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Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Causes and Consequences of the National Revivals and Conflicts in Late 20Th-Century Eastern Europe

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Reviewed by Johanna Granville, Clemson University, Clemson, SC USA

This book by Bollerup and Cristensen (both Danish diplomats and army reserve officers) attempts to explain why some nationalist movements turn violent and others do not. Part One discusses nationalist movements, while Part Two examines national conflicts in particular. The beginning chapters explore "the proclivity for nationalism," posing the basic question: what induces the individual member of the nation-group to participate in, or sympathize with, a national movement? The authors then explore two types of theories. The first views nationalism as a result of some sort of human predisposition, while the other sees nationalism as a rational choice. Before proceeding to the case studies, Bollerup and Christensen carefully articulate the hypotheses to be tested. Two relate to "primordialism" (i.e. stressing the importance of the "ethnie"). The authors define an ethnie as a "unit of population sharing a common name, myths of common ancestry, historical memories, one or more distinctive elements of culture, a common territory, and a sense of social solidarity." (38) The first hypothesis states that "national revivals are based on a common identity in nation-groups provided by 1) the ethnie and 2) the historical interplay between the ethnie and the other significant ethnie(s)." (41) The second hypothesis tested in the book is that "national revivals can be triggered by liberal policies adopted by former repressive regimes and eased by already existing republican political units and constitutional rights."(41) The third hypothesis stems from the "instrumental" perspective and stress certain deprivations. It posits that "national revivals are caused by internal colonization of nation-groups leading to economic, political, or cultural deprivation" (46). The authors then devote considerable text to a general discussion of social science theories about nationalism, on both the microsociological and macrosociological level. Later the authors turn to the subject of nationalism in Eastern Europe in particular. Because microsociological theories cannot be tested empirically, the authors focus instead on macrosociological theories (primordial and instrumental). They address two questions in this section. First, which general properties of twentieth-century national movements make them the peoples' choice (as opposed to other kinds of groups or movements). Secondly, what about East European societies in particular makes people choose to join nationalist groups, as opposed to other kinds of interest groups? Bollerup and Christensen conclude that both rational choice theory and social identity theory help to explain the national revivals in general, and those in Eastern Europe in particular. Rational choice theory "provides a very plausible microsociological foundation of the importance of economic inequalities as a cause of national revivals." (143) However, the authors claim that social identity theory best explains the growth of national revivals. Individuals join national movements not so much to "maximize their utility" (as the rational choice theory would suggest), but rather to raise their self-esteem. As the authors argue, social identity theory "best captures the identity crisis of those East Europeans who, before perestroika, took pride in the allegedly supreme communist model of society and the powerful international position of the communist bloc." Social identity theory assumes that "self-esteem is the motivational basis of human beings." It also "acknowledges that such self-esteem can be derived not only from individual achievements, but also from qualities that exist only among collectives of individuals." With the atomistic and utility-maximizing individuals assumed in rational choice theory, much insight is impossible."(58) Bollerup and Christensen then turn to the case studies, explaining the nationalist revivals in Estonia, Moldova, Croatia, and Czechoslovakia, first from the "primordial," and then from the "instrumental," perspective. Out of the four case studies, the authors selected two where the nationalist revival led to violence (Moldova and Croatia) and two where it did not (Estonia and Czechoslovakia). The national revival movements among the Estonians, Moldovans, Slavs, Gagauz (a Turkish-speaking minority in Moldova), Croats, and Serbs had several features in common: large-scale demonstrations on issues of nationalism, strong electoral support of parties favoring national independence, and large turnouts in referenda on autonomy. (Only the Moldovans, Czechs, and Slovaks did not arrange for such a referendum.) (135) The authors conclude that the national revivals in these countries are the result of existing "ethnies" combined with the adoption of liberal policies in formerly repressive regimes. Furthermore, they argue that certain deprivations (economic, political, and cultural) do explain the strong national revivals of Moldovans, Gagauz, and Serbs, as well as the weak revival of Russians in Estonia. But they point out that in four of the eight nationalist revivals discussed, cases of strong or medium-strong revivals (i.e. in Estonian, Russian (in Moldova), Croatian, and Czech) did not involve economic deprivation. Acute political and cultural deprivation was also absent from half of the eight cases (i.e. in Russian (Moldova), Croatian, Czech, and Slovakian). (138) This means that deprivations alone are not sufficient to explain national revivals; the existence of an "ethnie" is another necessary condition on which unfair inequalities or perceived deprivations can build. Thus, both types of explanations---"primordial" (stressing the importance of the "ethnie") and "instrumental" (stressing certain deprivations)--are necessary to explain national revivals in Eastern Europe. Bollerup and Christensen believe, for example, that violence broke out in Moldova, but not in Estonia, mainly because there is a more developed Slavic 'ethnie' in the Dniestr region of Moldova, due to its longer history on the left bank of the Dniestr River and its new and short attachment to the Moldovan republic.(140) In short, this is an interesting and very useful book in understanding the origins of nationalist revivals and violent conflicts in Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, the book resembles a dissertation somewhat, with its sometimes tedious and overly detailed categorization of theories and hypotheses. The frequent use of letters and numbers to denote the different hypotheses is likely to confuse readers. The authors could have omitted the discussion about nationalism in general and proceeded more directly to the subject of nationalism in Eastern Europe. Moreover, because of the rather pedantic style of the writing, Nationalism in Eastern Europe probably would not appeal to most undergraduate students. Johanna Granville, Clemson University