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Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II

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The title of David Faber's Munich, 1938 perhaps unconsciously makes it a perfect bookend for Margaret Macmillan's Paris 1919. Munich put an exclamation point to the tatters of Versailles, and these two books encompass the entire term of Eduard Benes as a Czech leader. Herr Hitler's ironic justification for his aggression leading to the French betrayal of Czechoslovakia and its destruction as a state was the boomerang of `self determination' proclaimed but disregarded at Versailles when Benes secured the borders of his new republic. Faber tells us that when Benes' order for Czech mobilization was officially announced by radio in late September 1938, it was broadcast in all six of the republic's official languages: Czech, Slovak, German, Hungarian, Ruthenian, and Polish. Thus one of the most striking failures of the Versailles treaty's nation building, the story that climaxed in Munich and ended in early 1939 when Hitler liquidated what remained of the Rump Czech State is compellingly told in this new addition to the English speaking history of Nazi Germany. In this day-by-day version we can take the time to contemplate the many sub-themes and personalities involved more fully than in the hackneyed versions that have made Munich a synonym for appeasement. Faber gives a delightful description of a befuddled Nevile Henderson, Britain's ambassador to Berlin, standing with the Nazi leadership at the Nuremberg rally, thinking Hitler both "an apostle of peace" and "insane," but in truth clueless of what these men really intended.

Neville Chamberlain is clearly Faber's protagonist, while Winston Churchill makes far fewer appearances than we might expect. There is no major disparity here from Churchill's version of the Czech crisis in The Gathering Storm (indeed, Faber even borrows a chapter heading from that book--The Loaded Pause). Churchill need not star because London and His Majesty's Government had quite enough players who contemporaneously viewed Chamberlain's actions much as history seems to have accepted them. The critics were however a distinct minority. In Churchill's words the Prime Minister's first ever airplane flight that took him to Germany was "the stupidest thing," and not because of the accident risk involved. Faber, however, makes it resoundingly clear that at the time the folk and the monarch alike cheered Chamberlain's every move in this crisis.

The author documents many times that Hitler intended to invade Czechoslovakia no matter what the "worms" in the French and English governments had to say. Hitler negotiated in a way to "minimize the chances of being cheated out of at least a little war." Also documented are the British people's ardent wishes to avoid war and the French government's terror at having to honor their 1927 treaty with The Little Entente. We can therefore wonder if Chamberlain's initiatives were not more folly than futile even as celebrated as a success. Nevertheless, Faber makes a fascinating story of the "war now or war later" great power diplomacy as a model for future crises. He quotes the Berchtesgaden joint communiqué that describes the first Chamberlain/Hitler talks as "a comprehensive and frank exchange of views," jargon repeated at almost every summit since.

This book is a masterful telling of one of history's tutorial moments, and it will remain a valued reference for those events. Some criticism must be made of a history volume without maps. Beyond the fact that most Americans would not accurately locate the previously annexed Austria as south of and surrounding Czechoslovakia or visualize the Czech borders as a dagger in the heart of Germany, some maps could have demonstrated the demarcations of the various proposed cessions as the Munich Dictate evolved. Also, in a book this detailed there is very little about "what-if." What if Hitler backed down or what if Hitler invaded and forced France into war in 1938. In this year's Masters and Commanders, Andrew Roberts has written of the Spitfires and Hurricanes that won the Battle of Britain "they were in fact for the most part produced during the eleven months of peace bought by Neville Chamberlain at Munich." The author does make it clear that the German military believed war in 1938 meant German defeat. David Faber's version is a very expanded but not revisionist book about Chamberlain and Munich. I highly recommend it.

In the Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938, Britain and France sold out Czechoslovakia to the Nazis and set the stage for World War II. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain gleefully announced to cheering crowds in Britain that he had obtained "peace with honor" and "peace for our time." Less than one year later, World War II began.

Author Faber presents the origin and culmination of the Munich crisis, mostly from the British view point. Britain's diplomatic aims and actions, its cabinet politics and the maneuvering in both the press and Parliament are considered in detail, as are many of the personalities involved. Faber has assiduously mined official and personal documents and memoirs to present their public and private thoughts, a device that (together with Faber's considerable writing skill) makes these people live on the page.

Despite this level of detail, much of the history leading to Munich is omitted or not explored deeply. This is the case, to give one example only, with Germany's unilateral reoccupation of the Rhineland (a clear breach of the Versailles Agreement) and the subsequent collapse of the Locarno Pact and the Stresa Front. The British had orchestrated the latter agreements to normalize relations with Germany and provide security for France. Their collapse ended the security system envisioned at Versailles.

Also missing is any detailed exploration of how and why the climate of appeasement arose and had such sway in Britain. Faber makes clear that appeasement was the majority view in Britain and that Chamberlain, whatever his other faults (arrogance and naïveté' among them), was merely leading the British where they very much wanted to go.
Except for Germany, no other country gets nearly the attention that is lavished on Britain (which was admittedly by far the leading Western Power in the appeasement effort). Even with Germany, however, much is unexplored.

Again to give only one example, Faber seems to believe that the Blomberg and Fritsch scandals, the former idiotic and the latter tragic, gave Hitler dominance over the Army. Yet this dominance was probably assured in 1934 when Col. Gen. Blomberg, already Minister of Defense, urged Hitler to act against the SA and its head, Ernst Rohm, whom Blomberg knew was seeking to have the SA take over the Army. Hitler, for this and other reasons, unleashed a lawless purge against the SA (and others), murdering many, including Rohm. Blomberg condoned the purge and placed the Army on alert to cooperate if need be. After President Hindenburg's death later that year, Blomberg had the Army's officers take the infamous oath of personal loyalty to Hitler. This was the corrupt bargain that sealed the Army's fate.

All other participants at Munich are reduced in the narrative to bit players supporting the lead of the Germans and the British. In particular the French are ghosts in the story as Faber relates it. There is little discussion of the twists of French politics and policies that led to their supine attitude at Munich. Similarly little attention is devoted to the attitude of the Soviets or to their deliberate exclusion by the Western powers from Munich, or to the refusal by Britain especially to try to involve the United States. Finally, a review of the bibliography shows that the great majority of sources listed are in English, which may be the reason for the emphasis on Britain.

Faber tells a compelling with skill, but the gaps make the story incomplete. Is it possible that concerns about the book's length (by the publisher?) may have played a role here? I do not think that Faber's book is nearly so complete or comprehensive as Telford Taylor's "Munich: The Price of Peace," originally published in 1979, although Taylor's book is less vividly written and is twice as long.

When Mr. Neville Chamberlaine returned to London from his meeting with Hitler at the end of September,1938,he waved a piece of paper which had his and the Fuhrer's signature."Peace for our time"- he exclaimed.Reality showed how naive he had been then.
Mr Faber has written one of the best books on this topic.It is a narrative history which starts on November,5, 1937.Hitler delivered a famous speech in which he made it very clear that it was his intention to wipe out Czechoslovakia with lightning speed.All its other neighbours would follow and submit to the Nazi beast like a pack of cards.
The next chapter describes the Blomberg- Fritsch scandal.In its aftermath, Hitler cemented his power and his dominance over the army.Adhering to his belief expressed in his "Mein Kampf",Hitler made sure that Austria had to be made part of the German Motherland.In a fascinating chapter which reads like a thriller, the author writes about the tactics of terror which the Fuhrer employed to coerce the Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg to hand over Austria to the Nazis.Austria was meant to serve as the general rehearsal for what was to follow,namely:the rape of the Czechs.
The rest of this fascinating book shows to what extent British personalities at that time were swayed and duped by Hitler into believing that what he really wanted was peace.Among them were Lord Halifax and Lord Runciman.Fortunately, there were other voices which branded Hitler a blatant liar.
This book contains new original archival material and we see to what extent Chamberlain had made every possible effort to appease Hitler.The final result is known to everyone.

Few authors are able to write narratives that keep a reader's interest from beginning to end, especially when the subject is diplomatic history. As a product of the '50's I was inculcated with the saga of Munich, Chamberlain and Hitler from grade school through high school and mostly in brief episodic and anecdotal fashion. Faber has serious talent (understatement). For me this was re-learning history in spades and especially on a subject of deep interest. Parts of the book read like a thriller from Hitler's browbeating of Schuschnigg, his constant mad tirades over Eduard Benes to anyone within earshot, the Wermacht constantly alerted then told to stand down and finally the diplomats and secretaries running and scurrying back and forth to deliver eleventh hour messages. On who's neck would Hitler bring down the Sword of Sigfreid next?

I misunderstood Chamberlain for years but the book left me convinced that he was the wrong man in the wrong place at the wrong time, or in today's parlance, old school. I think Faber used diary excerpts well and was able to put the reader in the room. I was astounded by Chamberlain's obsequiousness and bootlicking of Hitler. In spite of this I continued to remind myself that Chamberlain and most of the British did not want another Somme. I'm also left with a better impression of how manifestly insane Hitler was. Faber rightly places the betrayal of the Czechs in the lap of Chamberlain but I'd also like to give the French their due for backing away from their part of the TOV. I don't think much about historical "what if's" but will always wonder what the outcome would have been if Churchill had been the PM. The Munich agreement was indeed a diplomatic blunder and the ripple effect continues today in the form of historical analogy.

This was not another dry, laborious exercise of a subject that's been revisited ad infinitum but an academic work with a feeling of urgency and drama.

Everyone has seen it, the famous picture of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain standing on the tarmac of an airport waving a piece of paper and promising that it meant "peace in our time." (Well, actually, he didn't say that until later that day at Number 10 Downing Street.) Now, author and British politician David Faber takes us back to that fateful year, and presents the steps that led to the meeting between Hitler and Chamberlain, and that fateful agreement.

As for me, I must say that this book contained a lot of information on a subject that I knew very little about. I had not heard before about the Blomberg-Fritsch affair, and I did not know how widespread the desire to come to terms with Hitler was among the British.

Now, the book is fairly encyclopedic in its reach, telling you a lot about what happened and why, and what ALL the major players in this tragedy were doing. In a way, that is the one flaw of the book. The author covers so many different people and events in this 500 page tome that at times the book becomes somewhat heavy and boring.

But, that said, this is without a doubt the premier book on the subject, one that is sure to please anyone who wants to really understand what happened to bring about the Munich Agreement of 1938. I really did enjoy this book, and recommend it anyone interested in the subject.

A deep and scholarly analysis of Hitler and Chamberlain's meetings and negotiations in 1938 surrounding the Anschluss and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Notable for the remarkable level of detail, in which each conversation and movement of the principal players is carefully tracked. This detail is still clearly subordinated to the overall narrative plan.

Chamberlain here comes across as a somewhat befuddled elderly man, way out of his depth. Hitler seems to be a shrewd and effective negotiator, winning games of brinksmanship with the other European powers.

At times reading the book one doesn't know whether to laugh or cry, the stories are so odd. The most peculiar surrounds Hitler's sacking of Blomberg and Fritsch, senior military officers who were perhaps a bit too independent for Hitler's taste. The way in which Fritsch in particular was let go is amazingly bizarre - involving the blackmail of an unrelated officer named Frisch, the name similarity, like in the movie Brazil, leading to his sacking. It is interesting to contrast the German officer's notion of honor with modern perspectives on their actions, which, of course, are very different.

The pace of the book overall is entertaining, although in the later chapters I sometimes found myself skimming as the mass of detail became a bit much. But overall it was interesting.

The main weaknesses of Faber's treatment, which focuses on personalities and actions, is that there is a bit less of a philosophical analysis or broad perspective. In particular, the book lacks a detailed legal analysis of the treaty obligations that were incurred and broken, and there is also little in the way of detailed military analysis (i.e., what would the military result have been had Britain gone to war?). Some maps would have been helpful as well.

Most references are in English and not German.

The level of scholarship in the book is excellent, the narrative persuasive and interesting throughout. I had a couple of reservations about isolated points here and there.

For example, on page 24, Faber characterizes what might have been a veiled attempt by Neurath to obtain a concession from Britain in exchange for permitting Halifax to meet Hitler as an "attempt at blackmail." But there is no indication in the text that Neurath's suggestion was anything more than standard diplomatic attempt to gain a concession. I fail to perceive why it should be characterized as blackmail (particularly in light of the more specific meaning of the term in the Frisch affair later in the book).

On page 25, Faber states that "Göring enthusiastically had assured [Henderson] that `he had seldom heard Herr Hitler speak more in favour of an understanding with Great Britain' - a shamelessly brazen remark for Göring to have made, given that just a few hours earlier he had been listening to Hitler's diatribe at the Reich Chancellery." Here, the author suggests both that Göring's statement is false and that it contradicted Hitler's comments at the Reich Chancellery. But in fact Göring's statement seems to be artfully phrased so as not to be contradicted by Hitler's statements at the Reich Chancellery if, in fact, Hitler almost never spoke in favor of an understanding with Britain, which he likely didn't.

The context is a little unclear from Faber's description, but Göring may be using the kind of circumlocution employers notoriously use in recommending problem employees, e.g., "You will be very fortunate to get this person to work for you" and the like. In any case, Faber's characterization of the import of Göring's comment or of Henderson's view of it seems at best confusing.

Finally, the book jacket states, for example, that Chamberlain held the piece of paper that "contained the promise that Britain and Germany would never go to war." But the actual document on page 414 seems less clear. It says
"[w]e are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries." If this language is a promise never to go to war, it's very circumspect.

For fictional treatments of this period of time, let me recommend Kazuo Ishiguro's brilliant novel, Remains of the Day (the movie is excellent as well). Alan Furst has some good novels about this time, e.g. Spies of Warsaw.

David Faber has written a most thoughtful and well-researched study of the time leading up to the Munich Conference, the conference itself and the immediate repercussions that evolved from that conference. All the key players are covered: Hitler, Chamberlain, Eden, Halifax, Mussolini, Blomberg, Keitel, Fritisch and many others. The author also covers some of the actions Hitler undertook to make Germany compliant to his wishes as well as ready for war. I was completely surprised, expecting a dry, political reconstruction of the facts but instead received a poignant and intriguing look at the behind the scene story of the people involved in this drama that will lead to war for most of Europe. The author clearly shows the personal aspirations, fears and hopes of the people of the British and French governments in trying to curtail Hitler's thirst to recapture the lands lost to Germany after the defeat of WWI while avoiding another war. Even after 20 years since WWI, the Allied countries had still not recovered and Chamberlain had no appetite to throw his country into another devastating war. The reasoning is understandable but naiveté when you consider who his antagonist was; a man who feeds on and was energized on weakness. That's why Chamberlain continued to appeased Hitler until the invasion of Poland in Sept 1939.

The account also clearly shows Hitler's devious ways as he plays with these people as he strives to obtain his goals. Some of those goals will be the annexing of the Sudetenland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the city of Danzig. Taking over Czechoslovakia will be the keystone coverage in this book. During the Munich Conference, Hitler using the threat of war and with the help of Mussolini intimidate Chamberlain and Daladier to sacrifice Czechoslovakia for the sake of a tenuous peace. A short time later, defying the Munich agreement, Hitler carves up Czechoslovakia.

The author and former politician has certainly done his homework and provides a wealth of information on the personal and public lives of key people. These are the people who through their actions or non-actions will cause WWII. The author has done a magnificent job of setting the stage for the lead up to WWII. If you have an interest in WWII and how and why it started then this book would be the ideal place to start.

Munich has become a political synonym for appeasing an enemy nation. In "Munich 1938" David Faber, a former member of the British House of Commons and a grandson of Harold MacMillian has produced a fine addtion to the study of the diplomatic disaster which led Europe into the holocaust years of World War II.
It had been only 20 years previous to 1938 that the guns of World War I had been silenced. This event was followed by the Versailles Treaty, the formation of the League of Nations and the disastrous reparations foisted on the defeated German state. After the failure of the Weimar Republic, the Great Depression and massive unemployment, Hitler and his Nazi thugs became the rulers of Germany.
Conservative Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was an arch appeaser of Nazi Germany. He did not want to have Great Britian undergo another bloodbath as she had experienced in the horror of World War I. He viewed Czecholslovakia, a state created by the Versailles Treaty, to be unworthy of British blood and treasure. Chamberlain made his first airplane flights to Germany to meet with Chancellor Hitler. The meetings occurred in the fall of 1938 at Berchtesgaden, Hitler's mountain eyrie in Bavaria; Godesburg and most infamously in Munich.
At the Munich meeting Mr. Chamberlain represented Great Britain with Daladier the Prime Minister of France also participating as well as Duce Mussolini and Hitler of Germany. It was decided that Hitler would be given free reign to invade Czech. in defense of the Sudentenland Germans who wanted to be ruled from Berlin. Hitler latere commented that he treated the democracies as if they were worms. After Munich the Fuhrer dreamed of conquering all of Europe and invading the Soviet Union. The nations of Central Europe fell like dominoes into the grasp of the Nazi juggeraut of death, persecution and unbelievable cruelty.
Despite such brave cries in the wilderness by future PM Winston Churchill. Sir Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office and Lord Halifax the Fuhrer was given Czecch. on a silver platter. He had already grabbed Austria for Germany in the Anschluss of March, 1938. War would be declared after the Nazis invaded Poland on Septembere 1, 1939. Poland was allied with Great Britain and France who then declared war on Germany. Neither of these nations gave Poland any meaningful help during the Nazi blitzkrieg.
Diplomatic history can be a dull read but this book rivets the reader's attention knowing the consequences of the appeasement preached by Chamblerlain and his allies.
Neville Chamberlain was a Victorian man whose ideas of fair play and justice were no match against the cruelty and deception of such an odious dictator as Hitler.
This book is a a valuable addition to the bookshelf of anyone interested in World War II's beginnings.

Knowing the end of this historical event, you get to watch good men's ideals get in the way of fighting evil.

David Faber recounts the events on both sides leading up to the Munich Pact of 1938 that sacrificed Czechoslovakia in the name of peace. Faber's recounting of this historical account of can best be summed up by the quote in the book, "The choice is not between war and peace but between war now or war later."

Faber brings the reader inside these fateful events to watch people's actions and reactions.

I found this book somewhat disconcerting knowing what is to follow. All through the book, you keep asking how the participants did not realize the danger. Faber chronicling of the events answers this question.

Although I found it difficult to determine the relative importance of various positions in the English Parliamentary system, I found it a cautionary tale of giving evil a pass.

This is a fascinating read that has historical implications to this day. If you want to see how idealism and hubris can blind common sense, read this book.

"It is my unshakeable will to wipe Czechoslovakia from the map." Thus spoke Adolf Hitler to a gathering of his top military and diplomatic advisers at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on May 28, 1938. To those assembled before him, now tasked with final preparations for invasion of the Reich's small southeastern neighbor, the Fuhrer's intentions were not news. He had outlined his vision of Germany's future in November 1937 at a conference memorialized in the notorious Hossbach Memorandum: If the German race was not to fall into decadence and decline, Germany required more living space - lebensraum - in Europe. Such lebensraum was to be sought in the east. France and Britain would certainly oppose German expansion on the continent, therefore war between Germany and an Anglo-French alliance was inevitable. Prior to war with France and Britain, Germany's southeastern flank must be secured; therefore Austria and Czechoslovakia must be neutralized beforehand.

How were Nazi designs to dominate the European continent appreciated in Paris and London? French apprehensions certainly exceeded those of the British under the premiership of Neville Chamberlain. However, for France, no action against Germany would be possible without active British assistance. The western allies, and particularly France, had suffered terribly in the First World War. The specter of two million men lost on the Western Front haunted the deliberations of both governments. When Chamberlain spoke of the prospect of a new world war, he did so in apocalyptic terms, and his foreign policy was based on avoidance of that outcome - even at the cost of his nation's moral and treaty commitments to small allies. Perhaps as a consequence, he was inclined to accept German pretexts at face value: if Germany was granted the "return" of German populations and territories, then a peaceful European settlement could be worked out with Berlin. It was Chamberlain's stated policy "to appease the dictators of Europe."

Former British MP David Faber has produced an excellent account of Chamberlain's appeasement policy in _Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II_. Faber's diplomatic history of the Czechoslovakia crisis illustrates with precision the irony and tragedy of Munich: for Chamberlain, western acquiescence in German annexation of Czechoslovakia was the unavoidable down payment on a peaceful European settlement; for Hitler, that annexation was a necessary strategic precondition for successful war against the western powers.

Hitler had written in Mein Kampf, "One blood demands one Reich." Since assuming the Chancellorship in 1933 his public policy had followed the line of recovery of German territories lost at Versailles and unification of ethnic Germans under the Third Reich. He had succeeded in recovering the Saarland in 1935 and remilitarizing the Rhineland in 1936. His nationalistic program had received strong public and (more importantly) military support; but his wider ambitions as outlined in the Hossbach Memorandum gave his officers pause. War Minister Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg and army commander-in-chief General Werner Freiherr von Fritsch had cautioned against attacking Austria and Czechoslovakia, "an action for which they felt Germany was militarily woefully underprepared, and which would lead inevitably to a general war which they would lose... It was essential, they urged, whatever the circumstances, to avoid provoking a war with France and Britain." Three months later, Blomberg's new wife was exposed as a notorious prostitute and Fritsch was falsely implicated in a sex scandal. Hitler took advantage of their simultaneous downfall to reorganize the Wehrmacht: the position of War Minister was eliminated; the wooden and "servile" General Walther von Brauchitsch replaced Fritsch as army commander-in-chief; and Hitler anointed himself supreme commander of the armed forces. With the promotion of the fawning Keitel to army chief of staff, the transformation was complete: Hitler's plans for aggression would not be opposed.

Hitler then set his sights on Austria, where a strong Nazi movement was funded and coordinated from Berlin. The Austrian nationalist government of Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg had gone so far as to adopt, as he put it, "what was best in German Nazism", but nothing less than unification with the Third Reich would satisfy the Austrian Nazis. In March 1938 Schuschnigg announced a plebiscite on independence, prompting an Austrian Nazi coup d'etat engineered by Berlin. Hitler's Wehrmacht occupied Vienna on March 12, 1938 in the Austrian Anschluss. Hitler's Reich now surrounded Czechoslovakia on three sides.

Czechoslovakia was a multiethnic legacy of the fallen Habsburg Empire. This fragile democracy hosted a plethora of ethnicities, including Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians, Ruthenes, and some 3.5 million ethnic Germans concentrated in the Sudeten regions on the west and northwest borders with Germany. Hitler had positioned himself as protector of this supposedly oppressed minority. Since 1935 Berlin had covertly funded the pro-Nazi Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP) and its chief, Konrad Henlein. Publicly, Hitler's policy was to defend Sudeten minority rights from the Prague government, by force if necessary. This was pretext, as Faber makes clear: "Czechoslovakia's greatest crime was her threatening geographical position... Czechoslovakia blocked Hitler's path to the conquest of Poland... Worse still, she was an ally of his archenemy, Soviet Russia." In fact both France and the Soviet Union had guaranteed Czechoslovakia by treaty; violation of her territorial integrity would obligate both nations to declare war on the aggressor.

Chamberlain's search for a European settlement based on appeasement began upon his becoming Prime Minister in 1937. In November of that year he authorized his Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden, the dictator's Bavarian mountain retreat. While there Halifax suggested that some "reasonable settlements" might be reached on central European questions including those involving Czechoslovakia. After lunch and small talk, during which Hitler offered advice on the Indian independence movement ("Shoot Gandhi"), Halifax took his leave. Halifax may have thought the visit a "great success", but Hitler was ecstatic: "He now knew that Britain would happily entertain the prospect of possible changes to the existing, post-Versailles order and would almost certainly not go to war to prevent the expansion of the Reich for which he longed." Hitler correctly suspected that France would not act unless Britain did also; now he could feel secure that Britain would not act.

After the Austrian Anschluss, fewer cries of outrage were heard in London than sighs of relief. Permanent Under-Secretary Cadogan wrote British Ambassador to Berlin Nevile Henderson, "Thank goodness, Austria's out of the way... After all, it wasn't our business." With Hitler's rhetoric on the Sudeten question growing ever more bellicose through the spring and summer of 1938 and tensions rising between Prague and the SdP, London considered it prudent to take a more active stance. Chamberlain dispatched the hapless Lord Runciman to Prague as mediator. Tragicomedy ensued: London and Paris pressured the Czechs to accede to all demands while Berlin instructed the SdP to accept no settlement terms, but continually increase their demands. On September 12, 1938 Hitler addressed a picked crowd of 30,000 at the 10th Nuremberg Nazi Party Congress, whipping himself into a frenzy and vowing action against the Czechs. His speech threw the French government into "turmoil and confusion" at the prospect of having to do something in defense of their ally. With the Wehrmacht mobilizing on the Czech border, panic in Paris and war seemingly imminent, Chamberlain made his grand gesture: he would personally fly to Germany and meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden. In Britain, the venture was met with great public enthusiasm and support (except from Churchill: "It is the stupidest thing that has ever been done"). In Rome, an astounded Mussolini proclaimed to his son in law and Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano "the liquidation of English prestige."

From Chamberlain's perspective, Czechoslovakia was not militarily defensible by Britain or France, and the annexation of the Sudetenland was not a casus belli for Britain. In truth, some sympathy for Germany's stated objectives in central Europe, and the tendency to view political issues in racialist terms, existed within the Chamberlain government. As Ambassador Henderson in Berlin had written Halifax on the Sudetens: "It is morally unjust to compel this solid Teuton minority to remain subjected to a Slav central Government at Prague."

At Berchtesgaden, Chamberlain held out the possibility of a plebiscite to resolve the Sudeten issue. Hitler and Chamberlain agreed to meet again; both mens' prestige increased and the atmosphere seemed to improve. At their second meeting, in Bad Godesberg on the Rhine, Hitler suddenly increased his demands. Not only would German minority interests have to be satisfied; Polish and Hungarian interests in eastern Czechoslovakia would also. Still Chamberlain was willing to compromise. On return to London he met his first real headwinds. Halifax turned against his appeasement policy; the Czechs flatly refused the proposals and mobilized their considerable armed forces (800,000 soldiers); and Londoners prepared for war.

Paris and London worked frantically to outdo each other's proposals for a give-away of Czech territory which might satisfy Hitler. With only hours to go until the Fuhrer's September 28 deadline for resolution of the crisis by force or otherwise, London appealed to Mussolini to mediate. In most historians' analysis, and Faber seems inclined to agree, only Mussolini's eleventh-hour intercession prevented the outbreak of war in September 1938. A four-power meeting, to be attended by Germany, Italy, Britain and France, was hastily arranged. Chamberlain, French Prime Minister Daladier, Hitler and Mussolini with their respective ministers convened the next day in Hitler's office at the ultramodern Fuhrerbau headquarters building in Munich. The Czechs were not invited to or represented at the conference; a Czech delegation was installed at a nearby hotel and left to await the fate of their country. The parties hammered out a final agreement in an "increasingly chaotic" atmosphere: the Sudeten regions were to be ceded to Germany and occupied by the Wehrmacht in phases from October 1 through October 10, 1938; the disposition of other "preponderantly German" areas was to be decided by a joint commission of the four powers.

The next morning Chamberlain and Hitler met informally before the Prime Minister's return flight to London. Chamberlain requested the Fuhrer's signature on a note he had drafted beforehand: "We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries..." It was this paper which Chamberlain would wave to the cheering crowd at Heston airfield on his return from Munich. Later he would declare to another cheering crowd outside 10 Downing Street that it meant "Peace for our time." Back in Munich, Hitler dismissed Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's concerns: "Oh, don't take it so seriously. That piece of paper is of no further significance whatsoever."

German units began the occupation of the Sudetenland on October 1, 1938. After a bracing debate in Parliament (Chamberlain: "All the world seems to be full of my praises except the House of Commons"), the Munich agreement was ratified in London on October 6. By then, of course, the German takeover of the Sudetenland was a fait accompli. Czechoslovakia had lost 3.6 millions of her population, three quarters of her industrial productive capacity, and all of her substantial border defenses. The German frontier now lay 40 miles from Prague.

Isaiah Berlin defined succinctly the mood in London: "shame and relief." World war had been averted and Chamberlain's public popularity had perhaps never been greater; but in Parliament a substantial group of anti-appeasers made their views clear, and none more clearly than Winston Churchill: "We have suffered a total and unmitigated defeat."

On October 21, 1938 Hitler ordered Keitel to plan for the "liquidation of the Czech state." On March 16, 1939, again on a pretext (defense of Slovak autonomy), Hitler's Wehrmacht rolled into Prague. Shortly thereafter Hitler ordered the state of Czechoslovakia formally dissolved.

David Faber has produced a well-crafted narrative history of the politics and diplomacy of the Munich crisis. While Faber's end notes reflect only limited archival research, his work is solidly grounded in primary sources, especially published British and German document collections and participants' memoirs. However, when it comes to judgement and analysis of persons and events, Faber relies a bit too much on quotations from secondary sources. As well, Faber pays almost no attention to the Soviet role. As a co-guarantor of Czech integrity and a highly interested party in central European affairs, there should be much more to say on this point. We can most likely attribute this gap in the narrative to the inaccessibility of Soviet archives and unavailability of sources in English. The inference to be drawn is that the truly definitive history of the Munich crisis remains to be written.