Customer Reviews

The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace

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There is no end of reasons for anyone interested in Israel and Palestine to read this book. Miller worked for the State Department for a quarter century, under six different Secretaries of State and five presidents. The two Camp David summits essentially bookend his career.

The book is a veritable fountain of insight into American Middle East diplomacy. Miller never loses sight of both the political complications of attempts to bring peace to Israel and its neighbors, nor of the human elements that are such a vital part of diplomacy.

Unusual for a book of its kind, The Much Too Promised Land is exceptionally well-written and fully engages the reader throughout. It's that rarest of creations, a book of politics and history that's also a real page-turner.

Miller gives us priceless material on a quarter-century of American engagement in the Middle East; is unsparing in his criticism, including of himself; but is also quite clear in his praise. One gets a really good picture of what worked and what didn't and why. We also get a picture of the circumstances, which is crucial to understanding why a given course of action might work in 1978 but not in 2007, or might fail at one time but succeed at another.

Perhaps the most important point Miller brings out in his book, though this is not his focus, is the role of the "Israel Lobby" in American policy-making. Miller makes clear what I, among others, have been saying for years-that the "Lobby" is certainly powerful and effective and has an impact, but decisions are not based on what it wants. Miller illustrates well the importance of citizens organizing lobbying forces promoting reasonable policies but also makes clear where the power of lobbying ends and the leadership of a president begins. Click here and here for more of my own work on this issue. We'll get back to the issue of lobbying below.

Miller's book is simply indispensible for anyone wanting to truly understand America's policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict from Carter to George W.

In The Much Too Promised Land, Aaron David Miller presents and blends diplomatic and political history, a personal memoir, and offers advice on the future U.S. role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Miller is unique in his ability to present personal anecdotes and experiences from the peace process and he demonstrates an intimate understanding of the complex and existential issues facing the parties. He is candid and honest, admitting his personal mistakes from his twenty-plus years in the Department of State, and also identifies the errors of those who served around him. The Much Too Promised Land is more than just a diplomatic history however, and provides a readable, accessible book that at times made this reader laugh out loud - not an easy task considering the weighty issues being discussed. The book is a must read, and the supporting website, which is complete with audio clips from many of Miller's interviews with key policymakers is also a great resource.

Part memoir, part history, part journalism, this book by a veteran Arab-Israeli peace negotiator should appeal to Mideast junkies who still believe in the "peace process."
A disclaimer: I covered many of these same events as State Dept. correspondent for Reuters from 1989-94. I was present at some of the events Miller describes; I traveled with Secretaries Baker and Christopher. I even interviewed Miller himself on background a number of times. (He seemed to enjoy chatting to reporters on background but he rarely revealed anything interesting or useful). For more about me and my latest book The Nazi Hunter: A Novelgo to www.alanelsner.com.
This book is an uncertain mix of different genres. The personal memoir I found the most interesting. I wish there were more of these vignettes. I'm interested in the various characters Miller dealt with -- Rabin, Peres, Arafat, King Hussein, Presidents Mubarak and Assad. I'm interested in what went on behind the closed doors because I already know what emerged on the public record (I covered a lot of it). Unfortunately, Miller remains overly coy and discreet. He was never one to give much away and he apparently hasn't changed.
The history segment, in which Miller analyzes the successful Middle East negotiations conducted by Kissinger and President Carter, one can basically read about elsewhere.
The journalism -- he interviewed many of the key players, is somewhat interesting. But most of these actors have a deep interest in presenting events to their best advantage and Miller doesn't really challenge them.
His chapter of the power of the American-Jewish lobby and the fundamentalist Christian-Zionist lobby contained little new.
I picked up a couple of points I disagreed with: Miller claims the Madrid Peace Conference came as a big shock to the press. Not so. The only surprise was the venue. We'd all assumed the conference would be in Lausanne and had already booked hotel rooms.
Miller's account of Baker's trip to see the Kurdish refugees created after the first Gulf War conveniently leaves out the fact that these million plus refugees had fled their homes after the United States allowed Saddam Hussein to crush their revolt -- which they launched at the urging of President Bush. Miller notes that Baker, who had traveled thousands of miles by plane, helicopter and jeep, to see these refugees, stayed less than 10 minutes once he arrived.
The true hero of this book for Miller is Jim Baker who I agree was a largely successful Secretary of State who used the favorable circumstances he was presented with to achieve some modest progress on the Middle East. (He and Bush can be criticized for other failures -- their lack of attention to the looming war in Yugoslavia and the failure to anticipate Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.)
Miller gives relatively low marks to Clinton who got too bogged down in the little details of the negotiations, leaned too far toward Israel and committed himself to an ill-prepared summit at Camp David that was always destined to fail.
Miller loves Rabin, has little time for Netanyahu and is scathing about Barak. He is harsh, but not sufficiently so, about Arafat.
After all the failures and frustrations, Miller is still a true believer. He still believes in the possibility of peace between Israel and the Palestinians and lays out some conditions for that to happen. There may have been missed opportunities in the 1990s (although I personally doubt that either Assad or Arafat were ever ready to make peace with Israel) but it seems quixotic to hope for much today with Hamas ruling Gaza, the Iranian-backed Hizbollah controlling Lebanon and U.S. prestige so far eroded after eight years of Bush.
This book is recommended for those who already know a lot about the Middle East but would like to know a little more about what it was like to be in the middle of those negotiations.
But it falls a touch short in my view of what it could have been.

An interesting look at how diplomacy actually happens on the ground, and of how politics and personalities influence the larger sweep of history. I enjoyed it but thought it was a little light on the issues -- it reminded me more of a sports bio than anything else. A lot of anecdotes and personalities, not quite enough details or nuts and bolts. He explains how key issues play out politically but the details that make these issues problems or how those details get hammered back and forth in negotiations are often given short shrift. A certain level of familiarity is assumed. If you didn't know that Abu Mazen and Mahmoud Abbas are different names for the same person you won't learn it here (even though both names are used, at least once on the same page).

The author had a front row seat for over two decades and has a lot of interesting insights into some of the big plays and major players, but if you haven't been following the game its a little too 'inside baseball'.

I feel that this title is quite appropriate for this work. I found Aaron Miller's book to be a forthright and honest attempt at a historical analysis. What I found so refreshing though was the author's level of honesty. It is hard enough to find books that attempt a balanced view of these issues without adding to it the fact that the writer was very much an active participant in the very history they are attempting to analyze. I felt as if there were no attempt to whitewash or to put a better face on his or the US's role in this history, and so that makes this a very important book. While I may not always agree with his analysis, this disagreement is due to my interpreting the facts differently rather than over how the author has laid out the facts.

The book has a colloquial and anecdotal style that I normally cannot stand, but I think Miller did an excellent job mixing the anecdotal with the scholarly. I didn't find that the style detracted from the substance at all which is the usual problem I have with such works. Instead the style gives the reader a greater feel for how diplomacy works. The interviews and anecdotes bring US diplomacy down from the ethereal plains back down to the human level. Readers get the opportunity to see just how difficult these negotiations really are. It isn't this abstract chess board were large pieces are moved, but rather it is on the personal level where participants thrash out differences face to face. One gets to see just how much personalities play in diplomacy, and we get to see that this diplomacy is the work of hundreds of people and it evolves over time. Today's failure may be the ground work for tomorrow's breakthrough.

I really liked his look into the role of pro-Israel lobbying groups in the US. I think his analysis is very important. These lobbyists are neither all-powerful hands guiding US policy but neither are they completely benign. They are nothing nefarious though. These groups are doing nothing but using the US system to advocate for their policies. This is perfectly legal, and it is essentially the American way of doing politics. My only problem is that I feel these groups have a certain negative impact on US policy in that they have the affect of making the Israeli perspective the default position of US governments. This does affect our balance, and our ability to be honest arbiters in this conflict. This doesn't mean that the US policy can't be affective or that it is forever tilted to the Israelis, but it does mean that more often than not the US is looking at any problems that arise from the Israeli viewpoint rather than from a balanced perspective. The author explains this very well, and also shows how this tilt towards Israel can have benefits as well.

My one fundamental disagreement with this author's analysis is on the Camp David summit under Clinton. The author asserts that the US's unpreparedness was not a critical error that ensured the failure of these negotiations. The author explains that there were still huge gaps between the two sides along with big problems with trust between the sides and constituencies in Israel and the Arab world. While all of this is true, and the possibility of getting substantive agreements from both sides was remote, the fact that the US was unprepared and scrambling during these talks ensured that the two sides would fail to bridge the gap. The US gave too much deference to Israeli political constraints and this sullied the US negotiators from the outset. The US team should have come into these talks armed with a working paper that would have had both sides screaming and threatening to walk out, but instead they allowed the Israelis to have a hand in the drafting of the US starting position. In the end these talks were probably doomed to failure before they ever began, but the US team ensured that failure by not being prepared. Both the Israelis and Palestinians needed a tough and robust arbiter at Camp David to push, cajole and extort the two sides into bridging gaps instead they were largely lead by unfolding events.

All in all this is a great book that will inform all readers. The author takes a very balanced approach that offers readers a valuable perspective. I highly recommend this work.

This is a great read for anyone that is looking to have an insider's view of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Personal anecdotes add to an interesting and informative analysis regarding the history of the conflict. The author offers intimate knowledge of the missed opportunities and the prospects for peace in the future. Very informative and great read for anyone interested in a relevant and significant topic.

Aaron Miller has guts. This book tells the truth about Middle East diplomacy under the last three Presidents and concedes that the most adept was under George HW Bush. Why? The Bush/Baker team was fair and not simply a rubber stamp for the Israelis.
Read this Miller quote on Dennis Ross. Honest and true. So is this brilliant funny and fascinating memoir.

"Dennis, like myself, had a inherent tendency to see the world of Arab-Israeli politics first from Israel's vantage point rather than from that of the Palestinians. Not that he didn't understand Arab or Palestinian sensitivities. But his own strong Jewish identity, and his commitment to Israel's security combined with something else: a deep conviction that if you couldn't gain Israel's confidence, you have zero chance of erecting any kind of peace process. And to Dennis, achieving this goal required a degree of coordination with the Israeli's, sensitivity toward their substantive concerns, and public defense of their positions. Baker's good judgment and toughness balanced and controlled this inclination, which was not the case under Clinton."

The author has been very involved in the Arab-Israeli peace process through the administration of various US presidents. He is able to tell a fairly non-partisan tale of the good and the bad of presidents from Nixon to Bush Jr. This detailed personal knowledge of the peace process players is also the book's downfall. There is too much information about the people, personal relationships and negotiating conditions. At times it drifts in to minutia of the author's experience that would be more appropriate in a personal memoir than in the general history it purports to be.

This narrative gives insight into personal aspects of diplomacy. Miller is an expert on the conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians, and served in the State Department under the last three Presidents. From interviews with the actors Miller also explains for us why Kissinger, Jimmy Carter, and James Baker succeeded in their diplomatic leadership, while Clinton and Bush did not. We learn a great deal about the diplomats as persons, and how each worked to accomplish - or indeed fail in - their ends.

Miller explains the U.S. stake in peace between Israel and the Palestinians. He also shows us the role of American publics, - Jews, Christian supporters of Israel, and Arab-Americans, - in driving or limiting the actions of our government and its diplomatic endeavors. He leaves no doubt that we favor Israel and hence can not really act as an unbiased facilitator between the parties. In fact, he concludes (p. 377) we must learn to say "no" to Israel from time to time.

The Palestine war continues because, as yet, neither side is sufficiently desperate for peace to be able to agree on three issues (p.369). The Palestinians have neither the authority nor the will to build institutions which can guarantee security (no war, no terror, no suicide bombers, no rockets) to Israel. The Israelis have no intention to draw reasonable borders or roll up the West Bank settlements. So the war will continue, and the blood shed, and the occupation.

It is a good book to learn what actually goes on in diplomacy.

Fascinating no holds review of U.S. Middle East policy - willing to take on cherished myths on either side. So interesting that it kept me away from daily NPR news.