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The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe

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It is difficult to follow-up on a definitive book such as the Invisible People, Greg Behrman's factual yet deeply poignant book about AIDS in Africa which has inspired many Americans to take action to help alleviate the tragic pandemic effecting the African people. Yet, I can conclusively write that Behrman has done it again with his recently published book, The Most Noble Adventure. Behrman has taken the Marshall Plan and brought it to life with his description of all the key players such as Paul Hoffman, Averell Harriman, Richard Bissell, Will Clayton and Arthur Vandenberg. Behrman describes a George Marshall who is beholden to none except the interests of his country. The author describes how Marshall viewed the economic conditions in Europe as not only a huge humanitarian issue but also a potentially dangerous bridge to communism. Behrman also introduces Arthur Vandenberg, a major figure in The Noble Adventure, as an inspirational Republican U.S. senator who transcended party politics to "do the right thing". Without Vandenberg, an ex-isolationist, the Marshall Plan would never have passed through congress.Finally, Behrman's narrative takes the reader through the enactment of The Plan and all of its benefits to Europe and the United States as well as the unwinding of The Plan and the surrounding global political climate.
Behrman does an excellent job in educating the reader on what it takes to implement a program as complex as the Marshall Plan. He also describes the necessary bi-partisan support needed to capture the American public as well as the Congress. Behrman introduces us to players that remind us that while Marshall was a key player in The Plan, he was only one player in ensuring its acceptance and implementation. We also get a close view of the flawed Soviet thinking and strategy that eventually led to a Europe beyond its reach. Behrman reminds us that there are many applications of the Marshall Plan in today's world such as in Iraq, the Middle East and Africa. History repeats itself and as Behrman implies, repetition is not always negative but can actually be very positive if all parties come together to choose a noble adventure that, in today's world, can yield very important and life saving results that can also inch us towards world peace.

Detailed history of the plan that helped Europe get back on it's feet after WWII and kept Stalin and the communists from spreading their influence into Western Europe. Greg Behrman gives the account of how Secretary of State George Marshall's speech went from an idea to such an ambitious plan.

Following the War, Europe was in shambles. Germany had been the major manufacturing power but industry and distribution channels had been disrupted and destroyed. The people were discouraged and pessimistic about recovery, and the weather was worse than usual. The US had already given a lot of "relief aid" with nothing to show for it. Marshall envisioned a much more ambitious goal of helping to rebuild those systems that would allow Europe to pull itself out of it's problems, but he wanted to keep it under the Congressional radar long enough to prevent them from changing the essential humanitarian (and expensive) nature of the plan. Even then, it was a tough sell and only through some unlikely allies such as Michigan Senator and ex-isolationist Arthur Vandenburg was it passed. Many continued to try to cut the funding, but extensive propaganda efforts saved it. Other important figures such as Paul Hoffman, Richard Bissell, Will Clayton, Averell Harriman, etc., and their enormous contributions are discussed, as well as some of the mechanics of how it made Europeans a partner in their rebuilding. Also prominent are the essential contributions of important Europeans, such as Bevine (UK) and Bidault (France).

A key point about the Marshall Plan was it's focus on preventing communist influence from spreading and containing Stalin's power. Behrman explains the efforts communists employed to sabotage the plan, everything from Molotov's delay tactics in early negotiations to the strikes and riots by Italian and French communists, and the influence the US had in Italian elections in 1948. But Behrman makes it very clear where the communists overplayed their hand, and instead brought home the necessity of the plan to those in Congress who were more inclined toward an isolationist policy. He explains the reasons for reluctance to offer aid, the efforts that had already been made, the difficulties faced by the starved European countries and the "dollar gap" that prevented them from importing what they needed. US efforts at European economic integration (50 years before the EU!) are also discussed extensively, as well as French fears over a rebuilt Germany.

Interesting and definitely worth reading but not always a very "rousing" or compelling history of what was perhaps America's greatest moment. But the greater story here is entirely relevant to our current situation in and policy toward the Middle-East. The Marshall Plan worked because it made Europeans responsible for rebuilding their economy, and then gave them the help needed to get started. It was administered mostly by selfless men who had the brains to make it work, and corruption was very minimal. It was not heavy-handed and forceful, seeking to dictate all the conditions attached to the aid given, but wasn't simple charity either. And it had true leadership at all levels, something we seem to be missing today.

There are many in the United States who believe, rightly so, that the post-World War II period was this country's finest. Having triumphed in war, we then went on to win an even broader peace. The plan to bring that peace, brilliantly conceived by the man after whom it was named, General George C. Marshall, was then (and is now) considered to be the finest overture of any nation helping any other nations in history. Greg Behrman's comprehensive and insightful new book about the Marshall Plan, "The Most Noble Adventure", delves into every aspect of the plan's success...economic, political, historical and social and reveals the personalities that helped the plan get off the ground and keep going. Behrman has a talent for telling the story and he does so in a most compelling way.

This book is as much about Marshall as it is about those who came under his sphere during the years of the plan's conception and deployment. The cast runs far and wide. Will Clayton, whom Behrman describes as the "intellectual architect" of the Marshall Plan was as influential as they come. His business skills were a boon to the plan and without him it is unlikely it would have gotten very far. Dean Acheson and Averell Harriman, two longtime government servants of remarkable note, helped steer European leaders when times and tensions became rough. Richard Bissell was the point man on how the money would be spent. Paul Hoffman, the Republican businessman who agreed to head the Economic Cooperation Administration, lent an air of bipartisanship desperately needed in the Truman administration. His contributions to the Marshall Plan are almost without equal. There are many more Americans, of course, but one cannot overlook the political importance of Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan. Staunchly isolationist before Pearl Harbor, Vandenberg changed his views over time and helped shepherd the Marshall Plan through Congress.

Behrman points out that one of the goals of the Marshall Plan was to ensure that Europe would take the lead in determining its own fate and the plan was to be of assistance to this end. Not only did the United States hope to see Europe recover but the architects of the Marshall Plan hoped for the integration of Europe. That took longer, but the key player was Frenchman Jean Monnet's joint sovereignty proposal that allowed for France's sharing coal and steel resources with Germany along their common border. This magnificent proposal got the integration idea rolling. Another European of merit gets quite a bit of note in Behrman's book, British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, who often had to chart a lonely course of his own.

The author is particularly adept at describing the tensions that arose at just about every level and with every country. Grand ideas are hard to implement and the fact that the Marshall Plan was able to circumvent the landmines that were placed before it is a true testament to the courage and will of the people mentioned above and others in the book. All this at a time when Josef Stalin had his own designs in Europe and was solidifying his base in the East. (There is one funny oversight in Behrman's book. He says that "to further discredit Soviet propaganda about American cultural vacuity, some of America's finest performers and minds were flown to Europe"... and goes on to mention George Gershwin. Since Gershwin had died in 1937, this must have been news to the world community, let alone the Gershwin family!)

Greg Behrman has provided us with a wonderful read in "The Most Noble Adventure" and secondhandidly reminds us of America today. We have a "George" now, but compared to George Marshall, the current George seems very small, indeed. With the political climate in Washington these days it's hard to see another Marshall Plan evolving in the same way. But thanks to General Marshall and his broad thinking, the world became a better place, at least for a few years.

On 5 June 1947, US Secretary of State General George Marshall (he always preferred "General") gave Harvard University's Commencement Address from the steps of the Memorial Chapel aboard the pristine Cambridge campus. Marshall's speech provided the broadest outlines of what would come to be known as the "Marshall Plan," a plan to reinvigorate and rehabilitate Western Europe. Greg Behrman's fine new book tells the subsequent story of what is generally regarded as the greatest foreign policy triumph in US history.

Behrman writes for a purpose, and he tells us right away what it is. As a young historian who graduated from Princeton, earned a Master's Degree from Oxford, and is currently serving as a fellow at The Aspen Institute in Colorado, Behrman believes that in the post 9/11 world, the US has not yet responded with "comparable depth or imagination" to the challenges posed, and further believes that the Marshall Plan "contains insights that speak to the current American moment with resonance and urgency." Behrman's stated purpose in "The Most Noble Adventure" is to "help to illuminate a brighter path forward."

Behrman cites three broad reasons for the Marshall Plan's success. The first is an uncommon degree of bipartisanship shown by the US Congress. This was most deftly orchestrated by Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Grand Rapids, Michigan. Vandenberg helped to steer a then-largely isolationist Republican Party to understand the benefits of aiding Western Europe at a time when it needed a helping hand most. Indeed, Vandenberg viewed aid to Europe as a true national security issue, and saw that it could shore up the western democracies as a bulwark against Stalin's expansionist USSR. Behrman makes clear that without Vandenberg's strong support, the Marshall Plan would never have passed a skeptical and inward-looking Congress eager to use funds to focus on problems back home.

Behrman's second theme is that the Marshall Plan was truly an international and multilateral endeavor. US diplomats worked closely with foreign leaders such as Clement Atlee and Ernest Bevin of England; Georges Bidault, Paul Ramadier, Robert Schuman, and Jean Monnet of France; and Konrad Adenauer of West Germany, among many, many others to engender a new era of Western European peace and prosperity. The sixteen countries that were the ultimate beneficiaries of Marshall Plan aid had countless disagreements over the distribution of that aid, the pace of European integration, and the industrial future of Germany. But US and European bureaucrats showed an unusual degree of diplomatic skill over the course of many conferences, summits, and backroom deals, to find workable solutions to nearly every problem they faced. While Behrman acknowledges that it is was highly probable that the looming specter of Stalin's exportation of communist ideology and the terrible winter of 1947 might have bonded the Western European countries together without a gentle push from the US, he also makes a persuasive case that the US and its allies cooperated to a level rarely seen among sovereign nations. The international cooperation begun in the Marshall Plan was so exceptional that it bled over into security relationships that found fruition in the creation of NATO: arguably the most successful standing alliance in history.

The third theme that Behrman stresses is the vision and quality of those US citizens who served their country during that crucial time from June 1947 to June 1950. Statesmen such as Dean Acheson, George Kennan, and Averell Harriman were classic products of the east coast foreign policy establishment, and though they were elitist through and through, they felt a profound obligation to serve and serve well. They were the architects of the policy of containment, which guided US foreign policy actions for nearly half a century. Will Clayton and Paul Hoffman represented the best of men from the private sector; these were two successful businessmen who took a personal loss to serve a greater good by administering portions of the Marshall Plan. And towering above all the others is always General George Marshall; so respected yet humble, visionary yet simple, and unbending yet compassionate. His stature alone assured the bipartisan support the plan required (Truman insisted that the plan be named after the apolitical Marshall rather than himself) and the recruitment of the best citizens we had to make the plan work.

On 25 June 1950, three years after Marshall's Harvard address, North Korea invaded South Korea after receiving approval from Josef Stalin. Behrman correctly identifies this as a turning point in Western Europe; unable to gain a foothold against the combined diplomatic and economic power of the US and its Western European allies, Stalin resorted to military force in Northeast Asia. The years after Marshall Plan aid subsided saw a great increase in Western European fertility, which was boiled down to a combination of optimism plus free milk. Western Europe would make it after all, and in what I think is the best sentence of the book, Behrman says why: "During one of Western Europe's darkest and most desperate periods, the Marshall Plan delivered hope, it delivered reason for Western Europeans to envision a world into which they would want to bring children." And Marshall Plan milk and optimism enabled it.

Behrman's book is an excellent history of the Marshall Plan. If there is one area where the book could improve, it would be the addition of a series of maps. Behrman makes many geographic references, especially to the coal and steel regions of the Ruhr and to the legs flown during the Berlin airlift, but there is no map to give these comments context. Still, this is an excellent book and one in which I daresay that Behrman has achieved his lofty purpose.

It's hard to imagine sometimes and easy to forget that once America was truly transformative as a nation. Through the Marshall plan, we saved Europe from the grip of crippling poverty and the encroach of Communism. In many ways, as this book points out, the Marshall plan was the very best of America and America at its true apogee, at least when it comes to American foreign policy during peacetime. The brightest, most creative, and most idealistic and noble of an American generation answered the call and gave their all for their country. Their story is the story of the Marshall plan and the story of this book.

Good book it is definately ideal for the history buff and anyone who appreciates how things became what they are now from where they were at the end of the 2nd World War.

As a history buff I found this book fasinating. Very readable,moves right along. Not only covers the neccesity of the plan but covers the feelings, sacrifices and doubts of the American people as well as the people for whom it was intended. Sets historically the period after WW2. Addressing economic and nationalistic struggles in Europe but not covering ground easily found in other books. This book sticks to the issues.
I gave 4 stars instead of 5 for the simple reason that upon a new person or item being introduced the continuity would be broken by references to previous years.

The Most Noble Adventure - The Marshall Plan and How America Helped Rebuild Europe by Greg Behrman
From my education and reading I had a layman's knowledge of the Marshall Plan. If asked for a definition I would answered like this: " after WW2 the United States materially contributed to the reconstruction of Europe that had been devastated by war". This generalized statement is essentially accurate but very incomplete.
Mr. Berhrman's excellent book gives us a closed examination of the subject. To his credit the author avoids charts and pages of statistics detailing Marshall plan assistance. We are given brief and succinct biographies of the principle players; detailed descriptions of the spirited congressional debates and summaries of geo-political events that influenced the Plan and it's supports. The author uses abundant quotes two of which follows:
On June 5, 1947, Ernest Bevin, England's Foreign Secretary, listed on his wireless set to the text of George Marshall's speech given that day at the Harvard University commencement. For Bevin, Marshall's address was " a lifeline to sinking man' It seemed to bring hope where there was none" from p71 of the text

George Marshall spoke very eloquently during his address after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953: "The cost of war is constantly spread before me, written neatly in many ledgers of whose columns are gravestones. I am greatly moved," therefore, "to find some means or method of avoiding the calamity of war." He spoke of democracy and the moral power of freedom and self-respect for the individual. "These democratic principles," however "do not flourish on empty stomachs", he said. When there is want and deprivation "people turn to false promises or dictators because they are hopeless for anything that promises something better than the miserable existence they endure." -from p341 of the text. It should be noted that George Marshall is the first and only professional soldier ever to receive the award.

After reading this book I was most impressed with Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, the Republican Senator who championed The Marshall Plan through congress against the strong tide of his parties regulars. His reward was to be labeled "Benedict Arnold" by many. In my opinion many Europeans, if they knew of his efforts, would refer to him as Saint Vandenberg.

This is the first book I've read dedicated to The Marshall Plan - the reconstruction of Europe after the devastation of World War II which not so subtly also combated the spread of communism. The book is an admirable attempt but we need to wait for another to do this piece of history its true justice. The problem is that this volume reads in fits and starts - which implies lulls and there are more than a few of those in this book - and it strays from its subject attempting to cover numerous related topics - NATO, the birth of the CIA, the Korean War, the 1948 Presidential election and McCarthyism to name a few - all done piecemeal and this detracts from a coherent theme to the book. At times I felt as if I was reading one brief synopsis of a news story after another much like flipping through flashcards which became both cumbersome and at times repetitive.

On the positive side The Marshall Plan, its success and especially the players involved need to be remembered and this book does a good job at (re)introducing these topics and people to the reader. Some of the names hopefully are still familiar starting with George Marshall, Dean Acheson and Averell Harriman. But other key players such as Will Clayton, the intellectual architect of the plan; Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a Republican Senator who championed the plan through Congress - repeatedly - and Paul Hoffman who "sold" the plan both domestically and internationally deserve the recognition/credit this book gives them for the success of this "Most Noble Adventure". There are also a handful of European statesman/leaders who deserve much credit and their stories are included here.

Although this is not a "perfect" read, if you are interested in the topic pick up the book. At just under 350 pages it's not a major time commitment and is actually somewhat timely as we are still mired in a world-wide financial crisis that can only be solved with international cooperation - If it could be done 60 years ago why not now?

To end on an ironic historical note - when FDR selected Eisenhower over George Marshall to lead D-Day he told Ike he was worried that Marshall would not be remembered 50 years hence for all that he did for the country and civilization. And in fact Marshall does not garner the recognition today he deserves, so any book which highlights his accomplishments is a good thing.

This is a useful work on the Marshall plan that achieves its stated purpose of providing a comprehensive single volume narrative history profiling the personalities involved and the main themes of the initiative. There are many problems with this story, however, and the author has stressed two themes, the American initiative to deter Europe from falling totally into the Communist orbit and the simultaneous push for Western Europe's economic and eventual political consolidation into a single entity. As we now know, both efforts were successful (eventually) although the political unification has not been fully implemented.

The myth of the Marshall Plan that is learned in every American high school is that the plan was formulated and used to assist Europe in rebuilding from the destruction of World War II. Typically one hears that the Marshall Plan provided the funds for Germany to rebuild its cities and industry destroyed by British and American bombing. The truth, of course, is somewhat different and author Behrman doesn't even bother to confront the myth.

Unfortunately the author does not provide the single table that would show where the Marshall Plan money went -- a table that would be at odds with his themes. Of the money that went to the 16 European nations (Trieste was added as a separate entity), 40% of the money went to just two countries, Britain and France. Britain was not in danger of going communist (however, France and Italy were), and when the Marshall Plan money is combined with the direct aid during 1946-1952, Britain and France's percentage of American aid to Europe doubles. And, of course, the State Department could not fail to expand a program that ultimately received public approval, and the ECA distributed several hundred million dollars to India, Spain, and Asia that are normally included in ECA disbursements.

The author's canonization of Marshall is a little over the top. He never led troops in battle, and was much more an administrator than the "military genius" painted by Behrman. Nor was he without flaws. His adherence to a rigid personal schedule and lack of command oversight and direction exacerbated the Pearl Harbor defeat, although the author infers that Marshall's involvement was saluatory. His personnel appointments tended to be based more on personalities than performance, and when he flew to Moscow in March, 1947, he still lived in the fantasy land that, as the author puts it, "...cooperation with Stalin was possible. And perhaps he was the one man who could achieve it."

Marshall's speech was drafted by Charles Bohlen which Behrman mentions but then dismisses in favor of Marshall's self-serving rendition of how the speech was constructed. At any rate, speed was indicated to ward off the collapse of Western Europe and its fall under communist domination, and it only took 11 months before the relief portion (food, etc) of the plan began to arrive in Europe. Mass starvation was averted and the Socialist governments who were unable to solve their own problems through increasing government programs were propped up by the products of American free enterprise.

The author shows a curious sympathy for both the socialist governments and Stalin's communist regime, stating, "The 1930s were a time of remarkable growth (in the Soviet Union). The economy was planned to precision, industry flourished and much of the citizenry benefited." No doubt the Kulaks and those who starved due to the disasterous agricultural planning would agree. He also goes easy on France, whose irrational focus on the glory of France and its "premier" cultural position would not allow it to accept anything but the dominant role in post-war Europe. The fear of "Americanization" by dollars provided by cultural cowboys (described in European eyes by the author as "a giant with the limbs of an undergraduate, the emotions of a spinster, and the brain of a pea-hen," was more potent than their fear of Stalin and communism. And as A.J. Taylor noted, "Nobody in Europe believes in the American way of life -- that is private enterprise." Gee, it doesn't sound like European opinion has changed much in the last 60 years. And the author repeatedly used "The Economist", a leftist magazine produced in Great Britain, to support his contentions.

On the other hand the author inadvertantly mentions the gross arrogance by American functionaries in Europe, most notably Harriman and his staff of 2,000 in Paris and other European capitals. They were deciding (for example) on how much wheat a country could produce but then figuring on how much irrigation was needed, then on how much machinery would be needed for the irrigation, then how much the railroads needed to improve to transport the wheat, and how many tractors and ploughs would be necessary, etc., etc. A European country would submit its requests, but then Americans would decide what was best for that country and work out the details. Rather sounds like centralized planning by a group of foreigners, doesn't it?

So why did France require two (or four) times the aid of Germany when the destruction of Germany was so much more extensive? The author attempts to answer this question by stating that the German industrial plant was much less damaged that had been previous assumed. That's a pretty wild answer, particularly in light of the vast numbers of homeless Germans. Nonetheless by 1965, there was more wartime destruction still evident in London than in Hamburg although Hamburg had endured more than twice the weight of bombs than London and lost over 100,000 people in the fire storms of July 1943.

Also I must point out some of the more obvious mistakes in this work. On page 217 he states that Bruce was a "gourmand" when I believe he means "gourmet." He also implies that Bruce, Rockefeller, Schlesinger and Bruce were in Paris before the liberation. In addition I was amused that Wisner recruited those he knew from his own social and professional circles, Ivy Leaguers, lawyers and Wall Street bankers into the CIA. Yep, that's true, but not something normally exposed to the public. And speaking of not exposing something to the public, Behrman is to be congratulated for exposing the fact that Truman did not make the Clifford-Elsey Report public in order not to enflame American public opinion against the Soviet Union. As always, the Federal Government does not trust the American people. On page 274 Behrman blandly asserts that "Communists had been all but weeded out of government" (by 1950). Wow! Evidently Behrman is unaware of the Venona transcripts which showed that Soviet penetration of the Federal Government was endemic during the 40s, with over 200 agents alone in the State Department. By 1950, few had been "weeded out." McCarthy actually understated the situation, and there are still legions of Americans fearing exposure as Soviet archives become more open to the West.

Even with its flaws I recommend this book. However the book is to be read carefully and the reader must understand that the author is a writer at the Aspen Institute, almost a subsidiary of the Bilderberg Group and an institution that supports the formation of a Supra-National Socialist World Government run by the monied and intellectual elites of Europe, America, and other advanced states. It heavily supports the EU and eventual political federalization of Europe as well as the formation of a North American Union replacing the sovereign states of Canada, the US and Mexico with an amero replacing the dollar. As such, the Marshall Plan and subsequent Schuman Plan are important forerunners of their agenda. A note on the political correctness of the author -- malaria causes more deaths in Africa than AIDS, but one does not see the author supporting the resumed use of DDT.

Other works for those interested in the Marshall Plan:
"Labor Under The Marshall Plan" by Anthony Carew, 1987 -- this work discusses the development of a new labor-capital relationship in the MP nations.
"America's Feeble Weapon: Funding The Marshall Plan in France and Italy" by Chiarella Esposito, 1994 -- shows the Marshall Plan was only incidental to those nations.
"The Origins of the Marshall Plan" by John Gimbel, 1976 -- shows that the MP came from efforts to stop French, not Soviet efforts to prevent the reconstruction of Germany.
"The Marshall Plan" by Michael Hogan, 1987 -- probably the best book on the Marshall Plan and European resistance to Americanization.
"The Wise Men, Six Friends and the World They Made" by Walter and Thomas Isaacson, 1986 -- covers Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett and McCloy.
"The Marshall Plan Revisited" by Imanuel Wexler -- very useful book, heavy on economic statistics.
"40th Report for the Public Advisory Board of the Economic Cooperation Administration" by Richard Bissell (of Bay of Pigs Fame), 1951 -- gives data as of 9/30/1951.

Again allow me to state that there is much good history here with the story of the Marshall Plan and the contributions made by the individuals involved. Some of the author's characterizations of the individuals are a little too heroic, and the demonization of the MP's opponents has to be moderated. In addition, the push towards political consolidation and an eventual one-world government must be filtered somewhat to keep the narrative from becoming polemical. For details, the reader is advised to look at some of the above references.