The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More Jews from the Nazis [Hardcover]

W.D. Rubinstein (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0415124557 | ISBN-13: 978-0415124553 | Publication Date: June 26, 1997 | Edition: 1 edition

It has long been argued that the Allies did little or nothing to rescue Europe's Jews. Arguing that this has been consistently misinterpreted, The Myth of Rescue states that few Jews who perished could have been saved by any action of the Allies. In his new introduction to the paperback edition, Willliam Rubinstein responds to the controversy caused by his challenging views, and considers further the question of bombing Auschwitz, which remains perhaps the most widely discussed alleged lost opportunity for saving Jews available to the Allies.

Editorial Reviews

From Kirkus Reviews

In this revisionist history Rubinstein (History/Univ. of Wales, Aberystwyth) sets out to debunk as ``illogical and ahistorical'' the work of several established historians who raise the question of Allied culpability during the Holocaust. The key issues involve closed-door immigration policies that turned central and eastern European Jewish refugee movements into one long Voyage of the Damned; discussed but never executed attempts to bomb the railway lines to such concentration camps as Auschwitz; and aborted financial negotiations to ransom Jewish lives. Rubinstein's major thesis is that Hitler was too committed to genocide to be distracted by such efforts, but the author should have presented more documentation to prove that the Allies did what they could once they confirmed the reality of the Final Solution. His thesis is further weakened by many diversionary tactics, such as the presentation of Gallup polls showing that 80 percent of wartime Americans opposed anti-Semitism (but nearly 68 percent opposed immigration). The data in no way relieve the US State Department, Great Britain, and organizations like the Red Cross of culpability in not minimizing the number of Holocaust victims. Such serious charges as those in in Lucy Dawidowicz's work, that German extermination trains and railways were repeatedly spared by Allied bombers, are not addressed. There is too much here on what we already knew, such as that ``the Jews were the central obsession of Hitler's life,'' and too little on the paucity of efforts to save Jews in Europe during the war. Some valuable historical modifications may be lost due to a tone and strategy that make the author sound too much like an apologist for the Allies' inaction. -- Copyright ©1997, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

Review

The Myth of Rescue, written by a scholar who specializes in modern Jewish history, offers a comprehensive and iconoclastic look at the diplomatic, political, and military initiatives that were undertaken to assist Europe's Jewish population before and during World War II.
–Parameters, Spring 1999

Rubinstein has written a highly controversial and contentious book that is certain to anger many who have formed their views on America's response to the Holocaust. Nevertheless, the book should be welcomed if only to remind us that the responsibility for the Holocaust lies solely and wholly with Hitler, the SS and their accomplices.
–Jewish Exponent, 3/12/98

[A] persuasive account of the issues surrounding the question of rescue, in which Rubinstein challenges the major scholarly works dealing the with Allied response to the Holocaust.
–Congress Monthly, M/A 98

It is, in short, an important and courageous book....William Rubensteins' powerful brief against such excesses will, one hopes, be instrumental in restoring intellectual rigor and responsiblity to the continuing discussion on this aspect of the Holocaust.
–First Things, 2/98

Meticulously constructed and well documented....
–PS, 8/97

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 288 pages
• Publisher: Routledge; 1 edition edition (June 26, 1997)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0415124557
• ISBN-13: 978-0415124553
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.3 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (10 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,456,775 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

21 of 29 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Realistic view of the situation confronting the Allies, October 1, 1998

By 

Derek Copold - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More Jews from the Nazis (Hardcover)

Rubenstein does yeoman work in deflating the wild claims of post-Holocaust "Blamers." Through meticulous use of raw numbers and the context of the time, William Rubenstein demonstrates that, despite claims to the contrary, there wasn't anything the Allied powers could do to end the Holocaust save win the war. Rubenstein uses immigration numbers from around the globe to show that the world was extremely receptive of German Jews leaving repression from 1933-39. (72% of German Jews escaped Hitler's reich.) Once the war began, not one Jew who escaped Axis territory was returned to his country of origin. Treatment of escapees was not golden, but, as Rubenstein points out, that is another issue. Once war broke out, Rubenstein again shows that all that could be done by the allied powers was done. Armchair generals who offhandedly toss out suggestions that Auschwitz could be bombed should pay special attention to Rubenstein's chapter on this impossibility. Rubenstein is not a revisionist. He does not deny the Holocaust or any of the horrors that were thoroughly documented by the Allies after the war. What he does do, though, is place the blame where it belongs. With Hitler and his subordinates.

6 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars Overly Critical/"Ahistorical", November 5, 2009

By 

Ganglesaurusrex "Seth" (Not Tellin USA) - See all my reviews

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This review is from: The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More Jews from the Nazis (Paperback)

I find this work to be an incredibly off based book when looked at in light of the evidence available for the Holocaust. Countless illogical arguments are used throughout the work. At one point he assumes that because some victims inside of Auschwitz didn't know about the crematoria and didn't want us to bomb the camp we should not have bombed the camp. He bases this on the likelihood of accidentally killing prisoners. However, had we destroyed the camps we could have saved large numbers of Jews who were still being shipped their from many countries especially the Hungarian Jews. Another point can be made in that clearly the Allies were not worried about collateral damage. The U.S. and Britain both participated in terror bombing campaigns that killed thousands of innocent civilians at a time. This is just one off based argument. He also argues that the U.S. and Britain hold no blame for what happened because those killed were killed by the Nazis and their collaborators. This argument universalized suggests that it is okay to be indifferent to massacres of human beings in many instances and also would serve to argue that we have no civic duty to others.

The author also continually calls well respected Holocaust historians like Wyman and Breitmann "ahistorical." His criticisms go beyond critical and into blatant insults and are completely inappropriate for a man of his level of education. To stoop to personal attacks is to give in to the fact that your argument is weak.

13 of 20 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Thought-Provoking, But Could Be Expanded, August 17, 2001

By A Customer

This review is from: The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More Jews from the Nazis (Hardcover)

One of the most convincing facts presented by this book is the information on the accuracy of bomb hits by Allied bombers. From this, the author Rubinstein makes it clear that a bombing raid on Auschwitz, even if "successful" would more likely wipe out the barracks and kill many Jews (and Poles, along with inmates of other nationalities) without putting the gas chambers and crematoria out of commission. And, although the author mentions Babi Yar as proof that the Germans did not need death camps to make the Holocaust work, this could have been further developed. For instance, Albert Speer pointed out that, had the death camps been destroyed, all the Germans needed to do would be to revert to the pre-1942 method of killing Jews (and millions of gentiles also): Local roundups of victims with mass shootings on the outskirts of towns where they lived, followed by burial in mass graves (or mass cremations on pyres). Many other facts in this book could be expanded. For instance, accusations that the Polish Underground deliberately (because of alleged anti-Semitism) did not sabotage the rail lines leading to the death camps can be refuted by identical arguments against their bombings, as told by Rubinstein: Destroyed tracks can often be replaced in hours or days, and there are several alternative railroad routes to the death camps. In addition, many of the routes to Auschwitz do not even occur in German-occupied Polish territory. Finally, if the Polish Underground proved incapable of rescuing millions of Polish-gentile inmates from the German-Nazi concentration camps, it can hardly be argued that they deliberately avoided preventing the Holocaust of Jews.