with a clear plan for the defence of the Realm, his battles with that government, his role as architect and founder of NATO and, above all, his continued propensity for antagonising both his Allies and his superiors.

Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery was finally transferred to the inactive list (British 5 star officers never retire!) in 1958 as he approached his 71st birthday. This milestone, however, heralds yet another chapter in the life of a busy man which, in this work, was revealed for the very first time.

Hindsight is, of course, a fine science, and there are many interesting events which the historian (and even the amateur psychologist!) might now regard as the reason why Montgomery became what he became and did what he did. There was his strict upbringing as the son of a Reverend (later Bishop) both at home and abroad, public school, formative years in an army of Empire and the events of World War 1 which almost claimed his life. In 1936 there was the tragic death of his wife. In this series of three books, Hamilton reveals the very best that Montgomery ever was whilst also providing the reader with an understanding of his difficult side. Commendably, he has not allowed his personal friendship for his much older subject to blur his objectivity and thus provides a full and fine account of a great man. In so doing, these 3 books have become an important contribution to both British history and the history of the Second World War. More importantly for some, they are also an excellent read.

NM

This book makes such a strong case for Monty's military genius one might suspect partisanship (and the author acknowledges a warm personal friendship with him), yet it also seems unflinching in its depiction of his flaws (abrasiveness, egotism, and great coldness in dealing with certain family members). Its depiction of some of the brightest stars in the American military pantheon (at least those that Monty had to deal with) is extremely unflattering. Eisenhower in particular is depicted as completely removed from the realities of command in the field, and whose meddling interference in Monty's D-Day masterplan could well have cost the allies the war. The book is quick to concede Eisenhower's talents as an administrator and as a tactful coalition maintainer, but argues that he had little grasp of the battlefield, and that little grasp proved to be a dangerous thing. Patton and Bradley fare somewhat better.

I was very skeptical when I approached this book, since it challenged every preconception I ever had of Monty, that of the overcautious, slow, egocentric pedant who only cramped the styles of the Pattons of this world. This book changed my views. While in no way glossing over the Montgomery ego, time and again it cited examples of Montgomery putting the objective first, of repeatedly assuming the role of play-maker for Bradley and Patton in Normandy and Sicily, because that was what made the most military sense at the time.

Somehow, Hamilton succeeds in reconciling his depiction of the abrasive, egotistical, pompous, Montgomery with the military visionary who never lost sight of the ultimate end nor of the sacrifices that had to be made to attain it. The picture is of someone with all the elan of Patton yet a far greater feel for the individual soldier. Initially I was very uncomfortable with his depiction, yet at the end of the day one has to admit, Monty was at the helm when the allied armies won two of their most spectacular victories in the west, El Alamein and Normandy. What's more, the adversary Monty defeated there, Rommel, was by no means the 3rd Reich's "B-team". Hamilton argues those victories were the result of careful planning combined with a keen grasp of battlefield realities.

The book is well-argued. The author has clearly paid close attention to his source materials, noting that one military aide to Eisenhower even falsified a key diary entry that casts Montgomery in a somewhat more negative light. That pretty well destroyed the credibility of that aide for me, whose diary is relied upon unquestioningly by many other noted historians of the war.

The book is lively and well-written, with an occasional touch of humour to enliven what is a massive torrent of military information. It begins in the aftermath of El Alamein (November 5, 1942) and runs to the autumn of 1944, including the rest of the African campaign, the invasion of Sicily and Italy proper, and the Normandy campaign.

The book also conveys a keen appreciation of the personalities involved in the Allied Supreme Command. The intrigues carried on there, particularly by the Supreme Air Commander, another bigwig with little grasp of the situation on the ground, were another serious threat to Monty's plans, the plans which ultimately won the battle of Normandy. It demonstrates that mastering the battlefield was small cheese for Monty compared to the challenge of persevering in the face of all the scheming back room boys who wanted to bring him down, and nearly succeeded.

At the end of the book one is left wondering, how did we ever win?

Before the current resurgence in the love of history, I searched in vain for this book in countless new and old book stores. Every new city we went to, I would look for it. I had heard the American viewpoint on Montgomery, I had read Patton's version, but I wanted to hear Montgomery's version. As a Christmas present, there it was under my tree one year, and I devoured it in several days, even though it is incredibly detailed.
After reading the book, I felt I understood the man, the forces, the secret drives that made the General who he was.
He had a rather cold, lonely childhood, and was an aloof, intelligent loner.
The Battle of Dunkirk was the point at which he could no longer tolerate those he felt inferior to him, regardless of his rank. The absurdities of the waste of manpower of machinery, the inefficiencies of command by family name became clear to him. Here Montgomery rose to his highest success, a man who's destiny and abilities were matched by fortune to the time. He succeeded in defying the befuddled outranking superiors, took control, and performed brilliantly at El-Almein, a battle won almost exclusively by his strategic flanking movements.
El-Almein; however, became the soothsayer to his Achilles heel....his extreme egotism.
After El-Almein, he felt himself invincible and always correct regardless of the consequences for his men or the battle. His main focus after El-Almein was to preserve his legacy and reputation and to take credit for any favorable action by anyone, anywhere.
He was personally responsible for one of the two largest largest European debacles of the war: the Bridge Too Far. (The other being the inexperienced Eisenhower's debacle at the Kasserine Pass.) By sheer force of will, against the advise and counsel of many others, Montgomery forced an ill-conceived plan of the largest paratrooper drop in history with poor supplies, lack of artillary support, and a sheer waste of some of the finest men available. Even when it was evident that his plans were horribly inadequate, he refused to allow a strategic withdrawal, abandoning troops to their fate.
Whether politically correct to say or not, it seemed quite evident from the book that there was a strong presence of homosexuality in Montgomery's inner circle. Whether Montgomery was gay, bi, or neuter is impossible to say, and the fact that he procreated is irrelevant.
What is sad is that with his sycophantic inner circle, he could not be dissuaded from ill-conceived plans. He became the McClellan of World War II, sitting with troops that could have been used elsewhere, squandering supplies that could have been put to use for Patton.
Any other General would have been replaced after the fiasco of Operation Market-Garden. MONTGOMERY would have replaced any general of his that had carried out such an ill-conceived plan, then refused to halt when it was evident it was an abject failure.
Read the accounts of the Paratroopers who had to fight the actual battle, the SNAFU's they encountered, the hostility they received when they reasonably requested to withdraw and you have visions of Montgomery in the far distant rear echelons in his bunker, oblivious to the world. Montgomery went so far as to REFUSE to allow his sleep to be interrupted for important phone calls, reasoning that all he had to do was to plan a battle, but battles are vacillating beasts that require the presence of their commanders. Patton's brilliance in Sicily was his front-line presence, and therefore knowledge of the strategic changes that needed to be made.
With Montgomery's star tarnished by Market-Garden, Patton and Eisenhower were able to forge forward and accomplish what they were able to do at their best.
Argument has been made that Montgomery's bogging down after D-Day, and his Operation Market-Garden fiasco allowed the more Sourthern Patton to consolidate his positions, but then one wonders where was Monty when Bastogne was besieged and when Omaha beach was overwhelmed.
When I finally was able to read his version, instead of the American-written versions, I was dismayed that he was even pettier and self-centered than even the Americans realized.
Post-War, Monty was awarded the position of Chief of Staff, and felt it was due him as a royal coronation. He WAS the hero of El Alamein, but he was a one-note, one-battle, egomaniac hero who cost many lives needlessly.

As a history teacher who has studied WWII for the last thirty five years, this was the strangest and most slanted biography that I have ever had the misfortune to read. I never realized that Monty was the savior of both Western civilization and the Allied effort of WWII, which of course is completely off the mark. But I guess what surprised me the most was the author's personal attacks upon those sources that didn't view Monty as the next Napoleon. Certainly, Hamilton's view of Eisenhower was completely unfair and many of his facts were certainly distorted to fit his pro-British outlook. However unlike Monty, who demanded all of the Allies' precious supplies for his full blooded drive into the Ruhr, Ike's strategy for employing a continuous broad front into Germany was the correct one. Poor Monty would have ended up in a German POW camp, if he had been allowed to follow his plan. Which begs the question, who was the better strategist? Unquestionably, Monty deserves a lot of credit for his contribution to the war effort. Yet, his success in northern Africa was based mainly upon his preponderance of men and supplies over an exhausted foe that had stretched their supply lines beyond the limit. And as for Normandy that subject will be debated for the next hundred years. Apparently, Monty had his plan for success, while at the same time, Ike had a completely different idea in mind, along with a lot of other Allied commanders. Anyway, if a person is really interested studying the ETO during WWII, I would strongly suggest to him or her to pass on his book. There are a number of better books on the subject in print which aren't nearly as prejudice.

Monty is a great read but a lil dry if U r not prepared for it. If U know his background U may get a lil frustrated about some of his opinions. He was cocky, arrogant, rude and opinionated but he was brilliant for the most part with public relations,strategy. Very critical of GEN.Eisenhower, GEN.Bradley, GEN.Patton and GEN. HDG Crerar. Again a very good read no matter what u think of him.