Customer Reviews

In Mortal Combat

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(5)
3 star:		(4)
2 star:		(3)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

Toland depicts the Korean War with such detail and accuracy that it becomes impossible to romantisize war. The soldiers were against overwhelming odds in extreme conditions, and constantly in a struggle to stay alive. By retelling the war from the perspective of all the key generals in the war, or from a close observer of a general, Toland gave us their insight to why they made the decisions that they did. He also captured many of these key decisions in the epilogue detailing the weaknesses and mistakes of the key leaders. His historical accuracy of the carnage produced on both sides made it a chilling reminder of the horrors of war. The lengthy cat and mouse game played between the governments of the United States, North Korea, and China to sign the peace agreement lasted over a year while American soldiers suffered in POW camps. I wasn't born at the time, but reading it now made me angry as the battles continued to produce casualties as did the POW camps. Very good book!

Toland has written some outstanding books to include, THE RISING SUN and BUT NOT IN SHAME. However, IN MORTAL COMBAT is sloppy. He routinely makes mistakes when describing Anerican Army combat units and their role in the war. Moreover, he has lionized ceratin commanders, like Gen Walker, who were at best mediocre commanders. The book's only strength is that he made an attempt to tell the story of the North Koreans, too, and for that Toland deserves some credit. Still, for a better history of the war, its hard to beat Roy Appleman's SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU.

due to the fact that it has a strong and interesting beginning, a somewhat "vanilla" middle , and a rather "limp" ending.

I am not a military historian, but am an analyst. I am not a veteran, but do understand the difference between the various types of "histories",i.e. academic military history, journalistic military history, popular military history ("coffee table" books, etc.), "official histories", oral history, etc.

This book definately falls into the journalistic history category, with all it pitfalls and advantages. One pitfall is that Mr. Toland is FAR too easy on the press in general and he doesn't spend much time at all on faults of the forementioned press. On the other hand, one of the advantages is that this book is a wonderful "read", i.e. the book has a definite flow to it (along with being easy to read).

In my opinion, the book, like some of his other books, starts off very strong and detailed and then proceeds to a somewhat bland middle and finishes with a rather "limp" ending. [The book of his that epitimizes this is: The Rising Sun!] His discussion of Generals Walker and MacArthur are very good indeed and better than most other books (considering that he does it better in FAR less space/wording). Another strong suit of this book is the insight and discussion of POWS and their treatment. He also, does give a view of the "other side of the hill", which other so-called "histories of the Korean War" fail to do. However, in the middle of the book I would have liked to see more detailed discussion on some of the "nitty-gritty" tactical battles once the Chinese entered the war (as by this pt. in the book he just covers entire campaigns at the division and Corps level, with just "snippets" of tactical action). Finally, the last group of chapters in the book, "WAR & PEACE", could have been much better. He only covers the political bickering between the two sides and almost completely ignores ANY of the many interesting tactical struggles going on all along the "static" front line (MLR). IF he would have covered more than just the one he did, it would have GREATLY enhanced the book for me.

Thus, my real rating for this book is as follows:

1st 1/3 of book ***** (5 stars) Middle 1/3 of book ***1/2 (3.5 stars) Final 1/3 of book ** (2 stars)

Overall rating = 5 + 3.5 + 2 = 10.5/3 = 3.5 Stars or rounding to 4 Stars.

I want to use the title of this book to contrast Mortal Combat, which is what war is all about, with Mortal Kombat, which is what Clintonesque left wing radicals think it is all about. To be fair, the Pentagon did not help matters much with its 'videos' of missiles going thru store windows in Desert Storm. Some blame goes to Hollywood's celluloid warriors, who have been trying sanitize battle for decades, and the Air Force, which thinks war consists of flyboys doing a few afternoon sorties and returning in time for dinner at the Officers club.

I once met an editor who claimed he could decide if a book was suitable for publication after reading just three pages. I must state a concurring opinion. The early pages-- preface, contents, organization of a book-- are critical indicators of the quality which follows. In this sense, Tollands book does a good job, stating a few questions about the Korean War he will attempt to answer.

*** Did Russia and China Conspire to start the war?
No. China not only distrusted Russia because of its rape of Manchuria, Mao's dislike for Stalin was deep and personal. Instead, Stalin approved of the Korean War because it distracted American attention and materiel from Europe. His support of Chinese intervention was tepid and came at a high price. [Reviewers comment: I lived in the Russian Far East on the Manchurian border for six months. Russian visceral dislike for the Chinese continues and is a factor in local elections in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk.]
*** Was Trumans' insistence on voluntary repatriation of POWs valid?
Toland really has little new to offer here, and you would be better off reading Turner Joy's book, "How Communists Negotiate."

On some questions, he punts....
*** Did Americans use biological warfare?
After a ONE page discussion, Tolland says he can't believe the US did, but he can't deny the Chinese sure as hell believed we did. Gee. Thanks!

And on some questions, he never comes back to them. He tells us he will deal with the revisionist historians who claim the US provoked the war using South Koreans as puppets; but there is no mention of this in the main text.

Despite this mixed start, the book is a good chronology of the War and adds some detail not seen in other texts. His coverage of the battles in the east of Korea--Yechon, Taegu-- and the heroism of Private Myers are unique. Readers of Knox's books will recognize names, battles, and terrain of the Pusan perimeter. Tolands narrative is more detailed and analytical.

With respect to the Inchon landing, Toland also enlightens the reader. The Chinese told Kim Il Sung to expect and amphibious assault at that time and place (perhaps they read the NY Times, also?) but the 'great leader' was quite convinced his In-Min Gun would have the war wrapped up by then. Toland warms the heart of this former collegiate debater when he points out that McArthur skillfully accused critics of his Inchon landing of opposing any amphibious assault. Furthermore, General Walker felt at the time, and speculated even more later in the War and in the book, that the Inchon landing might have been a technical success but a tactical failure: it was too far behind enemy lines. Many enemy remained south of the parallel and harassed UN supply routes.

Another contribution Toland makes: everyone on the ground was wondering why the Chinese 'disappeared' into the hills after their initial assaults in early November. Some felt it was a warning from the Chinese, and having made their point, they vanished. Wrong: it was a tactic by Mao to exploit McArthur's overconfidence. UN forces indulged the Chinese premier by marching northward into the trap.

Other than these the authors' narratives and outlook on the war and negotiations closely resemble other authors. I do have an amusing question for Toland: is Maggie Higgins your fantasy or something?? For the first third of the book or so, Maggie Higgins makes more cameo appearances than Ted Kennedy at an IRA fundraiser.

I have been very disappointed by this book. Approximate at best on several occasions and written with way too much emphasis. There is a point where it just kills the credibilty of the book. Max Hasting's book for example, though far less accentuated on the hard fightings of the war is the work of an historian, not of a novelist.
The global synthesis of a whole conflict is not an easy task for sure but in this particular case the goal wasn't achieved.

I have been a fan of John Toland's books ever since I was a kid and read the abridged version of BATTLE: THE STORY OF THE BULGE. Toland writes in a style that is enjoyable to read. In reading his books it is evident that John Toland was an aspiring playright and budding novelist.

IN MORTAL COMBAT was Toland's last major military history book. He assembled this volume from numerous sources and made a concerted effort to keep the story balanced. In reading IN MORTAL COMBAT you find that the Korean War was not just a case of evil communists battling righteous capitalists. Nor was this a proxy war between the Soviet Union and the United States. Certainly the North Korean armed forces were equipped by and patterned after the Red Army, but the North Korean's shared a common goal with their southern neighbors: To unite Korea under one flag.

The North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel without without any contrived or otherwise phony pretext. At that time the dividing line, the 38th parallel, was an unfortified imaginary line cutting across the Korean peninsula. The attack was focused on destroying the Republic of Korea forces and driving foreigners from their shores. The invasion caught both South Koreans and American forces by surprise. The great conquering US Army of the Second World War had lapsed in peacetime apathy. Worse was the fact that American reinforcement sent to Korea were initially equipped with artillery shells and anti-tank weapons that were proven ineffective in the World War five years earlier.

Squeezed into the Pusan Perimeter, the United Nations force, primary US troops, counterattacked and virtually destroyed the North Korean army. North Korea was on the verge of total collapse when thousands of Chinese volunteers appeared on the scene. In a series of carefully scripted offensives, the Chinese pushed the UN forces back to the 38th parallel resulting in a series of see-saw battles of attrition until the cease fire finally took effect.

Toland clearly describes the challenges for Generals Douglas MacArthur and Matthew Ridegway in fighting the first limited war. Up until the Korean War the American military was used to pulling out all of the stops and waging war until victory was achieved. The Korean War was certainly frustrating for the two US military leaders. The Chinese were likewise perplexed by the wavering support of the Soviet Union for the struggle. It became clear to Chairman Mao that Stalin was playing a waiting game and was all too happy to have Chinese and American soldiers battle on a distant battlefield.

Toland garnered numerous interviews from participants from all quarters. In later years Toland was accused of being a revisionist historian -- specifically after publishing the two volume THE RISING SUN. That criticism is certainly misplaced. There is a great effort here. About the only overall opportunity for this book is that it was deserving of being a two or three volume set. Some activities are covered in great detail. Others are covered in a sentence or two. The narrative also jumps forward in time almost as if large portions of the original manuscript were edited wholesale from the book.

As I noted in other military history reviews, this is a great book, but should be read in conjunction with outher books on the Korean War.

I found this to be a very good, highly readable history. The Korean War was way before my time. During my schooling it was largely ignored so I had virtually no idea about anything that went on. Toland's book was a great education for me. He gives a great overview. He also goes into some good depth following certain individuals/units throughout the war. I would higly recommend it to anyone looking to understand this incredible conflict that is often called "The Forgotten War". It is also beneficial for understanding some of the current situations that the United States finds itself in. From the tensions with North Korea and China to the handling of prisoner detainees and the prosecution of an unpopular war at home, this book helps shed light on all of it.
On the down side I would say that Toland tends to jump around quite a bit in certain places which detracts from the continuity. It seems as if he tries to cram too much material into certain chapters and then has a difficult time tying it together in a way that flows evenly.

I thoroughly enjoyed reading this book, and I think it's a good starting point to begin studying the Korean War. Like many of the reviewers I found the amount of space spent describing the actions and movements of media people a bit puzzling. I did enjoy reading about General Walker's actions during the Pusan Perimeter battles. One thing that became very clear to me in reading this book is that we really do need good biographies on both Generals Walker and Almond. I am a bit concerned by some of the possible factual errors pointed out in some of the other reviews, and I'll be on the lookout for more accurate versions of those events as I continue to read Korean War books.

This is a lengthy book on the fascinating but vexed topic of the Korean War. Toland strives for what he calls a non-partisan, non-ideological approach, and generally succeeds. Unfortunately he, along with other historians, is able to shed little light on crucial events leading up to North Korea's invasion of the south. This remains one of the many murky but fascinating puzzles surrounding this "forgotten" war. A couple of points from the book are worth remarking on.

Like most orthodox historians, Toland lays principal blame on General Mac Arthur's notoriously imperious personality for the strategic entry of China into the war. In short, Mac Arthur's egotism led UN forces into the military debacle at the Yalu. Toland, like many others, however, neglects the importance of our domestic "China Lobby" in providing the General with the political support he needed to mount his aggressive advance on Chinese Manchuria. The fact that the war was widened as a result was more a matter of domestic American politics than the theater commander's unbounded ego.

The book's most distinctive parts are those that attempt to balance the historical account. Several rather startling admissions surface like sudden jolts of alarm during the closing chapters. First is the degree of military censorship and evasion surrounding the two years of peace negotiations. Surprisingly, Toland reports American journalists as getting more accurate information from left-wing and communist sources than from our own official sources. (Even so, there is no insurrection among overseas reporters; that would come later in Vietnam.) Nowhere, however, are his credentials as a non-partisan historian under greater pressure than on the explosive issue of biological weapons, perhaps the war's most controversial subject. Generally dismissed out of hand in orthodox accounts, Toland makes the startling pronouncement that evidence does indeed support communist claims of biological weapons used against them. Paradoxically, however, he almost immediately reverses himself by citing support for UN denials. The net result is that both sides are held as being correct! Clearly the author is not prepared psychologically to tackle the war's knotty ideological issues. In that sense, Toland remains a strictly military historian and jounalist, but one who has produced a highly readable account of a murky long-ago war.

Good descriptive view of Korean War. There were areas where I thought the research was a bit sloppy - wish some of the facts had been double checked by a good fact checker or what ever. I enjoy Toland's work, have read most of it, and enjoyed this one but it was not one of his best works. Recommend reading but reading with a mind set that not all is written in stone.