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35 of 36 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
The unraveling of Czechohungaropolandoruthenogermanoslovakia, September 19, 2009
This review is from: Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II (Hardcover)
The title of David Faber's Munich, 1938 perhaps unconsciously makes it a perfect bookend for Margaret Macmillan's Paris 1919. Munich put an exclamation point to the tatters of Versailles, and these two books encompass the entire term of Eduard Benes as a Czech leader. Herr Hitler's ironic justification for his aggression leading to the French betrayal of Czechoslovakia and its destruction as a state was the boomerang of `self determination' proclaimed but disregarded at Versailles when Benes secured the borders of his new republic. Faber tells us that when Benes' order for Czech mobilization was officially announced by radio in late September 1938, it was broadcast in all six of the republic's official languages: Czech, Slovak, German, Hungarian, Ruthenian, and Polish. Thus one of the most striking failures of the Versailles treaty's nation building, the story that climaxed in Munich and ended in early 1939 when Hitler liquidated what remained of the Rump Czech State is compellingly told in this new addition to the English speaking history of Nazi Germany. In this day-by-day version we can take the time to contemplate the many sub-themes and personalities involved more fully than in the hackneyed versions that have made Munich a synonym for appeasement. Faber gives a delightful description of a befuddled Nevile Henderson, Britain's ambassador to Berlin, standing with the Nazi leadership at the Nuremberg rally, thinking Hitler both "an apostle of peace" and "insane," but in truth clueless of what these men really intended.
Neville Chamberlain is clearly Faber's protagonist, while Winston Churchill makes far fewer appearances than we might expect. There is no major disparity here from Churchill's version of the Czech crisis in The Gathering Storm (indeed, Faber even borrows a chapter heading from that book--The Loaded Pause). Churchill need not star because London and His Majesty's Government had quite enough players who contemporaneously viewed Chamberlain's actions much as history seems to have accepted them. The critics were however a distinct minority. In Churchill's words the Prime Minister's first ever airplane flight that took him to Germany was "the stupidest thing," and not because of the accident risk involved. Faber, however, makes it resoundingly clear that at the time the folk and the monarch alike cheered Chamberlain's every move in this crisis.
The author documents many times that Hitler intended to invade Czechoslovakia no matter what the "worms" in the French and English governments had to say. Hitler negotiated in a way to "minimize the chances of being cheated out of at least a little war." Also documented are the British people's ardent wishes to avoid war and the French government's terror at having to honor their 1927 treaty with The Little Entente. We can therefore wonder if Chamberlain's initiatives were not more folly than futile even as celebrated as a success. Nevertheless, Faber makes a fascinating story of the "war now or war later" great power diplomacy as a model for future crises. He quotes the Berchtesgaden joint communiqué that describes the first Chamberlain/Hitler talks as "a comprehensive and frank exchange of views," jargon repeated at almost every summit since.
This book is a masterful telling of one of history's tutorial moments, and it will remain a valued reference for those events. Some criticism must be made of a history volume without maps. Beyond the fact that most Americans would not accurately locate the previously annexed Austria as south of and surrounding Czechoslovakia or visualize the Czech borders as a dagger in the heart of Germany, some maps could have demonstrated the demarcations of the various proposed cessions as the Munich Dictate evolved. Also, in a book this detailed there is very little about "what-if." What if Hitler backed down or what if Hitler invaded and forced France into war in 1938. In this year's Masters and Commanders, Andrew Roberts has written of the Spitfires and Hurricanes that won the Battle of Britain "they were in fact for the most part produced during the eleven months of peace bought by Neville Chamberlain at Munich." The author does make it clear that the German military believed war in 1938 meant German defeat. David Faber's version is a very expanded but not revisionist book about Chamberlain and Munich. I highly recommend it.
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21 of 23 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Well Written but Limited, January 23, 2010
This review is from: Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II (Hardcover)
In the Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938, Britain and France sold out Czechoslovakia to the Nazis and set the stage for World War II. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain gleefully announced to cheering crowds in Britain that he had obtained "peace with honor" and "peace for our time." Less than one year later, World War II began.
Author Faber presents the origin and culmination of the Munich crisis, mostly from the British view point. Britain's diplomatic aims and actions, its cabinet politics and the maneuvering in both the press and Parliament are considered in detail, as are many of the personalities involved. Faber has assiduously mined official and personal documents and memoirs to present their public and private thoughts, a device that (together with Faber's considerable writing skill) makes these people live on the page.
Despite this level of detail, much of the history leading to Munich is omitted or not explored deeply. This is the case, to give one example only, with Germany's unilateral reoccupation of the Rhineland (a clear breach of the Versailles Agreement) and the subsequent collapse of the Locarno Pact and the Stresa Front. The British had orchestrated the latter agreements to normalize relations with Germany and provide security for France. Their collapse ended the security system envisioned at Versailles.
Also missing is any detailed exploration of how and why the climate of appeasement arose and had such sway in Britain. Faber makes clear that appeasement was the majority view in Britain and that Chamberlain, whatever his other faults (arrogance and naïveté' among them), was merely leading the British where they very much wanted to go.
Except for Germany, no other country gets nearly the attention that is lavished on Britain (which was admittedly by far the leading Western Power in the appeasement effort). Even with Germany, however, much is unexplored.
Again to give only one example, Faber seems to believe that the Blomberg and Fritsch scandals, the former idiotic and the latter tragic, gave Hitler dominance over the Army. Yet this dominance was probably assured in 1934 when Col. Gen. Blomberg, already Minister of Defense, urged Hitler to act against the SA and its head, Ernst Rohm, whom Blomberg knew was seeking to have the SA take over the Army. Hitler, for this and other reasons, unleashed a lawless purge against the SA (and others), murdering many, including Rohm. Blomberg condoned the purge and placed the Army on alert to cooperate if need be. After President Hindenburg's death later that year, Blomberg had the Army's officers take the infamous oath of personal loyalty to Hitler. This was the corrupt bargain that sealed the Army's fate.
All other participants at Munich are reduced in the narrative to bit players supporting the lead of the Germans and the British. In particular the French are ghosts in the story as Faber relates it. There is little discussion of the twists of French politics and policies that led to their supine attitude at Munich. Similarly little attention is devoted to the attitude of the Soviets or to their deliberate exclusion by the Western powers from Munich, or to the refusal by Britain especially to try to involve the United States. Finally, a review of the bibliography shows that the great majority of sources listed are in English, which may be the reason for the emphasis on Britain.
Faber tells a compelling with skill, but the gaps make the story incomplete. Is it possible that concerns about the book's length (by the publisher?) may have played a role here? I do not think that Faber's book is nearly so complete or comprehensive as Telford Taylor's "Munich: The Price of Peace," originally published in 1979, although Taylor's book is less vividly written and is twice as long.
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19 of 23 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A BRILLIANT ACCOUNT OF A CONTROVERSIAL PERIOD, August 29, 2009
This review is from: Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II (Hardcover)
When Mr. Neville Chamberlaine returned to London from his meeting with Hitler at the end of September,1938,he waved a piece of paper which had his and the Fuhrer's signature."Peace for our time"- he exclaimed.Reality showed how naive he had been then.
Mr Faber has written one of the best books on this topic.It is a narrative history which starts on November,5, 1937.Hitler delivered a famous speech in which he made it very clear that it was his intention to wipe out Czechoslovakia with lightning speed.All its other neighbours would follow and submit to the Nazi beast like a pack of cards.
The next chapter describes the Blomberg- Fritsch scandal.In its aftermath, Hitler cemented his power and his dominance over the army.Adhering to his belief expressed in his "Mein Kampf",Hitler made sure that Austria had to be made part of the German Motherland.In a fascinating chapter which reads like a thriller, the author writes about the tactics of terror which the Fuhrer employed to coerce the Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg to hand over Austria to the Nazis.Austria was meant to serve as the general rehearsal for what was to follow,namely:the rape of the Czechs.
The rest of this fascinating book shows to what extent British personalities at that time were swayed and duped by Hitler into believing that what he really wanted was peace.Among them were Lord Halifax and Lord Runciman.Fortunately, there were other voices which branded Hitler a blatant liar.
This book contains new original archival material and we see to what extent Chamberlain had made every possible effort to appease Hitler.The final result is known to everyone.
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