Natural Goodness [Paperback]

Philippa Foot (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: December 4, 2003 | ISBN-10: 019926547X | ISBN-13: 978-0199265473

Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only to living things considered as such; she finds this form of evaluation in moral judgements. Her vivid discussion covers topics such as practical rationality, erring conscience, and the relation between virtue and happiness, ending with a critique of Nietzsche's immoralism. This long-awaited book exposes a highly original approach to moral philosophy and represents a fundamental break from the assumptions of recent debates. Foot challenges many prominent philosophical arguments and attitudes; but hers is a work full of life and feeling, written for anyone intrigued by the deepest questions about goodness and human.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"...an important new book from Phillippa Foot, a central figure in the revival of ethical naturalism and character-based ethics.... Natural Goodness provides a valuable statement of the mature insights of one of recent moral philosophy's major contributors." -- The Review of Metaphysics

"Natural Goodness is an exciting and provoking book, more interesting than most books in moral philosophy....What she has given us both in this book and elsewhere deserves nothing but intellectual and moral gratitude."-- Alasdair MacIntyre, Philosophical Quarterly

"One of the most fascinating ideas in ancient philosophy--that there is a close relation between human happiness and virtue--has been largely neglected in modern philosophy. In this highly significant book, Philippa Foot revives that idea, rooting it in an understanding of human goodness as depending on the nature of our species. In more than one sense, it is a work of great integrity. Beautifully and economically written, and powerfully argued, it will become a classic of modern moral philosophy."--Roger Crisp

About the Author

Philippa Foot is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles, Honourary Fellow of Somerville College, Oxford, and a Fellow of the British Academy.

Product Details

• Paperback: 136 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (December 4, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 019926547X
• ISBN-13: 978-0199265473
• Product Dimensions: 5.4 x 0.4 x 8.5 inches
• Shipping Weight: 9.9 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.9 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (10 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #246,144 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

32 of 35 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Virtue, Happiness and the Form of Human Life February 19, 2002

By [e-mail]

Format:Hardcover

This short work is certainly the most beautiful and moving treatise on moral philosophy that has yet been written in the contemporary Anglo-American tradition. Foot's unusually brilliant use of examples, most of them drawn from life and literature, makes Natural Goodness a very pleasant and accessible book to read. But the purpose of these illustrations is to outline a very deep theory of the good life, rational choice and moral reasons. Her main aim is to oppose both the popular neo-Humean and neo-Kantian positions in contemporary moral philosophy and to defend a sort of "neo-Aristotelianism."

Foot begins with the simple point that it is not only part of well-constituted human life to have the capacity to see and hear (as it is of mole or blue-jay life), but also to *reason practically about how to live*. Practical reasoning is not an accidental feature of some human lives, as hat-wearing is. But just as it is part of a soundly constituted human life to discriminate colors and sounds *within certain specific ranges,* so it is part of a soundly constituted human life to *reason practically in certain specific ways*, that is, to operate with certain forms of practical reason. In the first instance, it is an open question what these forms of reasoning are. But whatever they are, things might be quite different with, say Martians: they see only "in black and white", as we say; they have no hearing, let's suppose; and they do not reason about their own future good or in accordance with ideas of justice, at least when they are well functioning. With human beings, Foot argues, prudence and justice are genuine virtues: it belongs to this kind of organism to pursue its own future good, for example, and to take account of other human beings in some way. Of course, a lot of them don't, but a lot of them don't have the right number of teeth either!

To reformulate: just as different things may count as "good sight," "good hearing" and "the right number of teeth" in different species of animal, so different things might count as "good reasoning about how to live" in different forms of "intelligent" life. Or again: the distinction of fundamental "virtues" and "vices" might rightly be drawn differently in radically different forms of intelligent life. But as a matter of fact for *us humans* prudence and justice are genuine virtues and genuine forms of practical rationality. Or rather, this is what we are implicitly claiming in offering people reasons of prudence and justice and in criticizing their actions on these fronts -- and, Foot argues, there is no reason why we should not accept these implicit claims, once they become explicit.

The question much discussed by philosophers -- what gives certain forms of practical reasoning "authority" or "normativity" -- is thus solved by Foot without the slight of hand we find in Kantian writers and without the immoralist conclusions reached by consistent Humeans. This part of the book is difficult but Foot's magnificent style keeps the reader on board.

In the chapter on Happiness these ideas are extended and applied; her discussion of "happy" Nazis and "happy" idiots and "unhappy" imprisoned Resistance leaders is worth the price of the book. She rescues the idea of happiness from the egoistic treatment that is usually presupposed in discussions of it, making an astonishingly strong case that something in the way of justice, for example, is essential to the possibility of a genuinely happy life.

Foot's concludes with a short exposition and critique of the ideas of Nietzsche which helps one grasp the larger picture she has been drawing: she is in many respects close to Nietzsche but believes that most of what we value in morality can be defended against his attack.

This book is certain to become one of the classics of moral philosophy. It is also likely to be an excellent introduction to serious work in the field.

64 of 75 people found the following review helpful

3.0 out of 5 stars Brilliant, appealing, ultimately unsatisfying July 27, 2002

By Bob Fancher

Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase

I agree with most everything in this elegant, well-reasoned book. Unfortunately, I think, it will convince no one not already of like mind--and rightly should not.

Foot's thesis is that "good" refers to fulfilling "the life form of the species" to which one belongs. Thus, a tree has good roots if, in the circumstances in which it grows, those roots allow for it to be a good specimen of the sort of tree that it is. Thus "natural good" depends on facts about one's species and the circumstances in which one finds one's self--dissolving the "fact/value distinction." To be a good person, then, is to fulfill the life form of our species under the circumstances in which we find ourselves--allowing that there may be many specific ways of doing this very general thing. As an earlier reviewer noted, Foot maintains that for humans, a certain sort of "practical reason" is characteristic of our species, since certain forms of life define us and reason must serve those defining characteristics; not to reason thusly is to be defective, in a way analogous to a shallow, poorly dispersed root system in a tall, heavy tree growing in sandy soil.

There are many problems with this.

(1) Contra to the earlier reviewer, I believe Foot has sleights of hand of her own:

(a) Traditionally, the dilemma of practical reasoning is, "And what about circumstances in which practical rationality demands that one act against virtue?" E.g., a CEO must maximize profits, despite what that does to the lives of employees and the businesses of competitors. Foot simply turns it around: She insists that, virtue being normative, to defy virtue is to be irrational. That is, practical reason must fultill the demands of virtue to be rational. That's nice, but no one is likely to believe it unless they are desperate to do so. If the CEO goes to his board to explain why profits are declining with, "To be practically rational requires one to act in accordance with virtue," do we really think anyone on the board will be impressed?

(b) Similarly, her "rescuing" the notion of happiness turns on distinguishing various meanings of the term, some of which apply quite well to "happy Nazis"--or CEO's--and the like, but to insist that there is *another* sense of the term that cannot be fulfiilled in the absence of virtue. Wonderful. And why should wicked people prefer, or be obligated by, this kind of "happiness" rather than the other senses that Foot acknowledges are real and consistent with evil? Because practical reason must conform with virtue? And how many people who are happy--though not in the "right" sense--will find this compelling?

(2) At one point, Foot criticizes Nietzsche for constructing a generalizing theory without bothering to observe facts. Sadly, she does the same, and her argument turns on her so doing.

Several very substantial bodies of research today claim that, in fact, our "vices" are "natural" and have substantial advantages. For instance, in evolutionary psychology, infidelity, deception, vengeance, jealousy, and the like seem to have substantial advantages in maximizing the survival of one's genes. Similarly, in clinical and social psychologies robust bodies of research show that self-deception is characteristic of "healthy" people, while persons prone to, or suffering, depression are more likely to be truth-seeking and to be accurate in their self-appraisals and appraisals of their control over their environments. (E.g., in any group, on any desired atribute, about eighty percent of the people believe themselves to be above average, and over half believe themeslves to be above the ninetieth percentile.) And the basic irrationality of how we "naturally" approach problem-solving is well known, a la Kahneman and Tversky.

If these bodies of research hold up, it will follow that "fulfilling the life form of the species" involves all the vices that ethics is supposed to give us reason to proscribe. "Natural goodness," by Foots criteria, would be very bad indeed.

Doesn't it seem, contra Foot, that (if we retain our current notions of virtue) such research fits the old religious idea that our natures are inclined to evil and must be disciplined toward virtue? Even truth-seeking is not a "natural" attribute of our species, requiring a good, disciplined (philosophical?) education for its instantiation!

(3) It is hard to see, on this analysis, how ethics differs from mental health, and hence why we should not turn ethics over to psychologists--they, after all, are supposed to know the "life form of our species" and to identify and address "defects." Yet surely it is obvious that listening to mental health types has been one of the ethical disasters of our century, is it not?

(4) These days, no one is "defective" for failing to instantiate the "life form of our species," even on the attributes that Foot supposes we can obviously evaluate as better or worse--e.g., sight,hearing, able-bodiedness, and the like. They are, at best "challenged," and allegedly it is only our prejudices that make us think "normal" characteristics are "better." Such views grow out of a body of ethical reasoning that Foot gives no inkling of even knowing--and her blithe assumption that outside of ethics we have "natural goods" defined by the "life form of our species" bespeaks some sort of serious blindness to the conditions under which we live today. Her argument cannot even get off the ground in the face of such views, and people who hold them are neither few in number nor floundering at the margins of power.

There is value in this book, for those of us who think this way, in that it is probably the most logically elegant presntation of this view around, and it presents it in less than a hundred pages, deftly written. But is does nothing to help us see why our thinking this way should carry much weight, or indeed why we should not give up the field to our opponents.

21 of 24 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Virtue, Happiness and the Form of Human Life February 19, 2002

By [e-mail]

Format:Hardcover

This short work is certainly the most beautiful and moving treatise on moral philosophy that has yet been written in the contemporary Anglo-American tradition. Foot's unusually brilliant use of examples, most of them drawn from life and literature, makes Natural Goodness a very pleasant and accessible book to read. But the purpose of these illustrations is to outline a very deep theory of the good life, rational choice and moral reasons. Her main aim is to oppose both the popular neo-Humean and neo-Kantian positions in contemporary moral philosophy and to defend a sort of "neo-Aristotelianism."

Foot begins with the simple point that it is not only part of well-constituted human life to have the capacity to see and hear (as it is of mole or blue-jay life), but also to *reason practically about how to live*. Practical reasoning is not an accidental feature of some human lives, as hat-wearing is. But just as it is part of a soundly constituted human life to discriminate colors and sounds *within certain specific ranges,* so it is part of a soundly constituted human life to *reason practically in certain specific ways*, that is, to operate with certain forms of practical reason. In the first instance, it is an open question what these forms of reasoning are. But whatever they are, things might be quite different with, say Martians: they see only "in black and white", as we say; they have no hearing, let's suppose; and they do not reason about their own future good or in accordance with ideas of justice, at least when they are well functioning. With human beings, Foot argues, prudence and justice are genuine virtues: it belongs to this kind of organism to pursue its own future good, for example, and to take account of other human beings in some way. Of course, a lot of them don't, but a lot of them don't have the right number of teeth either!

To reformulate: just as different things may count as "good sight," "good hearing" and "the right number of teeth" in different species of animal, so different things might count as "good reasoning about how to live" in different forms of "intelligent" life. Or again: the distinction of fundamental "virtues" and "vices" might rightly be drawn differently in radically different forms of intelligent life. But as a matter of fact for *us humans* prudence and justice are genuine virtues and genuine forms of practical rationality. Or rather, this is what we are implicitly claiming in offering people reasons of prudence and justice and in criticizing their actions on these fronts -- and, Foot argues, there is no reason why we should not accept these implicit claims, once they become explicit.

The question much discussed by philosophers -- what gives certain forms of practical reasoning "authority" or "normativity" -- is thus solved by Foot without the slight of hand we find in Kantian writers and without the immoralist conclusions reached by consistent Humeans. This part of the book is difficult but Foot's magnificent style keeps the reader on board.

In the chapter on Happiness these ideas are extended and applied; her discussion of "happy" Nazis and "happy" idiots and "unhappy" imprisoned Resistance leaders is worth the price of the book. She rescues the idea of happiness from the egoistic treatment that is usually presupposed in discussions of it, making an astonishingly strong case that something in the way of justice, for example, is essential to the possibility of a genuinely happy life.

Foot's concludes with a short exposition and critique of the ideas of Nietzsche which helps one grasp the larger picture she has been drawing: she is in many respects close to Nietzsche but believes that most of what we value in morality can be defended against his attack.

This book is certain to become one of the classics of moral philosophy. It is also likely to be an excellent introduction to serious work in the field.