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59 of 62 people found the following review helpful
on January 6, 2000
This book is a lot more than it seems. On the surface it is a book about evolution and current evolutionary thinking. Behind the scenes it is a great dissertation on contemporary science and the modern misuse of science.
Ruse, who is a philosopher, has written an engaging book and though is not an easy read. He won't choke you on philosophical jargon. Though it is not a beginner's book on evolutionary thinking, it is easy to digest for someone with some modest knowledge of the field.
Mystery of Mysteries begins by showing the two polar philosophers of modern scientific thought: Thomas Kuhn who is best known for "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" and Karl Popper who wrote many books on science but a good example would be "Logic of Scientific Discovery." Kuhn comes down on the side that scientific reality is based in culture. Popper says science is independent of culture. Ruse then goes on to use a number of evolutionary scientists and their works to show the push and pull between these two poles. Gould, Lewontin, Wilson, and others, share the spotlight for a chapter.
It's a great book on contemporary evolutionary biology and philosophy. Ruse also gives us a grand tour of the movers and shakers, and their thinking and personalities. We also get some glimpses of the vicious infighting going on between the camps. But it is much more than this. The biologists and their ideas are only a foil for Ruse to discuss the issues that confront science today. I found it to be a worthy guide to scientific thinking. There is a wealth of ammunition here to be used when one is confronted by much of the irrational garbage that passes for logical thinking today.
Though Ruse does not bash Kuhn directly one can see his star gradually fade as the book progresses. Taking Kuhn to its ultimate conclusion, one would have to declare that scientific truth is a consensus of opinion and not fact. Kuhn has become the darling of Post Modernists for this very reason. Karl popper comes of as a breath of fresh air.
Anyone who calls himself or herself a Skeptic should consider this required reading. If evolutionary biology is your thing, or if you are at all interested in how science works, or if you are interested in the philosophy of science, order it now.
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11 of 12 people found the following review helpful
People will likely come at this book from one of two directions; philosophy or biology. The book is certainly not dissapointing at all coming from the latter angle. It is a great history and analysis of some great evolutionary thinkers: Dawrin (both of them), Huxley, Dobzhansky, Dawkins, Gould, Lewonton and a handful more. Ruse focuses on how they came about their ideas, how others recieved them at the time and whether their ideas and writings hold up to certain epistemic and non-epistemic metavalues of sciecne: predictability, objectivity, conscilience.
It is when coming from the philosophy angle that the book fails to hold up. After all, from its title, we expect to be treated to a query on whether evolutionary biology has made it over the hurdle from metaphysical philosophy to bonafide science (and many readers will not even have been aware that this was even a question). The first chapter is an introductory overview of the dilemma. There are two views of science: one objective and descriptive of the world out there (a la Karl Popper) and one more subject dependent, influenced by cultural factors enough not to yield true description of reality (a la Thomas Kuhn). Ruse discusses the difference in these two thinkers writings. Coming from a reader whose read both authors, his description of Kuhnian 'subjectivism' is well off the mark and his synopsis of Popperian objectivism also could use a fair amount of tweaking. Instead of Kuhn, maybe Dewey would've been a better choice.
It is after the first chapter that the chapters become short summaries of key thinkers: the first half devoted to history and biography and the second, a review of each thinkers scientific achievements and whether they represent sceince or metaphysical philosophy. The chapters on the two Darwins, Dawkins, E.O. Wilson and Lewonton are incredible and penetrating. The others are adequate. All of these are followed by a brief conclusion chapter to tie up loose ends, too brief for the books purposes
In the end, maybe Ruse got so caught up in how much fun he was having with the individual histories that he forgot to focus on the question. The nature of science was to be our topic and sometimes we get a glimpse of analysis on the question but not enough to warrant the books subtitle. For those concerned with the history of the field of evolutionary science - from its days as natural philosophy to the present - this book will no doubt satisfy. As an examination of where evolutionary sciecne does and does not hold up as an objective (or subjective) discipline, Ruse leaves us dissapointed.
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4 of 5 people found the following review helpful
on May 11, 2002
I imagine most readers who are drawn to a book like this have asked themselves something similar while contending with issues that are important to them. Enter Michael Ruse who argues in this thought provoking book that such questions, although critically important, are ultimately futile; there's always going to be a dichotomy. The ongoing debate between the scientific worldview of objective reality on one hand, and the humanistic vision of subjective cultural values on the other hand, still remains unresolved. Ruse as both a philosopher and biologist has as good a chance as any of shedding some light on this MYSTERY OF MYSTERIES. Is there indeed something "real" underlying science or as the book's subtitle suggests "Is Evolution a Social Construction?"
Although evolution is the specific subject looked at, the book is excellent in putting all of science and it's practitioners into a useful historical and cultural setting. Ruse normally has a very low opinion of "popular science" but in recognition of the importance of the topic of "science vs culture", he has offered a book that will appeal to a general audience. It's well written with ideas carefully explained and he's humorous in parts. Ruse provides a good glossary to help with the evolotuionary biology and philosophy terminology. Let's start where he does by looking at one of those terms. Science is founded on "epistemic values" which Ruse defines as "those norms or rules that supposedly lead to objective knowledge". Ruse contrasts the "objectivist" view of science - illustrated by the work of Karl Popper - with the "subjectivist" approach of Thomas S Kuhn who saw science in terms of "cultural values". The whole notion of social constructions owes its existence to Kuhn's shifting paradigms. Ruse's first chapter is a short and brilliant explanation on the difference between Popper's and Kuhn's views.
Most of the following chapters are mini biographies of some of the better known evolutionary scientists, and case studies of their work to see where it stacks up along the Popper/Kuhn scale. Ruse says "I wanted to present a portrait of individual scientists and ultimately ask the question: Is science what scientists think, something about the real world? Or is it, as cultural studies thinks, a cultural constraint, a reflection of society?" He argues that if the subjectivist view is correct, social constructionism and all its attendant moral, religious, and political content, should be fairly constant features of science throughout history. The first individual he studies is Erasmus Darwin, and sure enough, his science was steeped in the culture of the day. Ruse believes that "science is special" so he expects that as science matured, a more objective nature would emerge - built on predictive capabilities, consistency, and explanative powers. In contrast to his grandfather Erasmus, Charles Darwin's thinking represented a major step forward in terms of epistemic values. Ruse still finds other influences at work, most noticeably religious values. Darwin was never an atheist and only became an agnostic late in life.
The other scientists looked at in order are: Julian Huxley, Theodosius Dobzhansky, Richard Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Lewontin, Edward O Wilson, Geoffrey Parker, and Jack Sepkowski. The last two individuals are practitioners of "science of the first order" and Ruse is hard-pressed to find cultural values impinging as it did with the quasi-science of Erasmus Darwin. With regard to the "big names", Ruse explores what influences them. "I'm interested" he says "in Dawkins' violent atheism, Gould's New York Jewish background and connection to Marxism, and Wilson's Southern Baptist background and fascination with the military". Where Wilson is shown to make broad metaphysical statements, Lewontin is parsimonious with praise for the power of genes. Ruse saves some stick for one of his pet peeves - those "poularizers" of science. He does make a distinction between the books that Dawkins, Gould, and Wilson offer us and the work that is shared with professionals. However in Gould's case he's unimpressed either way. "The average working evolutionist is no better off with Gould than without him".
The criticisms of pet theories and ideas are all laid out here, and for those who have read widely about the "science wars", the level of vituperation and personal commentary will come as no surprise. That aside this is a brilliant exposition on the evolution of evolutionary thought and a good analysis of the nature of science. Ruse believes that "both Popper and Kuhn were right". His book offers a strong argument for scientists to acknowledge this and to recognize how this influences their work.
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7 of 10 people found the following review helpful
on July 15, 2001
I found I was of two minds as I read Michael Ruse's Mystery of Mysteries. In fact I was of several minds. On the whole I found much material for thought, but I was also left with a feeling that the author might have subtle ulterior motives of his own to promote.
I attempted to begin with chapter one, only to find that it started out as though the author was "mid-conversation." That propelled me to the prologue, only to be confronted with a similar sense of "something is missing." Although I don't generally read what I usually find are just an author's favorite quotes--for which read, "I liked this when I read it, and this is the only way I've found to make use of it." With Ruse, however, the quote that opened the volume, though gobblety gook itself, was absolutely essential to understanding his thesis. Taken as a whole, I thought his style was a very cleaver device. One worthy of a good novelist. It certainly pulled me through the work from start to finish. As I read the prologue, I had to admit that there was certainly meat to the subject: how objective is science?
Though I had been aware of the skirmish between the social and the "hard" sciences--finding myself on the former team by natural ability and wistfully a "wanna be" on the latter by a lack of it--I had not given the matter great attention. Ruse does. He makes it abundantly clear that the two have been in a struggle for society's respect and financial support for decades, sort of an academic survival of the fittest, and that the rancor on both sides is both intense and legitimate.
Probably the most important theme he posits in this introduction and develops throughout the book is that society has certain preconceived ideas about science and those that practice the discipline, namely that there are no other motives than the pursuit of knowledge and the betterment of society. This is not always the case. As any of you who've read Iceman : Uncovering the Life and Times of a Prehistoric Man Found in an Alpine Glacier by Brenda Fowler (see my review) are aware, cultural biases, personal quirks, and professional jealousies can all distort what passes for objective research. The lack of accountability for the spill-over costs to society of research gone bad and the priority of financial interests in directing the goals of science were the basis for the now very famous novel Jurassic Park. Ruse's contention, then, that the distrust by the social sciences of the physical sciences is not altogether a matter of self interest is a valid one, and one we need to seriously consider. Just what agenda might a person have whose research indicates that black people aren't as bright as white people or women as mathematically inclined as men. How might their personal biases direct his/her research and his/her interpretation of results? The recent book Bell Curve, is a case in point.
As a means of demonstrating what is expected of "good science" and of its practitioners, Ruse has chosen to discuss the development of the theory of evolution, its own evolution as a "hard" science, and the personal history of some of the more famous of its researchers from Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of Charles, to Dobzhansky, Dawkins, Gould, Lewontin, Wilson and others. It was very interesting to see how cultural values permeated research from the choice of a topic to the selection of data and interpretation of results. While Ruse does not outright accuse individuals of bias, he definitely makes it clear that scientific research is not as value free as society and even the researchers themselves may believe.
This said, I have several points of my own to make. I feel that at times Ruse makes almost personal attacks, and only thinly disguised ones at that, on some of the individuals reviewed, particularly the popular writer Stephen J. Gould. Furthermore he, or more correctly "scientists," seem to hold such popular writers in at least mild disgust. (I was made aware of the animosity directed toward Carl Sagan for his popularization of cosmology when I was taking an astronomy class and the professor, a well known researcher himself, made disparaging remarks.) It would almost appear that anyone with a gift for putting hard science across to the rest of us--who are after all paying the bills for most of it--is considered to be betraying the inner sanctum. Science is apparently supposed to be "hard" and "mysterious," otherwise why would we be obliged to pay so much for it!
Secondly, why Evolution? Certainly it is a very contentious subject and at the center of a societal debate in almost every decade, but if one wants to pick on "science" why not one of the heavy duty ones like physics? It's not that there aren't eccentric personalities in abundance, as Ruse himself points out when he discuses Newton. Perhaps its because there would be less of a need to discuss bias and the existence of objective reality as he does in the final chapter. With physics, the existence of objective reality is irrelevant or nearly so. It's what "works" and an effective explanation of "what works" that's important, as quantum mechanics makes abundantly clear. Newton may have been a complete lunitic, but the theory of gravitation was a major break through in thinking and has contributed to further scientific and technological break throughs. Furthermore, gravitation is just that, "a discovery." If not made by the lunatic Newton, then sooner or later by someone else with some other foible.
What I think that the author fails to make clear, or perhaps even understand himself, is that science is responsible for the discoveries while technology puts them to use. It is then society itself that dictates what is "wanted" and what is "good." And that is the domain of the social sciences: philosophy, ethics, sociology, psychology, anthropology, etc. If scientists are motivated by cultural standards and beliefs and produce technological and social effects with which we are displeased, then it behooves us to make changes in our values, the way we motivate people, the way we use technology, they kinds of technology we chose to employ, and the way we think of and treat others. For this reason I believe we need both the social and physical sciences. They keep us in balance.
I gave this book a very high rating because of the thinking it made me do!
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Michael Ruse (born 1940) is a philosopher of science who teaches at Florida State University, and has written/edited books such as Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA,But Is It Science?,The Darwinian Revolution,The Evolution-Creation Struggle,Darwinism and its Discontents, etc. He wrote in the Preface to this 1999 book, "This is a book about the nature of science using evolutionary theory as a case study... in this book I am using biology to try to understand philosophy... This book is intended more for a general audience."

He notes, "[Theodosius] Dobzhansky, though he hated war, nevertheless thought that the West must maintain its nuclear superiority and that if this means testing, then so be it. He and his students were therefore keen to show that the radiation artifically introduced into the atmosphere has little or no bad effect---possibly a good effect even!... I have little doubt that cultural factors lying behind the formal science ... helped significantly to flesh out the gaps between the proven and the presumed. The fact that the Atomic Energy Commission was delighted with these results and happy to support the work ... was a nice bonus. Everybody's ends were being served." (Pg. 110-111)

He observes, "when it comes to saltationism---the claim that evolution would have come about ... only through large new variations... [Richard Dawkins says], 'By what mysterious, built-in wisdom does the body choose to mutate in the direction of getting better, rather than getting worse'? Normally, variations are deleterious, and large variations are very deleterious. This is an empirical fact, yet one entirely ignored or minimized by saltationism." (Pg. 127)

He suggests, "A huge amount of hostility to religion is also characteristic of Dawkins's writings... Recently, this hostility has become so obsessional and so overt that one might truly say that today this value---blasting religious beliefs---is a major reason why Dawkins does what he does... It is precisely because Darwinism can so substitute for Christianity that Dawkins finds the theory attractive." (Pg. 130)

He admits, "Charles Darwin took magnificent leaps forward. At the same time he had epistemic weaknesses: there was certainly nothing much by way of exact prediction, and there were perceived epistemic failures as well---the inconsistency of his theory with the earth-dating findings from physics, for example." (Pg. 237)

This book will interest those interested in the Creation/Evolution debate.
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on March 6, 2010
The structure of the book consists of a series of dichotomies used to highlight the different ways science is approached and practiced, contrasting how cultural and epistemic values play a role in evolutionary science. Ruse starts with the contrasting philosophical frameworks of Thomas Kuhn (i.e., cultural) and Karl Popper (i.e. epistemic); they provide the ways in which the evolutionists of the book should be assessed. Erasmus Darwin's crude and speculative approach is contrasted to Charles Darwin's rigorous empiricism. Although both had a penchant for a progressivism, Julian Huxley's consolidation of ideas culminates with the maturation of evolution into a modern and professional scientific enterprise under Theodosius Dobzhansky. Richard Dawkins' gene-centric natural selection is compared to Stephen Jay Gould's stress on group selection and saltationism at the expense of natural selection. Richard Lewontin's Marxist-inspired mitigation of adaptationism, which argues for the interacting roles of adaptation and environment, "one blending into the other" (p. 167), is contrasted with the prominence of adaptationism in the Southerner's Edward O. Wilson's progressive view of evolution. Finally, Geoffrey Parker's Darwinian adaptationism is compared to Jack Sepkoski's kinetic model of alternating rapid diversification and consolidation (once an ecological niche is filled); both employ a staunch empiricism and a Popperian "falsifiability criterion". As the book progresses, Ruse points out that there is a progression towards an ideal scientific methodology; it is one that becomes increasingly purged of cultural values and is better understood in the Popperian framework than the Kuhnian one.

Unfortunately, on a number of occasions Ruse forces a tenuous connection between scientific ideas and cultural background. As an example, he quotes Jack Sepkoski's disregard for his Christian educational background, "the Christian brothers had beaten religion out of me while trying to beat it into to me'" (p. 231), as evidence of his indifference to it in his work, but on the following page he notes that there is a very strong Herbert Spencer element of "states of dynamic equilibrium" (progress followed by a pause, followed by further progress) in his work, in spite of never having read of word of his: "... again we have reason to think that we have a culture-drenched vision, a neo-Spencerian one, rather than raw data" (p. 232), or "... or is Sepkoski (unconsciously) simply reflecting an American [Spencerian] tradition" (p. 233) . Why has Spenser left his mark on Sepkoski but not Christianity? Isn't there a progressive or teleological element in Christianity which could have left its "unconscious" mark on Sepkoski despite of his proclaimed "indifference"? If denying the role of one cultural influence, why not deny the role of both? On another occasion, Ruse mentions that Geoffrey Parker draws an analogy with painting in order to describe his approach to science, but Ruse then comments, "... this philosophy of science does not necessarily mean that Parker's values intrude into his science" (p. 211). Ruse tends to be selective about his examples and the lessons he draws from them.

This is a book that should be read with a very critical eye because Ruse occasionally oversimplifies and forces circular pegs into square holes in order to accommodate his theses. But it is also an approach with a pedantic purpose intended to show how one should assess what makes good science and accordingly how evolutionary science has progressed towards a high scientific standard. Although forced at times, such an approach does a good job of highlighting similarities and differences. In the end, Ruse argues that although Kuhn and Popper provide insight how science is practiced ("Both of our philosophers captured part of the overall picture" (p. 249)), it is the latter approach which should be the goal of science and is the "paradigm" of modern evolution. This book is packed with many interesting ideas from the post-Darwinian period, which is different from your typical history of evolution that focuses on the pre-Darwinian period. I rate this book 3.5 stars.
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4 of 6 people found the following review helpful
HALL OF FAMEon September 20, 2002
Michael Ruse may be the gentlest man in the world. Here, he certainly has no peer in providing a comprehensive history of evolutionary biology without descending into the acrimony and vituperation that has plagued the field. He opens with a review of "the science wars," particularly the humanities' assault on science over the past generation. He chooses evolutionary thought for his focus, because he's familiar with the topic, having addressed several books to the field. In this book, he evokes the work of twelve scholars in assessing the impact of "culture" on evolutionary research.
As Ruse sees it, "the debate is between objectivity and subjectivity." These "scientific values" are used in reviewing the work of his chosen personalities. They are assessed in light of his overview of Karl Popper's "objectivism" versus Thomas Kuhn's "paradigms of thought." Ruse follows the tortured path of this debate with compelling skill. His guidance is sure-footed, keeping our attention and maintaining a balanced course along the way. It's a perilous journey, since many of the personalities are current and none hesitant about making known their displeasure. Stephen Gould, Richard Dawkins, Richard Lewontin and Edward Wilson have all tilted at the academic lists. Ruse negotiates this hazardous milieu effectively.
Ruse synthesizes many works in assessing the cultural milieu of each of his subjects. Darwin's comfortable upper-middle class lifestyle, Gould's rampant Marxism, Wilson's Southern fundamentalist upbringing have been examined by many others over the years. Ruse adds a fresh level of organization to these accounts, giving each of his subjects a "level playing field" position as he relates them to the larger issue. He faults none of them, for none consciously sought to inflict a social standard on society. They were all men of their times, writing to an audience they understood. Although Ruse has some mild reservations about the "popularization" of science by such figures as Dawkins, Gould or even Ed Wilson, he doesn't openly condemn them, nor does he feel they're honing axes. He understands the need for science to reach a broad public, even at the risk of flawed comprehension.
As a philosopher, Ruse's conclusion may surprise the unwary. He finds the charge of "cultural determinism" wanting, especially among today's active scientists. The quest for objectivity has intensified over succeeding generations to become the fully established standard. Is the assault on science responsible for tightening the discipline of its practitioners? Again, Ruse rebuffs the claims of the deconstructionists, arguing that science, by the very nature of its practices, has provided a core of self-discipline improving the way in which science is reported by its members. Even if they stray from the norm in other ways, it isn't the impact of "cultural" mores that tempts them from the path of full objectivity. Ruse deserves full accolades for this study, long needed to counter the foolish assaults science and
scientists have endured.
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7 of 11 people found the following review helpful
on February 17, 2004
Michael R's book starts out well, providing a lively introduction with the now famous Sokal incident, reviews Popper and Kuhn (sorta) on Provability or Falsifiability, and then promises to address this question ( is science provable objective truth or subjective cultural currency) using evolution and biology as the plow horse. As one of the other reviewers observed, he is obviously having a lot of fun. He seems to have either consumed his energies in the interesting mini-bios, or lost his thread, but after the introduction, he never seriously returns to the question at hand. He does the obligatory savaging of Teilhard, treats Gould as a cartoonist, gives some interesting biographical bits on former famous fat people, but never steps up seriously to his main question, waffling the question ata the end. Of course there are elements of truth in two competing points of view. Of course there are serious and honest scientists on both sides. But where do you stand, Prof. R?
Frankly, I was expecting an answer. I did not get one.
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5 of 11 people found the following review helpful
on June 5, 2004
This book will change the way you read literature discussing the theory of Evolution. I stongly recommend that you read this book if you are interested in the debate about what we should teach our children in science class.
Michael Ruse is a philospher and an expert in the history of Biological Evolutionary thought. His goal is to evaluate two alternatives about about the nature of science. He wishes to evaluate if science measures a reality that is independent of the scientist, as Karl Popper would propose, or alternatively that what we see is governed by the paradigm or world view we have selected (and which is often inpenetrable to new concepts), as Thomas Kuhn might propose. His method is to analyse the writings of a selection of Evolutionists from Erasmus Darwin (grandfather of Charles) to current day Evolutionists. Ruse's favorite word is "epistemic" (from the Greek word meaning "knowledge"). He uses it in the sense of "objective testable, reproducible science".
For me much of the value of this book was the analysis rather than the final conclusions. What becomes clear is that Evolutionists simply cannot resisist the temptation to expand their writing outside of pure scientific study into the "non-epistemic" world of reading between the lines and speculating what might have happened in the earth's past history. This is particulary true of Evolutionists public or lay literature. What you can be fairly sure of is this, if you have read anything about evolution lately, and you are not a specialised scientist, what you read is almost certainly of the non-epistemic unscientific kind. Why would evolutionists do this? They are creating coherence, making sense of the world around them, scientific or not.
This leaves me with some conclusions thanks to Ruse.
1)Much of what appears as literature in "evolutionary science" is surely no better scientifically than literature about "intelligent design". The desire for Coherence drives both paradigms.
2)If the Thoery of evolution has become progressively more scientific over the last 150 years as Ruse proposes, is the theory we have now merely a scientific veneer covering a non-epistemic core?
3)Ruse says that in 1981 in the Little Rock Arkansas "balance treatment" case he argued that Creationism was unscientific. Would he now take the stand and warn parents that most of what their children heard about evolution was like-wise non-epistemic?
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2 of 10 people found the following review helpful
on May 12, 2001
A polished mini account, almost a bit slick, that is an amusing read, of both evolutionary epistemology and the history of the evolutionary hypothesis, including a family album from Erasmus Darwin to Sepkowski, the little rascals who have done so much to change our perceptions of the cosmos and man, by hook or crook. Opening on the offensive in the 'science wars' with its subtitle question, Is Evolution a Social Construction? the book proceeds to politely smother Popper and Kuhn in the first chapter, no doubt because of the rumour that Darwin's theory is not falsifiable and the disturbing resemblance of the whole research project to one of Kuhn's paradigmatic Chaplinesques. That evolution, quite surprisingly, should have poetic origins in the heroic couplets of Erasmus Darwin is proof of its heroic stature, however much its epistemology battles resemble the Trojan War. Ruse's inclusion of this vigorous Darwin progenitor is entirely apt, and an overdue feature of this genre. It is interesting to see the close packing of the whig families and science themes of the Industrial Revolution's inventors and promoters attendant at the birth of evolutionism. But we should not forget the Lamarckian radicalism that founded the subject, and the Darwinian conservatism that packaged it as both a theory and a social ideology. This account of Darwinian epistemology in its changes is not of the naive variety so common although the defense of evolution and the theory of its mechanism is still too embraided in the main confusion. This basic defense is essential if we take too seriously the obvious evidence of the social construction of evolution. It would seem that it is the theory of natural selection that threatens the sound foundation of evolution as fact with the charge of being a 'social construction'. It is a bit facile to exempt the whole research project from the charge of being 'culturally value-laden' if the main idea of 'how evolution happens' is so suspiciously cousin (to repeat this for still another time) to a well-known economic process. One difficulty is that of separating evolution in the past from evolution in the present, since the collation of the two confuses the basis of the theory's application. This "Oedipus" effect, described by Karl Popper, in his Poverty of Historicism, confounds action in the present with the assumption that survival of the fittest will improve, shall we say, brains, since it did so once before. If this assumption is false, then the future is betrayed and our action incoherent. This belief that more of the same is entailed as reverse duty, for coneheads to come, from apes in the past, is proof that 'theories' might be the curse of the modern age as much as myths were in the past. This fallacious head-scratcher lurks in the unconscious of every generation since Darwin, and strongly demands the division foreseen by Huxley of evolution into a theory of 'two evolutions', past, and present, with some explanation of the boundary. The inability to account for this 'evolution against evolution' is the mysterious component missing, and the reason, perhaps, that 'evolution still can't cut the mustard', to invoke the title of the last chapter. Worth reading with raised eyebrows. The paradigm clock is ticking.
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