Moral Reality [Hardcover]

Paul Bloomfield (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0195137132 | ISBN-13: 978-0195137132 | Publication Date: September 27, 2001

We typically assume that the standard for what is beautiful lies in the eye of the beholder. Yet this is not the case when we consider morality; what we deem morally good is not usually a matter of opinion. Such thoughts push us toward being realists about moral properties, but a cogent theory of moral realism has long been an elusive philosophical goal.

Paul Bloomfield here offers a rigorous defense of moral realism, developing an ontology for morality that models the property of being morally good on the property of being physically healthy. The model is assembled systematically; it first presents the metaphysics of healthiness and goodness, then explains our epistemic access to properties such as these, adds a complementary analysis of the semantics and syntax of moral discourse, and finishes with a discussion of how we become motivated to act morally. Bloomfield closely attends to the traditional challenges facing moral realism, and the discussion nimbly ranges from modern medical theory to ancient theories of virtue, and from animal navigation to the nature of normativity.l
Maintaining a highly readable style throughout, Moral Reality yields one of the most compelling theories of moral realism to date and will appeal to philosophers working on issues in metaphysics or moral philosophy.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"[P]resents a clear, elegant, and enjoyable argument in favor of moral realism. Anybody with serious interest in metaethics should read it, if only to familiarize themselves with a strain of realist argument that is likely to be influential in future debates."--Mind

"Bloomfield masterfully articulates and defends a metaethical theory that represents the most plausible form of moral realism now on offer. He deftly engages certain metaphysical and linguistic similarities between the properties of moral goodness and physical healthiness, forcefully arguing that there is as much reason to be a realist about morals as there is to be a realist about health. This book is a pleasure to read and will surely have a significant impact on contemporary metaethical debate."--Mark Timmons, University of Memphis

"The difference between being good and bad, Bloomfield argues, is in many ways like the difference between being healthy and unhealthy. You may not care about either difference, but that does not make the differences any less real. An engaging, original, uncompromising, and ultimately pretty convincing defense of moral realism."--David Schmidtz, University of Arizona

From the Back Cover

"The difference between being good and bad, Bloomfield argues, is in many ways like the difference between being healthy and unhealthy. You may not care about either difference, but that does not make the differences any less real. An engaging, original, uncompromising, and ultimately pretty convincing defense of moral realism."--David Schmidtz, University of Arizona

"Bloomfield masterfully articulates and defends a metaeth theory that represents the most plausible form of moral reality now on offer. He deftly engages certain metaphysical and linguistic similarities between the properties of moral goodness and physical healthiness, forcefully arguing that there is as much reason to be a realist about morals as there is to be a realist about health. This book is a pleasure to read and will surely have a significant impact on contemporary metaethical debate."--Mark Timmons, University of Memphis

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 224 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (September 27, 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0195137132
• ISBN-13: 978-0195137132
• Product Dimensions: 8.7 x 5.9 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 14.7 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #5,387,830 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

8 of 9 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars normative ethics resurrected, July 3, 2004

By 

allen g. minker (los osos, ca United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Moral Reality (Paperback)

When I was an undergraduate student in philosophy in the 1960's, ethics culminated with Professors Moore, Hare,and Von Wright, and the assignment was how to describe what we are doing when we use the language of morals. It was a given that we are NOT making statements which could be true or false. Ethics was tolerated in philosophy departments, but the sense was that it really belonged in the anthropology or mythology departments. When you surveyed philsophers' writings on ethics, the purpose seemed to be how to understand mistaken thinking. Normative ethics were finished.
Since my college days, it seems some writers of philosophy have had the temerity to attempt normative ethics anyway. Books on virtue ethics, applied ethics, practical ethics, bioethics, and medical ethics are pretty common on the philosophy shelves.
And a phrase, moral realism, describes a school of thought, which stands in opposition to the sentence from Shakespeare that says, "There is nothing good or bad but thinking makes it so."
Moral Reality by Paul Bloomfield is a readable, clear survey and rejection of those arguements that say ethics is but emotion and feeling, and therefore outside the true boundaries of philosophy. It says that moral claims CAN be accurately described as true or false. In doing so, the book operates on two levels: as survey of a host of past writings on ethics and as defense of a particular model of moral realism. The core belief defended is that actions do have objective moral properties, to be discovered by philosophical investigation. The model or metaphor is biological health.
One thing I would maintain regardless of who is right about the language of morals: excursions into normative ethics are more interesting to read than descriptions of the varieties of goodness. Paul Bloomfield's book presents it all: how the battle was joined, who were the effective proponents and opponents of the move to junk normative ethics, and a new offering that says, take a swing at me.
The book is readable by non-academics and non-"ethicists" (an awkward word to me still). The book uses contemporary language and references, giving it a friendly tone. I find it a little gem.

1 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Original and provocative, August 3, 2004

By 

Patrick Higgins (east coast, USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Moral Reality (Hardcover)

This book provides an original and provocative defense of moral realism. While I certainly don't agree with all of its conclusions, Bloomfield is clearly in the first rank of the new moral realists.