21 of 22 people found the following review helpful
on November 25, 2006
In order to see the outlines of the arguments presented in this book, the reader should view the "Moral Skepticism" entry in the online Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, which is also written by Sinnott-Armstrong. The reader can there assess for himself whether this book's deeper treatment of the arguments is worth the investment.
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful
on October 7, 2013
Sinnott-Armstrong upholds contrastivism, i.e. the view according to which we must be able to rule out all relevant alternatives to a given proposition in order to justify our belief in it. Applying this view to moral justification, Sinnott-Armstrong shows that we are justified in holding moral beliefs when we select a modest contrast class, i.e. a set of commonsensical alternatives, but that we are never justified in holding those beliefs when an extreme contrast class (which includes skeptical hypotheses such as brains in vats and evil demons) is selected. In other words, S-A shows that moral nihilism cannot be refuted. The text is crystal-clear and constitutes real progress relative to a gamut of important meta-ethical issues. If you are interested in meta-ethics, please do read this book.