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Napoleon's Great Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and Austrian Army, 1792-1814

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Napoleon's Great Adversary is a well-written military study of the evolution of the Austrian Army and the role of its best commander, the Archduke Charles, during the Napoleonic Wars from 1792-1814. Charles, brother of the Austrian emperor, saw his first combat in 1792 and rapidly rose to become the driving force behind the reform movement in the often-defeated Austrian army. The author, a veteran of both the British army and the US Air Force, is a distinguished scholar and expert on the Austrian military. Dr. Rothenberg brings the full weight of his scholarly research and military insights to provide one of the few English language accounts of the Austrian military in this key period.

The book is organized in nine chapters which cover the Hapsburg monarchy and its army in 1792, the wars of the first and second coalitions, the first reform period in 1801-1805, the Ulm/Austerlitz campaigns of 1805, the second reform period of 1806-1809, the campaigns of 1809 and the final phase of the war in 1810-1814. There are 17 maps in this volume, mostly taken from other sources such as Scott Bowden. There are also 23 illustrations, mostly from the Vienna Army Museum, that depict uniforms and notable commanders. Unfortunately, the editors have not done the authors any favors and he notes this in his introduction. Given the dearth of works on this subject and the research effort made by the author, this is a shame.

The author gives an excellent description of the condition, equipment, tactics and doctrine of the Austrian army at the outset of the Napoleonic Wars. However the description of Austrian military operations in 1792-1800 is overly succinct and focuses primarily on Charles' 1796 campaign in Germany. Napoleon's 1796-1797 campaign in Italy is covered in less than two pages and the Battle of Marengo in only one paragraph, with no new Austrian perspectives offered on either campaign. Instead, the author provides considerable detail on the reform programs pushed by Charles after the defeat at Marengo. These reforms were only partly accomplished when war broke out again in 1805, resulting in the catastrophes of Ulm and Austerlitz.

Clearly the author's main interest is the period of reform that followed the defeat at Austerlitz and culminated in Austria's decision to re-enter the war in 1809. It was during this period that Charles, despite the suspicion and hostility of his brother's court, made his greatest contributions as War Minister and field commander. While not equal to the hard-hitting and fast-moving French armies, Charles was able to restore the Austrian army's cohesion and modestly improve its staying power. While he essentially bungled the outset of the 1809 campaign by failing to strike quickly at the dispersed French forces in Bavaria, Charles opted to retire behind the formidable Danube River and await Napoleon's attack. Napoleon soon obliged him with a reckless hasty assault across the river at Aspern-Essling, but a combination of Austrian tenacity and bad luck contributed to Napoleon's first battlefield defeat. The chagrined emperor, who had taken Austrian incompetence for granted, then realized that only a better-prepared offensive could succeed against the stout Austrian defense. Charles, although victorious, elected to do nothing and await the next attack. Napoleon's second crossing was successful and resulted in the bloodbath Battle of Wagram. This costly French victory taught Napoleon that Austrian armies were no longer the small, fragile forces that quickly retreated if their lines of communication were threatened, but were evolving into an attrition-oriented force. However, defeat at Wagram was the end of Charles' career and retired into relative obscurity thereafter.

This account, while somewhat superficial in the early phases of the Napoleonic Wars, is graced with considerable data on Austrian forces. At times, Austrian leadership and tactics seem almost imbecilic and rigid to a fault. Even after the defeat at Wagram, Austrian reforms were reluctant to endorse open-order skirmishing tactics that the French had been using so successfully for the past 17 years. The Austrian army had some of the finest cavalry in Europe but wasted it by splitting it up in an infantry support role and using mounted units piece-meal, just as the French would later do with their armor in 1940. Good ideas, such as introducing all-arms corps formations, were negated by attempting to apply them in the chaos of mobilization. Nevertheless, the Austrian army continued to rise and fight again, even if it was a worn, threadbare force by 1814. Military reforms did not come easily to the hide-bound Hapsburg Empire as the author notes that, "the political and military leadership realized that radical innovations in the military sphere were linked to changes in government and society that neither party desiredBasically the Hapsburg army remained a dynastic force."

If you are interested in the 1809 campaign, or want to know more about the Army that was Napoleon's main adversary during the entire period, then you should read this book.

When first published, this book was touted as the only English text dealing specifically with the Austrian Army and Archduke Charles. There are now several other books on essentially the same topic. I found this book to be rather too academic for the lay reader (me), dwelling as it does in considerable details on Army organisation and reorganisation and other statistical details. There is also a heavy reliance on Austrian sources for the text. The author is aware of this and tries to correct the imbalance in treatment by selective use of material from other sources. However, one is still left with the feeling that this tome is not the definitive account of the Archduke Charles.