Customer Reviews

In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire (Phoenix Press)

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Goldsworthy successfully draws a picture of how Roman generals actually commanded their armies. This book is in similar style to Goldworthy's first book "The Roman Army at War", which covers how the Roman Army actually fought its battles.

Besides the story of individual generals, this book also traces the development of the Roman style of command as it evolved along with changing Roman society. The story starts with Fabius Maximus and Claudius Marcellus who are elected leaders of citizen soldiers in the Second Punic War and ends with Belisarius, a member of the Imperial household, who is general of an army of unruly mercenary cavalry and questionable infantry. A definite "Roman", style of command emerges which Goldsworthy then follows past the end of the Roman world and into modern times through leaders like Gustavus Adolphus, du Picq and especially Napoleon.

The main Roman leaders covered in the book are:

Fabius Maximus (2nd Punic War)
Claudius Marcellus (2nd Punic War)
Scipio Africanus (2nd Punic War)
Aemilius Paullus (Conquest of Macedonia)
Scipio Aemilianus (Numantia)
Gaius Marius (Jugurthine War / Cimbri & Teutones)
Quintus Sertorius (Roman Civil war in Spain)
Pompey the Great (Conquest of the East)
Julius Caesar (Conquest of Gaul)
There is also a chapter on Pompey vs. Caesar in the Civil War.
Germanicus Caesar (Reprisal war across the Rhine after defeat of Varus)
Domitius Corbulo (Armenian War)
Titus Vespasianus (Siege of Jerusalem)
Emperor Trajan (Dacian Wars)
Emperor Julian (Career on the Rhine and in Parthia)
Belisarius (Persian Wars / Battle of Dara)

Goldsworthy also manages to work in many other prominent Roman generals such as Sulla, Lucullus, Agrippa and Paulinus Seutonius.

If you are interested in military leadership, ancient military history or Roman history in general you should read this book.

Roman-era expert Adrian Goldsworthy has written an outstanding history of seven centuries of Roman generalship with his latest volume, In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire. This is Goldsworthy's first volume that is focused primarily on individuals, rather than organizational studies of the Roman Army, but he handles the material deftly and brings these characters into sharp focus as individuals, rather than as mere ciphers. Goldsworthy also attempts to divine general lessons about the nature of the Roman command style from the behavior of these generals, many of whom are not well-known to modern readers.

Each chapter in this volume details the career of one or two generals in a given period and the chapters are arranged sequentially, covering the period from the Second Punic War to the 6th Century A.D. Generally, Goldsworthy covers each of these Roman commanders in 25-30 pages as well as providing background material about contemporary conflicts and leaders. It is particularly impressive that Goldsworthy has been able to construct such a rich narrative on these generals, given the fragmentary and incomplete nature of the historical record. The chapters on Sertorius and Corbulo were particularly enlightening. Readers may also note that Goldsworthy's discussion of the Emperor Julian's generalship is far less complementary - although probably more accurate - than some modern accounts that attempt to rank him alongside Julius Caesar.

Goldsworthy disputes the oft-held opinion that Roman generals were military amateurs and instead depicts them as professional public figures who alternated between military, civic and political roles. One of the chief attributes of Roman leaders that Goldsworthy cites is Virtus, the steadfast ability to endure setbacks and to endure until final victory was achieved. Although Roman armies were often defeated, they were rarely demoralized and they usually recovered quickly. While only a few Roman generals were truly gifted soldiers - Scipio Africanus and Julius Caesar being exceptions - most learned how to employ the operational art and tactics that served Rome so well for centuries (unlike modern military leaders, who must constantly update their professional knowledge due to changes in technology and doctrine).

As Goldsworthy notes, Roman generals did not typically participate in close combat, as Greek generals did. Rather, the role of a Roman general on the battlefield was to "serve as a witness to his troops' acts of bravery" and to dispense rewards. Goldsworthy's theory is essentially that Roman troops were primarily motivated by the anticipation of rewards. It is a good theory and certainly one that tracks well with what we know about other armies in history, such as Napoleon's Grande Armee. Goldsworthy also discusses changes in the Roman Army over these centuries, including a greater degree of professionalism and the fact that soldiers became more loyal to their commanders (the one who rewarded them, anyway) than the state. Goldsworthy's hypothesis appears solid and the narrative supports it well. Although readers familiar with Caesar's commentaries, Tacitus and other Roman histories will find few new details here, the skill and clarity with which Goldsworthy weaves together all these accounts into a coherent narrative is truly commendable.

I am a new-comer to military history, and thought I should start with the Romans, the ancestors of tactical warfare. I am glad I picked up Mr. Goldsworthy's book. By selecting various generals who have influenced or been indicative of some evolution in military/political atmospheres Goldsworthy has created an extremely broad and interesting history stretching from Fabius Maximus in the Second Punic War right up to Belisarius fighting for the Byzantine Emperor Justinian. Before delving into their military achievements, Goldsworthy outlines the historical context, as there are many century long jumps or more in later chapters where generals became less influenial (or were not allowed to be by paranoid emperors afraid of being toppled), then gives a brief biography of each general - perhaps too brief for my liking. I would have preferred Goldworthy to extend the book by a couple of hundred pages and hand out some more detailed information and analysis of their lives and times; at present these often one or two page linkages are forgotten by the end of the chapter, and certainly by the end of the book. His writing and research is of a high enough standard for any reader to accept such extensions.

On the plus side - and there are many plus sides - Goldsworthy presents a detailed (as detailed as ancient sources can provide) and comprehensive account of military tactics and concerns which are absolutely fascinating. Contrary to popular belief, battles of the time were not simply two big armies walking in to each other. It was a complicated game of flanking and routing, feints and deception, supply line maintenance and organisation, sieging and recruting.

The maps and diagrams are an excellent addition, though I sometimes wish there was a section dedicated purely to maps of the different discussed periods so I can be at least vaguely aware (even if the location is mostly hypothetical) of the locations of provences, cities and enemy lands - though to be fair there are maps sprinkled throughout the volume, but not nearly enough. On the flipside, the glossary and timeline is invaluable.

After reading and immensely enjoying this book, Mr. Goldsworthy can safely say about military history what Gaius Julius Caesar said about himself over two-thousand years ago: "veni, vidi, vici!"

This book is well researched and well written. Depending on your level of experience and reading, this book will enhance and supplement your understanding of both the basics of warfare in Antiquity and also wll provide good examples of tactical, operational and strategic lessons learned. The book also provides excellent vignettes on the crucial importance that politics and diplomacy have in war; as well as some glaring examples of the consequences for those that fail to follow the subtle rules of power politics while attempting to advance one's career.
Although the Author indicates that this book is about the men that won the Roman Empire, it also provides useful examples that illustrate the fog, friction and uncertainty of war. For instance; Chapter three speaks to the Conqueror of Macedonia, Aemilius Paullus, but this chapter also provides a useful illustration of an "meeting engagement". All in all, this is a very valuable reference tool for the novice to the subject matter expert.

In The Name of Rome by Adrian Goldsworthy presents summary biographies of fifteen Roman generals from roughly 200 BC through 565 AD. Subjects include not only many of the better known Roman generals from the Republican era (Scipio Africanus, Marius, Pompey, and Julius Caesar) but also many lesser known generals from both the Republican and Imperial eras (from Fabius and Marcellus who checked Hannibal's advance in Italy to Julian the Apostate who held back the Germanic invaders in Gaul in the 350s AD and Belisarius who battled the Persians on behalf of the Byzantine Empire after the fall of Rome.

In addition to the chronological events and biographical materials on the primary actors, Goldsworthy presents, as an almost subliminal subplot, his analysis of the changes in Roman government that led to the fall of Rome. Rather than detail the lives of the fifteen generals, I plan to outline this analysis in the following paragraphs.

From about AD 200 on, Emperors were largely made and deposed by the army. This pattern had several effects on both the military and government of Rome.

1. Emperors were generally insecure in their positions. Having been placed in power by force of arms, they were inclined to be on the lookout for other generals who might attempt to follow the same path to power. To prevent rival generals from developing power bases in the army, Emperors spent more and more time in direct command of the army in the field.

2. Prior to AD 200, larger provinces were garrisoned by up to four legions. This was a considerable force and could become the power base for a potential rival. To reduce this potential threat, Emperors reduced the sizes of provincial garrisons by either transferring forces or subdividing the larger provinces. This resulted in provincial garrisons that seldom exceeded a single legion in size.

3. The reduced provincial garrisons were less able to cope with serious revolts or invasions. With limited forces at their disposal, provincial commanders were less inclined to come to the aid of a hard-pressed colleague.

4. Significant revolts or invasions required a large army to quell or repulse them However, the only really large army was that commanded directly by the Emperor. This further tied the Emperor to field operations on a permanent basis.

5. The need for an army commanded by the Emperor to deal with major conflicts effectively eliminated the Senate's role in creating proconsuls to govern provinces and command armies.

6. The selection of the Emperor by the army destroyed even the myth that the Senate exercised any meaningful role in imperial succession.

7. The extended absence of the Emperor from Rome effectively transferred the seat of government to the army's current headquarters location, further reducing the influence of the Senate and administrative bodies in Rome.

8. The need for direct imperial leadership of the army on campaign effectively limited the ability of the empire to deal with more than one or two simultaneous crises.

These themes seem to me to explain why Rome fell better than most other sources.

While it of course has a very interesting subject matter, it still is an extraordinarily easy book to read. It is no thin composition and yet I accidently finished it in three days. While I'm a fledging of sorts on the subject this book is easily the best written military history book I've ever read.

This looked a little daunting but Adrian Goldsworth held my intellectual hand and walked me through 700 years of Roman history as seen from the viewpoint of the fightin' generals. Goldsworth demands a bit of rigor from his readers but the payoffs are fun and worthwhile. Join Africanus as he lays waste to Carthage, Caesar in France and Germany, and everbody else in Spain. Weapons and discipline are explained patiently. (When you get tired of crucifying enemies the regular way, try some new positions where the folks looking out at your camp can see what you have in store for them unless they surrender) He helps you understand how the process of war changed with the political drama constantly unfolding back in Rome. And finally helps you come to grips with why commanders ultimately came to feel that Rome was irrelevant. This is a meaty book for the serious ancient history fan. Thanks Adrian !

I cannot come up with enough positive adjectives for this book. Adrian Goldsworthy makes history very readable and enjoyable but at the same time very informative and in depth.

The only problem with this book is that the maps are worthless and that Goldsworthy takes it for granted that the reader has some previous knowledge of roman history. These are minor flaws however and the book clearly deserves a 5 star rating.

Buy it if you are interested in roman history or military history.

Goldsworthy's book is a superb study in ancient Roman military leadership, the realities faced by commanders over a 600 year period fighting opponents all over the "world" (at least as it was known to the Romans). Clearly, for any student of Roman history, whether scholar or hobbyist, this is a must have.

What I found fascinating, however, were the lessons that Goldsworthy clearly identifies throughout the book that are so applicable to the world around us today. Lessons that we can use in making decisions and thinking about complex situations; lessons that, with any luck, we can all apply and not have to relearn the hard way.

First - and easiest to make - are analogies with today's military situation. Modern militaries of US, Europe, Japan, and so on, are not likely to fight great battles any more than most of the Roman commanders fought great battles against equally armed, styled, and sized opponents. Few of the Roman commanders battled equal Parthian or Carthaginian armies; most conflicts were against smaller opponents like Gaulish, Germanic and Pictish tribes. Roman commanders had armies who were vastly better armed, trained, and organized than these tribal warbands. And yet, when the Roman tried the "traditional" means of warfare, the tribal warbands did not "play along" (when they did, the Romans defeated them). And so the warbands turned to raiding and almost guerrilla-like tactics. Goldsworthy then lays out what the Roman generals did in order to cope and turn the situation to their advantage: heavy reliance on intelligence gathering, rapid responses, spread out deployments holding down various fortified positions or camps, constant politicking to find even small allies amongst the various tribes, and continual work with local populations to improve their lot (building roads, bridges, etc.) and refrain from plundering.

Sounds a lot like the strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, doesn't it?

For corporate leaders, Roman leadership lessons also apply. Be seen with your "employees" (i.e., soldiers); do not set yourself too far apart from your men (e.g., it's fine to have the corner office but having a beautiful glass and steel office building dedicated to you and your staff miles away from your factories and call centers is not going to engender support and loyalty and, thus, increased productivity and creativity amongst your employees); make sure you are in a position to be able to see, identify and call out individuals for going above and beyond the call of duty - and make sure to reward them; insist on everyone - from the leader to the junior hire - helping in the grunt work (in the Romans, case rebuilding ruined fortifications, fortifying camps, etc.).

Sounds a lot like advice from some of the best business and leadership books written over the past decade, doesn't it?

Admittedly, Goldsworthy's "In the Name of Rome" is not a book you're going to sit down with after dinner and whip through before bedtime; but then good leaders are not made in a day.

This book concentrate only on military events , its not a biography of each leader , even its not
a full military biography of each leader ! Just focusing on the most important campaigns in the
leaders career ..

Thereupon , and in a word ; ( In the Name of Rome ) is a magnificent , majestic , amazing , scholarship
book but at the same time reads like a novel ! .. my only complaint is the absence of some great military
names from the author list , such as : Sulla and emperor aurelianus .

all by all : 10 stars ! ..