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Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Canto)

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This slim volume is an introduction to moral philosophy, and it has the distinction of being one of the few introductions written by a major figure in the field. It's a fine book for the beginner, as Williams does not assume that the reader will be coming to this book with any prior engagement with moral philosophy. And it's worth reading for people with more philosophical background as well, since Williams doesn't shy away from presenting original thoughts about the issues. Indeed, this is more of an original essay on some of the basic issues in moral philosophy than a summary of the various positions found in the literature. So, for the reader looking for a summary of the competing positions in the field or an introduction to the literature on these topics, this book's lack of engagement with the existing literature makes it less than an ideal choice as an introductory text. But if you'd rather introduce yourself to the subject of moral philosophy by seeing an especially competent person wrestling with the not insignificant task of arriving at a defensible moral view, this is the book for you.

Behind much of what Williams says here is a skepticism about the usefulness of moral theory, and about the role that philosophy can play in elucidating issues about morality. This is motivated not by a philosophically-based skepticism about morality itself--as a matter of fact, much of the book argues against such skepticism--but by a skepticism about the philosophers' ability to tell us much of substance about how we ought to moralize. What he's especially quick to repudiate is the suggestion that philosophical thinking will enable us to arrive at a better conception of how we ought to think morally. Williams suggests instead that we accept the complexity of ordinary moral thought and experience, and this is the source of one of his major strengths as a moral thinker: that he refuses to engage in the sort of simplifying that all-too-often goes along with the systematization of ordinary moral thought that philosophers try to provide. What we need instead, Williams thinks, is careful attention to everyday moral thinking, an attention undergirded by unwillingness to ignore the details, and the occasional messiness, of actual moral thought and feeling.

But as admirable as this attitude towards ordinary moral thought is, it's not clear to me that it's the best sort of attitude for the author of an introductory text. For this careful attention to detail can make the book somewhat difficult to follow at times, and I'm certain that the importance of some of what goes on here will be lost on the beginner. Too often, the short chapters appear to end up bogged down in lengthy digressions; and, although the chapters can be naturally grouped together into small groups, the book as a whole doesn't have any obvious thread of argument to tie the various subjects together. Still, given number and variety of introductory texts on these issues, it is arguable that this is a benefit of this book. Williams hasn't dumbed-down his ideas and insights in order to make them accessible to everyone, and so the work here should prove stimulating and thought-provoking to anyone willing to follow his thought through its various twists and turns.

What specific topics does Williams discuss? He begins by considering certain reasons for being skeptical about morality in general. The first such challenge is that presented by the amoralist, the person who wholly rejects moralizing as an activity. And Williams treats this as a way to reveal what morality is--morality is whatever the amoralist is supposed to be rejecting. He then considers the challenges posed by three forms of subjectivism: (a) noncognitivism, the view that moral language expresses or describes attitudes or feelings; (b) a form of skepticism according to which we have no way of arriving at moral knowledge; and (c) nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Williams's main focus here is the project of "defusing subjectivism": that is, of showing that the subjectivist positions don't, and shouldn't, lead to a loss of confidence in morality or a loss of moral resolve. While he thinks the project is largely successful, Williams doesn't think it allows the subjectivist to account for everything of importance to ordinary moral thought. For, according to him, something remains unexplained by the subjectivist even after the defusing project, namely the sense that our moral views are intended to mirror some aspect of mind-independent reality. And he also attacks a rather crude form of moral relativism that he thinks is especially influential as a reason for suspicion about the legitimacy of morality. The basic idea of this relativism is that rightness and wrongness apply in virtue of the society a person is, and that this shows we ought to be tolerant of others. Williams's primary argument against this view is that it's self-defeating in that it makes a non-relative virtue of tolerance and non-interference.

In the central part of the book Williams considers goodness and the nature of good human beings. He begins by discussing the term 'good' and how it applies to things of particular types. The most important conclusion here draws is that, at least with respect to certain types of things, there particular non-moral criteria related to application of 'good' for things of particular types. And this, he thinks, provides us with a way of disputing the inviolability of the fact/value distinction. When we make evaluative judgments about the goodness of many types of things, we have to rest our evaluative judgments on certain sorts of facts. And he then considers the possibility of there being such criteria for moral evaluations, for evaluations of the goodness of human beings. Are there such criteria for applying the term 'good' to human beings? Williams first considers the possibility that we might discover such criteria by studying the nature of human persons and their distinctive capacities and abilities, and then the possibility that we might discover such criteria by studying nature of persons and their relations to God.

In the book's penultimate chapter Williams discusses the point of morality, and particularly the connection between morality and human well-being. Finally, he discusses utilitarianism as an example of a moral theory.

Although this text presents nothing new to the professional philosopher or graduate student, it is a supremely rewarding introduction to moral thought for two reasons. One, it is short. At 97 pages, this book can be covered in one day. Second, although some of Williams' own views are discussed, this essay is a lucid, easy to read survey of the major modes of ethical thinking - from amoralist to utilitarian.

If you want to know more about moral philosophy but are not sure where to begin, try here.

This is a very short, highly polemical introduction to moral philosophy comprising ten brilliantly concise little essays. There are extremely few good introductory texts in ethics and the best way into the subject is probably via its more accessible classics such as Plato's `Gorgias' and Mill's `Utilitarianism'. But if you are looking for a good intro text, this would be hard to improve on and in the 30 years since it was published I doubt if anyone has improved on it. It's inexhaustibly rich, witty, judicious and illuminating. Famously, the late Professor Williams write in the preface that `most moral philosophy at most times has been empty and boring, and the number of good books in the subject... can be literally counted on the fingers of one hand.' This and the other books he went on to write are among the strongest reasons one could adduce in arguing that at least two hands would now be required.

...which is worth the attention of more advanced students, too. The arguments here are crisp without being technical, and deeply engaging. His discussions of the attributive "good", of the point of morality, and of the connection between morality and religion are exemplary. The book ends with a subtle critique of utilitarianism.

This book is very useful for ones who interest philosophy.

I am a student in İzmir Divinity Faculty in Turkey. Translation of this book is my study for finishing my school. Generally this book is very good. But for foreign reader it is some difficult.

For my study I need Mr. Williams' C.V. If you send this information, I will be very happy.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Zehra Gençel Efe

This book is very wordy...I felt that the author used sentence structures which compicated the reader...I may be a simplistic reader, but I feel fluidity of sentence plays an essential role in conveying an idea to the audience.