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Moral Skepticisms Paperback

ISBN-13: 978-0195342062 ISBN-10: 0195342062

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Product Details

  • Paperback: 288 pages
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (October 19, 2007)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0195342062
  • ISBN-13: 978-0195342062
  • Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.3 x 0.7 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 14.4 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
  • Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,469,530 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Editorial Reviews


"Overall the book was a delight to read. It's full of interesting arguments on all sorts of topics in moral metaphysics and moral epistemology. If you're interested in...moral metaphysics and moral epistemology, it's truly a book worth reading. I highly recommend it to anyone curious about these topics."--Peter J. Graham, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

"Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has long been a leading proponent of moral skepticism--the view roughly that there is some considerable difficulty involved in attaining justified moral belief, or moral knowledge. This volume brings together his latest thoughts on the matter and provides, in addition, a survey of different sorts of skeptical problems confronting realists and cognitivists about morality... well written and covers an impressive expanse of territory. It is to be welcomed, further, as the only major book-length treatment of the topics of moral epistemology and moral skepticism to appear in some time."--Brad Majors, ETHICS

About the Author

Walter Sinnott-Armstrongr isProfessor of Philosophy, Dartmouth College

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20 of 21 people found the following review helpful By P. Hubbard on November 25, 2006
Format: Hardcover Verified Purchase
In order to see the outlines of the arguments presented in this book, the reader should view the "Moral Skepticism" entry in the online Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, which is also written by Sinnott-Armstrong. The reader can there assess for himself whether this book's deeper treatment of the arguments is worth the investment.
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Format: Paperback
Sinnott-Armstrong upholds contrastivism, i.e. the view according to which we must be able to rule out all relevant alternatives to a given proposition in order to justify our belief in it. Applying this view to moral justification, Sinnott-Armstrong shows that we are justified in holding moral beliefs when we select a modest contrast class, i.e. a set of commonsensical alternatives, but that we are never justified in holding those beliefs when an extreme contrast class (which includes skeptical hypotheses such as brains in vats and evil demons) is selected. In other words, S-A shows that moral nihilism cannot be refuted. The text is crystal-clear and constitutes real progress relative to a gamut of important meta-ethical issues. If you are interested in meta-ethics, please do read this book.
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