Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development (Bradford Books) (Volume 3) [Paperback]

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Editor)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0262693550 | ISBN-13: 978-0262693554 | Publication Date: October 19, 2007

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The neuroscience of morality is in its infancy, with the first brain imaging studies of moral development undertaken only in 2001. The contributors to volume 3 sample the best work in this very new field, discussing a variety of approaches, including functional imaging, lesion studies, abnormal psychology, and developmental neuroscience. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include the neural basis of moral emotions and moral judgments as well as comparisons of normal adult moral judgments with those made by children, adolescents, and people with psychopathy, brain damage, and autism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy and Hardy Professor of Legal Studies at Dartmouth College.Contributors Abigail Baird, William Casebeer, Cordelia Fine, Nathan Fox, Uta Frith, Jordan Grafman, Joshua Greene, Catherine Hynes, Fatima Azavedo Ignacio, Richard Joyce, Jerome Kagan, Leonard Katz, Kent Kiehl, Jeanette Kennett, Melanie Killen, Daniel Lapsley, Heidi Maibom, Victoria McGeer, John Mikhail, Jorge Moll, Shaun Nichols, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Adina Roskies, Jana Schaich Borg, Katrina Sifferd, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Smith, Mark Timmons, Frederick de Vignemont, Paul Whalen, Roland Zahn

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Moral Psychology is a remarkable publishing achievement. Sinnott-Armstrong has a real talent for drawing together the cutting-edge researchers in the field, and letting them present their positions and challenge each other. These three substantial volumes cover many of the newer and more exciting issues being raised in ethics and moral psychology today. Essential reading for anyone who wants to know where the field is heading." --Peter Singer, Ira W. Decamp Professor of Bioethics in the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University "In the last decade moral psychology has been transformed into one of the most interesting and important areas of interdisciplinary research--a field where philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and economists interact productively. Recent theories and findings have generated a genuine and justified sense of intellectual excitement. If you want to see what all the excitement is about, this book is a great place to start." --Stephen Stich, Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Rutgers University "Moral Psychology represents a powerful and penetrating discussion of the emerging science of moral behavior. Each volume cross-examines important arguments which lead to fascinating dialogues on this compelling subject. With these volumes, Sinnot-Armstrong is revealed as a leading mind in this field." --Michael S. Gazzaniga, Director, Sage Center for the Study of the Mind, University of California, Santa Barbara

About the Author

CHARLES W. HAXTHAUSEN is Professor of art history and Director ofthe graduate program in the History of Art at Williams College. Heis the editor of The Two Art Histories: The Museum and the University(Clark Art Institute and Yale University Press, 2003), and iscurrently working on the art criticism of Carl Einstein. His "BloodySerious: Two Texts by Carl Einstein" appeared in October 105.

Product Details

• Paperback: 592 pages
• Publisher: The MIT Press (October 19, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0262693550
• ISBN-13: 978-0262693554
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6.1 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.7 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #373,500 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

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3 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Worth studying in detail, March 20, 2010

By 

Dr. Lee D. Carlson (Baltimore, Maryland USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development (Bradford Books) (Volume 3) (Paperback)

This book, the last of the three volumes in the series, is more philosophical debate than neuroscience, despite the title. Despite the over-emphasis on philosophy, and its attending annoyance of never-ending dialog, the articles in this book do at least introduce the reader to some of what is known on the cognitive neuroscience behind morality and ethics. Ten years from now, a book such as this will no doubt contain a large amount of data that will illustrate how the brain process moral decision-making and how it conceptualizes and creates broad systems of ethics. But for now the field of neuroethics and moral neuroscience is just getting started, and this volume does give a taste of how researchers are approaching issues such as the neuroscience of moral emotions, the origin of moral conceptualization via "affective" versus "rational" brain processes, and why (and how) autistic individuals should be distinguished from psychopaths in the methods they use to conceptualize morals and ethics.

Some of the highlights in the book include:
- The idea that cognitive neuroscience could give a scientific formulation of the "theory of moral sentiments" of the economist Adam Smith. Such a formulation would be very interesting, given the historical importance of Adam Smith and the total lack of empirical evidence in his writings for supporting his theory.
- The assertion that "moral sensitivity" is nothing other than the coactivation of PFC-temporolimbic networks in the brain. This kind of reductionism will no doubt alarm many readers, but it will find its justification if this assertion is shown to be plausible by intense experimentation and research.
- The view that moral emotions are "disentangled" from rational processes during moral judgments. This assertion, if shown empirically, is very important to those who believe the brain to be modularized or task-specialized, and to those who are studying psychopathy. Some evidence for this disentanglement is presented in the book, such as that damage to the prefrontal cortex can retard or prevent the conceptualization of moral values. In particular some of the authors assert that the anterior prefrontal cortex is specialized for the representation of social knowledge, leading one to ask whether through surgical, pharmaceutical or electromagnetic intervention one could manipulate or tune this knowledge, or even record it.
- The idea that research in cognitive neuroscience will allow one to distinguish between moral violations and violations of social conventions. Being able to do this will shed light on the role of social hierarchies as acting as a surrogate or substitute for what is truly moral. Too often in human history the respect for these hierarchies has resulted in incalculable suffering, and so a diminution of respect for these hierarchies would be morally justifiable if they are shown to be false substitutes for morality. The Milgram experiments are quoted in this book as an example of passive cooperation to immoral authority figures. It is of utmost importance in neuroethics to find the neural processes and representations that are responsible for the excess of veneration paid to social hierarchies. Once that is done, we can find techniques, either via genetic engineering or pharmaceutical intervention, for tuning the brain so that unquestioned loyalty to these hierarchies is eliminated or suppressed to a large degree.
- There are places in the book where a very typical view of morality is asserted, namely that whenever one is acting in one's self interest that this cannot possibly be considered moral. Such myopia in ethical thought seems to plague all systems that have been developed to his day, and this book is no exception unfortunately.
- The assertion of the need for a computational theory of moral cognition, which will be "descriptively adequate" and possess an efficient system of moral grammar. Such a theory would also be of great interest to those who want to implement moral thinking (computation) in non-human machines. Such a system, possibly called "artificial morality", would allow humans and machines to work together for mutual benefit, and would also alleviate some of the anxiety associated with the use of artificial intelligence. Such a theory seems challenging to construct, for it might have to deal with the unconscious processes behind human moral cognition, and these processes may be extremely difficult to identify from an experimental viewpoint. A computational theory of morality would also shed light on such things as "cognitive dissonance" in moral cognition, and how moral judgments seem to scale with the number of people that are involved (the greater the number of people that are subjects of dastardly acts the less affective reaction there seems to be). These phenomena are discussed throughout the book, with references given for some of the approaches taken for what might be called "computational morality".
- The discussion on the cognitive neuroscience of psychopaths. Psychopaths are in this book discussed mostly in the context of how to distinguish their moral cognition from those of individuals suffering from autism. The discussions and debates along these lines are fascinating, and their resolution would settle long-standing questions on the origins of socialization (or lack thereof in the case of autism) and why psychopathic behavior is actually deemed a virtue in some contexts (the financial industry for example).

2 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Moral Psychology, Vol. 3, July 29, 2010

By 

Sally K. Severino (New Mexico) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development (Bradford Books) (Volume 3) (Paperback)

This is the third volume in a series on moral psychology that hopes to bring philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists to work together. The effort is timely because in the last few decades noninvasive techniques have made it possible for neuroscientists to get solid information about how human brains make moral decisions.

The book is structured so that each chapter opens with a scholar or group of scholars presenting a specific thesis. This is followed by responses from scholars of different disciplines than those presenting the thesis. The chapter closes with a final response from the original scholar(s). Each chapter lends itself to lively cross-discipline dialogue, which highlights the nuances of the issues being researched.

The book is a must for anyone involved in interdisciplinary research on morality and anyone excited about the new issues being raised within the fields of twenty-first century morality and ethics.