Customer Reviews

Must a Jew Believe Anything?

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

In this slim and wonderfully articulate book, Kellner makes a convincing case that Maimonides brought a radical new idea to Judaism: that Aristotelian "perfection" is the highest ideal of the Torah. To achieve this perfection, a Jew must have knowledge of the principles of Jewish faith, and not just any "knowledge," but a philosopher's knowledge, which in the context of medieval science, meant being able to prove each article of the faith axiomatically, working from foundational principles. Kellner argues that Maimonides' introduction of this notion of philosophical "faith" is an innovation, unprecedented in Jewish thought until that point. Like many of the Rambam's innovations, this notion was not universally accepted - and in the cases where it was accepted, it was not accepted in its entirety. Rather, what survived from Maiminides' elaborate architecture of idealism is the prosaic idea that Judaism espouses certain articles of faith, and that deviation from these articles makes one an apikoros, a heretic.

It is the notion of Judaism having a catechism -- a mandatory dogma -- that Kellner spends much of the book arguing against. If we could bracket out the Rambam's influence in this particular area, he suggests, we would have a more authentic Judaism, centered on Talmudic and Gaonic norms, which are more concerned with what one does than what one "believes." More importantly, a halachic, non-dogmatic Judaism could be a bigger tent, more inclusive than the highly factionalized Judaism of today.

It's a lovely idea, generous and humanistic, but it unfortunately founders quickly. Kellner stipulates that the Torah does teach certain normative beliefs, but in the classic rabbinic thinking, these beliefs are not mandatory (i.e. XYZ is true, but you don't have to agree that it is true in order to lay tefillin with me). But then he reverses to say that there are in fact some mandatory beliefs, and failing in these beliefs rightly puts one outside the camp. Examples are holding that the Torah did not come from God, polytheism or trinitarianism, or holding some non-Jewish notion of messianism (i.e. Christianity in Jewish clothing). And he does unlikely backflips to avoid any endorsement of "orthopraxy," behavioral Judaism stripped of theology. But the biggest iceberg in front of Kellner's book is that he argues that the Rambam's innovations are (A) a response to outside pressure, and (B) imported from Islamic Aristotelianism, and therefore they are not intrinsic to Judaism. This is an untenable view of historical Judaism. If we were to discount every development in Judaism that met the same criteria, nothing would be left. Instead, the truth is that Maimonides irrevocably changed Judaism, and there is no turning back the clock. Rather than wishing that the Rambam's marriage of Judaism and medieval philosophy could somehow be annulled, we should instead develop more fully the idea that understandings of Maimonides' thirteen principles are given to each generation to determine. Even accepting the Rambam, it is possible to be fully contemporary and yet a believing Jew.

The book gets five stars anyway, for being such a thoughtful and readable look at Maimonides. Right or wrong, it's still a wonderful book.

This book is essentially a commentary on the "Thirteen Principles of Faith" discussed by Rambam (aka Maimonides, Moshe ben Maimon). Rambam asserts that any disbeliever in these principles is "a sectarian . . . one is required to hate him and to destroy him." Later commentators generally accepted the majority of the principles as normative Jewish theology, but gutted or narrowed the "hate and destroy" language (as did Rambam himself in later writings, as Kellner points out).

Kellner usefully quotes Rambam's "Thirteen Principles" discussion in his book, and tries to explain Rambam's logic. He doesn't really explain the logic behind each principle very convincingly; to do so would require a longer book with more quotes. I think I would understand Rambam better (and thus understand Kellner's discussion of Rambam better) if Kellner had done so.

But Kellner does explain in a general way why Rambam believed that failure to know of the principles was so harmful. First, Rambam relied on a vague passage in Habbakuk about the righteous "living by their faith" to support his view that incorrect views deprived one of "life" in the world to come. Second, Rambam interpreted a passage on the Talmud about the world to come (a passage which refers to the righteous "enjoying the radiance of the divine presence") as meaning that they "enjoy what they know of the Creator". It followed (according to Kellner's interpretation of Rambam) that people without philosophical knowledge had no share in the world to come - and thus that one who did not know of these principles had no life after death. (Kellner is fair-minded enough to note that other works of Rambam appear to adopt a more traditional interpretation of the afterlife). Third, Rambam believes that philosophical knowledge is what separates us from lower animals; thus, one without philosophical knowledge is in some sense not fully human.

And given Rambam's emphasis on knowledge, Kellner asserts that Rambam demands actual philosophical inquiry into, and understanding of, his principles, rather than simple "belief."

I think I understand why Rambam thought that holders of incorrect views were excluded from the world to come; however, it is not clear to me from Kellner's analysis why these errors were sufficiently noxious to justify stigmatizing errant Jews as "sectarians" during their lifetime. (Nor is it clear to me whether my lack of understanding is my fault, Kellner's, or Rambam's!)

Kellner goes on to assert that the "Thirteen Principles" should not be considered halachically binding, since their philosophical foundations (e.g. that well-founded "knowledge" rather than mere belief is required for salvation) were not accepted by earlier tradition, by later Jews, or even in all of Rambam's works. Thus, Jews who fail to accept these principles should not be stigmatized as "heretics" based on Rambam's works.

Kellner does not, however, believe that belief is completely irrelevant to determining who belongs inside the Jewish community; he does not believe there is a simple "bright line" test (though he would clearly exclude Jews for Jesus).

Regardless of the merits of this book, it certainly inspired me to read other works (such as the critical book review mentioned in another review of this book).

Kellner's book accurately but dispassionately summarizes some of the controversies that swirled around the Rambam in the middle ages. If you want to understand why Maimonides is still considered controversial in some circles, read this work.

One of the central questions confronting the Jewish community in assimilation friendly United States and Western Europe is whether or note their grandchildren will be Jewish. Menachem Kellner (Sire Isaac and Lady Edith Wolfson Professor of Jewish Religious Thought, University of Haifa) addresses the core concern and provides a coherent and persuasive analysis of what religious faith means in classical Judaism. He concludes with arguing for a new way of construing the relationship of Orthodox to non-Orthodox Jewish and Jewish institutions. Must A Jew Believe Anything? is an invaluable, timely, and much appreciated contribution to Judaic Studies collections and reading lists.

Moses Maimonides (1138-1204) composed a list of thirteen basic principles of Judaism in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Introduction to Perek Chelek, which many Jews accept as the basic dogma of Judaism. Menachem Kellner, like Marc B. Shapiro in his The Limits of Orthodox Theology, writes that Don Isaac Abrabanel (1437-1508, in his Rosh Amanah) and many others recognize that Maimonides composed his principles for the less educated public to give them information that would strengthen their belief in Judaism. Abrabanel faults those who take "Maimonides' words at face value."

Leo Strauss and Shlomo Pines, in two introductory essays to the Guide of the Perplexed, 1963, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, in the several books of Conversations with Yeshayahu Leibowitz published between 1995 and 2003, and other scholars posit that there is an "exoteric and esoteric Maimonides." Exoteric statements are ideas that Maimonides writes which he does not consider to be true but rather as necessary to help the less educated masses, the majority of Jews, because he feels that they will be threatened if they are told that these ideas are untrue. The esoteric statements are hints that Maimonides does not state explicitly, but which he expects the learned Jew, who knows both Jewish and non-Jewish studies, to mine from his writings and understand.

This exoteric-esoteric approach to understanding Maimonides is supported by Maimonides' own writings. In his Guide of the Perplexed 3:28, he explains that there are two kinds of beliefs: true beliefs and necessary beliefs. "True beliefs" are statements that express a truth that can help one understand an idea and grow intellectually. These are what Strauss, Pines, Leibowitz and others called esoteric teachings.

A "necessary belief" is a tradition, a mistaken or wrong notion, rather than a fact. These beliefs are not taught as truths, but to fulfill a social purpose, such as instilling obedience to the Torah, regulating social relations, improving human or social qualities or alleviating fears. These are his exoteric statements.

Maimonides was not the first person to recognize the importance of teaching "necessary [but untrue] beliefs." The Greek philosopher Plato writes in his Republic and other works that the masses need to be taught untruthful myths in order to survive.

Kellner certainly knows the Rambam, however, I believe he is in generally a bit overborad in his conclusions as to how the Rambam has been adopted and why he thinks Orthodox Judaism needs to rethink heresy.

I think the issues he addresses with respect to pluralisim need to be addresssed and this book is very insightful in that regard.

Kellner puts together a hodgepodge of ideas, most of them correct on their own but entirely wrong when grouped together, and tries to create a new approach. His approach is entirely un-new and internally inconsistent. In trying to combine traditional talmudism and Jewish philosophy with his own brand of pluralism, Kellner ends up with an ill-defined mixture that does not sustain even the most basic analysis. As Dr. David Berger wrote in his review of this book (Tradition, 33:4 1999), "While significant elements of Kellner's argument are convincing, others, I think, are flawed to the point where they render the historical thesis misleading and the contemporary message, for all its good intentions, confusing and unworkable."