Customer Reviews

Moral Basis of a Backward Society

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(3)

 

 

Ed Banfield must have been about 42 when this book was published, yet it has a young man's astonishment and a young man's anger. Shrewd and observant as he was, he seems not to have realized what the world could be like until he settled down here in what was then (as, indeed, now) one of the poorest parts of Italy. It shocked him, as indeed it might have, for any number of reasons. But Banfield focused on just one: "the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good or, indeed, for any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear family." Until then, Banfield had been (he would surely hate this characterization) an American innocent-one thinks of the Ugly American in Graham Greene's novel, all good intentions and unintentional mischief. The difference is, of course, that Banfield did not remain an innocent: with his unflinching clarity of vision, and his shrewd capacity for synthesis, he used this inquiry to launch himself into one of the most important careers in political science in the 20th Century.

In hindsight, one may be tempted to say that he could have known better. He does quote from "Christ Stopped at Eboli," by Carlo Levi. But in addition to Levi, others had seen what Banfield came to see: one thinks of Verga or Silone (one is tempted to add Sciascia, but most of his work came later). Indeed, closer to home, he might have learnd from Norman Lewis' great "Naples '44."

But this, as I concede, is hindsight. The fact is that you can't think of any other American scholar of his generation in his time who approached this kind of problem in this kind of way.

Banfield's encounter with Montegrano clearly informs his later work: his studies of Richard Daley's Chicago and his later, more general work on city politics and on government in general. Superficially, this may appear paradoxical. In Montegrano, Banfield lamented the curse of "amoral familism." This might seem to suggest a distrust of families, and a hospitality to government participation ("It takes a village..."). Yet Daley's Chicago is a community of families and his later work shows a distrust of government that borders on truculence.

The paradox is, of course, quite superficial. Daley's Chicago is a community of families, but a community with a vibrant public life. And it is the very corruption of government in a place like Montegrano that adds such plausibility to Banfield's later critique. One thinks of James C. Scott and his admirable "Seeing Like a State".

There is another and wholly different virtue of Banfield's work that deserves mention. This is his use of scholarly apparatus. The blurb on my old Basic Books copy says mentions (appreciatively) his "use of T.A.T. materials" along with "intensive standardized fieldwork Neo-Freudian psychology, and structural-functional analysis." Even the concept of "amoral familism" bears the smell of the lamp. It is all bound to send the alert reader fleeing to the new Harry Potter. A critical mistake: Banfield not only survives all the academic detritus, he positively transcends it: he is one of the few who can make this kind of analytical structure produce something plausible and interesting.

Footnote: for further background on Banfield, there is a wonderful appreciation by his sometimes co-author, James Q. Wilson, in The Public Interest for Winter 2003. Google "Banfield Wilson Public Interest moral basis" and it ought to be the first hit.

Antecedents to this study lie in two areas: the study of social capital and the study of giving to and volunteering for charity. A large body of work now exists on the theme of social capital. Alexis de Tocqueville is cited as remarking on the civic associations of America in the 1800s. More recently the concept of social capital, if not the exact words, were reported by Edward Banfield in The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Banfield, 1958). Banfield's book was a study on a poor village in Southern Italy and explored the reasons for the low level of development there. Banfield surmised that the fundamental reason for the village's low level of development was the incapacity of local residents to work together. The term social capital was first used in the 1980s by Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman, though Coleman received credit for establishing the analytical framework of social capital in his exploration of education (Bourdieu, 1986 and Coleman, 1988). Coleman's work has served as a theoretical framework for studies in education and social capital through to the present.

This book is very relevant to the question of the effect of culture on development. I have lived half my life in an Anglo culture, and the other half in a Latin culture- very similar to that of Southern Italy. I can absolutely assert that the findings in this book are a true description of 'amoral familism' and the effects on a society. As for a previous reviewer, I suggest he actually live in Southern Italy (or a similar culture) before he omits an opinion that is based on a limited, provincial experience of only living in the US (or a anglo culture). Anyone who has experienced -truly experienced- an anglo and a latin culture will agree with the conclusions drawn by the author.

This book is anti-Italian racist garbage. Completely dated and debunked. Better to use as kindling than reading material. If you want some real insight into the lives and culture of Southern Italians, read "Were you always an Italian" by Maria Laurino. Far more accurate and enjoyable than this elitist tripe.

The point in Banfields' book is not that cultural backwardness explains evry asset of economic growth. The point is that culture is an important part of the explanation. Because of Karl Marx's historical (technological) determinism this important part has been left out. Max Weber wrote about the same ideas as Banfield in The Protestant Work Ethic (1905). Their ideas can now be tested with new statistical techniques proving that culture has strong independent explanatory power relative to policies, institutions or geographical factors. Beliefs and Values in society that creates trust, savings, hard work and entrepreneurship is crucial to economic growth, more so than any other factors. Please read Marini (2004), Tabellini (2005) and Guiso (2006) for good summaries of recent research.

Edward Banfield's reputation was built on the basis of this book and the research that informed it. While I am confident that he added significant value in his work and writing subsequent to this effort, I am equally confident that in the minds of most of Banfield's fans, at least those with whom I have discussed this book, he was defined by this work. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society is an exceptionally powerful ethnography describing what happens when there is no "community" even in what is described and thought of as a community, as in the village that serves as the backdrop for this book. Outstanding lessons are observable in this work that are transferable to our current society. When we decide we will work together, there are few limits to what we can accomplish. When we fail to do that, all of us, and the community spirit suffers.

For those of us that wish to look at the foundations of the case study, Banfield's book is a good start. The only problem is his definition of what constitutes a backwards scoiety. His work was new and intruiging, but it explains the human nature without addressing human nature. By nature, humans are selfish. In the case of an isolated village, the people of Montegrano were not backwards. Instead they were doing what was necessary to survive. They did not organize for the greater good of society because they were too busy searching for food for that day and the next. That does not seem backwards. That seems like survival of the fittest,to use a tired cliche. Whenever examining a case study, we need to be sure that we do not generalize the subject.

Banfield's "amoral familism" is a convenient way to explain away poverty, but it's a little too convenient. He wants to explain the poverty in Southern Italy, but he never looks at the historical, geographical, environmental or other factors that contribute to this poverty. Where is the discussion of the malaria epidemics that prevented this region from developing sea trade (people who lived by the coasts died from malaria a lot, thus preventing the development of a significant maritime economy)? Similarly, he doesn't like to examine Calabria's geographical isolation from the rest of Europe (all the way at the end of a peninsula) and the fact that there weren't very many roads leading into that place until the 1930s. What about the fact that the allies bombed the hell out of this place a mere decade before this "research" and relatively little of the Marshal plan assistance ended up going there? He also neglects to consider the other invading armies that had visited this place before Mr. Banfield (the Austrians, the Spanish, the French, the Normans, etc.), some of which were still in living memory at the time, as Calabria was on the front line of the Austro-Hungarian invasion of Italy during WWI. How is a region supposed to develop economically when a different army sweeps through every generation, and there is no practical way to trade in large quantities with the rest of the world without malaria epidemics and in the absence highways and trains to carry goods? Any kind of sensitive treatment of this subject matter would look at these and other factors, and not just dismiss them as "excuses." Banfield's "amoral familism" is a convenient way to explain away poverty, but it's a little too convenient. Having spent time in Calabria, I am impressed with how far these people have come since the WWII and the crippling poverty that ensued afterwards. This area is still far from well off, but all the progress that a stroll down Corso Mazzini (a major shopping and business district) would make obvious flies in the face of Banfield's "science." In order to support his feelings about the poor, Banfield neglects a host of factors that any sensitive review of this region would make obvious.

The general question Banfield is attempting to answer in this book is "what accounts for the political incapacity of the village?" His approach to answering his research question is the case study, an in-depth study of the village of Montegrano, Italy. Within the village, he finds that there is a complete lack of what most Westerners would call a "civic-" or "public-spirit." It is this deficiency that interests Banfield and drives his research. His main argument is that Montegranians have developed a social system of "amoral familism," in which all actions are carried out for the benefit of the individual and their immediate family. Others in the community (including the church, the poor, orphans, etc.) are neglected as a result. Interestingly, what Banfield is describing seems to be a public goods problem. But instead of using a rational-actor explanation, he suggests that it is the culture of the Montegranians that leads to their sub-optimal social conditions. Yet he explicitly states the free-rider problem (perhaps without realizing it?): "In a society of amoral familists, no one will further the interest of the group or community except as it is to his private advantage to do so," (pg. 85). Doesn't this phenomena bear a more general cultural and social application? It is interesting that Banfield would choose to call this a "cultural" explanation when this seems to be an individual rational calculation, no matter what culture one inhabits. All in all, I did not find the arguments put forth by Banfield to be very convincing. His "syndrome" of amoral familism could be much more easily be explained in terms of the rational behavior of individuals, rather than attributing it to the mystic influence of culture. His approach to this study is interesting, but obviously could bear some updating.

This book's main contribution is in the definition of "amoral familism": the well established primitive behaviour of human beings (present in different extent in any social structures) which may be expressed as the primitive "clan law" that any person should be faithfull to the other members of his/her clan/family independently on how these other members behave. However, the book does not add much contribution to the understanding of the REASONS for the different speeds of development (or even for the cases of social "regression") of many regions in the western coutries. In particular, this book is totally silent as to the nature of the "civilizing" force which overruns the more primitive associative scheme represented by the "amoral familism".
To concentrate, as the author of this book does, only onto the primitive clan obedience, means, for instance, that even the american "Far-west" communities in the 1800's, or even the Al Capone ruling of Chigago could be ascribed simply to "amoral familism"!!!.
This book is totally silent as to the factors that in the history of the richer regions have overturned the primitive associative organization in familar clans into larger social indentity. Is the absence of these factors the real cause of any undeveloped or even regressed society.
In particular, this book does not recognise the basic fact that the more "the law" is applied in the same way for everybody (i.e. the more a society is ruled by the law) the more any citizen may recognise himself as a part of the larger social structure rather than searching for protection in the familiar clan. In the most developed societies the leading classes have been (and must constantly be) OBLIGED to follow the "law", in many cases in consequence of revolutions and/or of the constant pressure of the middle classes and in general of anybody who have understood that the more the "law" is ruling a state the richer the entire society is.
In many undeveloped regions the ruling of the law has not yet been realized and the leading classes may still abuse the "law" for their short term economical interesses, thereby preventing the overall economical developement as well as the growth of a "social" coscience.
I think that the author of this book has not asked to himself how many americans would regress to "amoral familism" if e.g. the us courts would constantly refuse to enforce the law for the favour of large companies or certain leading social groups (e.g.the wasp americans).
Accordingly, he has not investigated the reasons why e.g. some regions have a very corrupted state administration, why some ways of providing international charity have only resulted in an even more corrupted administration, etc... The only message in this book is: the less developed regions have a less developed "social" attitude. This book however does not even recognise that the fact that the "amoral familism" remains (or become again) the leading social ruling is the EFFECT and not the cause of the undevelopment.