Customer Reviews

Mussolini As Diplomat: Il Duce's Italy on the World Stage

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This book is an interesting account of Mussolini decision to go to war that led to his decision to go to war.

Whether Mussolini might have gone to war against Germany is unlikely as his plans could only be realized if there were changes to the world order that Britain and France did refuse to go along with. A neutral Italy was maybe possible. The writer certainly shows that British politician Eden made many mistakes in dealing with Italy in this period.

However I would like to have read more on why Mussolini did several actions in particular why he did declare war on the US. What was he thinking when he did it? The writer just leaves us with the words that he went mad. Also how did he feel as time went on and Italian troops were dieing in what became more and more Hitler's war? How did he feel as an Italian? Did he feel any responsibility for their deaths?
Maybe the writer could continue the work?

Overall I found it to being a very good and readable book.

This book by Richard Lamb is an interesting account of how Mussolini engaged World War II and the performance of Il Duce in world politics. It is a fairly positive view of the Duce's role in world politics and the author is far more critical of the British and French governments (particularly Anthony Eden). There are many interesting arguments here about the Italian diplomatic strategy and those interested in World War II diplomacy will do well not to miss this book. The author has researched from a wide array of sources and compiled them in a unique fashion. This is not just an account of the war but a thorough diplomatic analysis that is very hard to come by. It does an excellent job of combing multiple countries sources to weave a story where they are complimentary. For those who really want to delve into World War II they will find a lot here that can be enjoyed. It is well written and goes into an appropriate level of detail for those familiar with the subject. If this is your first book on diplomacy in World War II you may want to start with a more traditional biography of Mussolini such as Dennis Mack Smith's (which provides an interesting contrast with this book). While this book represents one viewpoint of scholarship it is one that deserves consideration and although not all the conclusions can be taken at face value there is a lot that can be gleamed from this book.

Reviewers need to write for the benefit of potential readers, not to vent bile, and recognize that a difference of opinion does not mean "trash." Lamb deserves to be read, even if one disagrees with the conclusions. He writes as one experienced in the complicated Italy of WWII and as a historian, and we should be reluctant to dismiss out of hand a book, while not the author's best (that is War in Italy), still has value as a dissenting opinion from that of the current mainstream. This dismissal of him reminds me of the dismissive reviews and views of the great book, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, by people who are many years removed from first-hand experience. A little respect for experience would be refreshing. Also, Lamb's prose is engaging, as is the book, if one approaches the book with anything resembling an open mind and sense of fairness. Read, reflect, weight, yes, and even disagree. But trash? With all due respect, I think not.

In this book, Lamb is out to argue that Britain and France should appease Italy in order to maintain the Stresa Front against Germany. In it, the author has made some absurd observations that belies his partiality.

1. That Italy's occupation of Abyssinnia was equivalent to German reoccupation of the Rhineland, and if Britain should acquiesce to the latter, it should give de jure recognition of the Italian conquest (by bombs, poison gas, pillage, massacres). It's as if Germany's peaceful reclaiming of what's her rightfully is the same as brute colonialization by the Italians.
2. That appeasing Italy should be the policy instead of courting favour with Germany, forgetting the fact that you always appease the strong, never the weak.
3. That as if Italy matters when subsequent events showed that she'd just a pygmy amongst giants, and that she lost every war she made.
4. That Mussolini was to be trusted to keep his words, conveniently ignoring the fact that he's just an undisciplined, cowardly bully boy with a loud mouth.

In writing the book, Lamb has also chose to omit Italian atrocities and perfidy, and Mussolini came across as a worthy geopolitician. The prose is dry, the narrative is boring, and the observations ludicrous.

There is, in between the boards, only rubbish. That's why the book has not been read widely, and you can get a brand new hardcover one for $5 on amazon, attesting to the low value of the scholarship, which is shoddy, egoistic and stupid.