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The Nazi connection

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Winterbotham was sent to Germany to befriend the Nazi leaders and learn about their plans. He learned about the forthcoming invasion of Russia 5 years before it happened. Later he was in charge of the Enigma code breaking operation - The Ultra Secret. Winterbotham first went to Germany in 1934 as an official who had important connections. Hitler did not want war with England, and would boast of Germany's powers in order to keep England neutral. Winterbotham would gather this information to warn the military and politicians of this future danger.

Chapter 1 tells of his experiences as a flyer in the Great War who was shot down, captured, and imprisoned. Chapter 2 tells of his joining the Air Ministry. Winterbotham had a law degree, had been a pilot, spoke good French and reasonable German. In addition to technical details, he had to learn about the political and military intentions of Germany. He visited Berlin in 1934, and wondered about its resurgence (Chapter 3). That resulted from the failure of the Allies to occupy Germany and purge its ruling class, who soon wanted another turn at bat. The German Army, controlled by the aristocracy, acted as a political force that affected the government. In Chapter 4 Winterbotham explained that his friendship with top Nazi leaders gave him influence for meeting with lower ranks (p.63). At one school 12-year olds were taught how to attack on a battlefield (p.75). He explains the theory of the Aryan master race (p.76). Chapter 5 tells of his meeting with top Air Force and Army officers. He learned in 1934 of the plans to attack Russia with lightning speed (p.83). This would require a vast armament program (p.89). In Chapter 6 Winterbotham explains the need to talk to the new pilots (p.93), and for wider contacts (p.94). In WWI the airplane was introduced for reconnaissance, but the Germans would use it for a superior fighting force (p.95). Page 100 explains the technical information that was wanted. He explains the problems with divebombers (pp.103-4).

Chapter 7 tells of his visit to the Middle East, where he observed the old irrigation canals in Mesopotamia that were destroyed by the Mongol invasion (p.113). They calculated the number of bombers from the number of air crews (p.119). Big bombs produced shock waves that shattered buildings like a small earthquake. The British depended on their Navy for protection (Chapter 8). Aircraft and tanks were minor details. They were warned about the Hitler menace, but disregarded it (p.127). The failure to contest Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 resulted in another war (Chapter 9). Winterbotham returned to Germany to learn more about their aircraft. A successful dictatorship must have both an internal and external enemy (p.140). The British Empire was successful because it mostly did not interfere with the religion and customs of the conquered (?). He learned the most by just listening (p.143). The "vast majority" of Germans supported Hitler and his promises for a better life (p.146). The vast rearmaments were not for defense. Chapter 10 tells of his visit to East Prussia, where he saw an amber mine (p.159). The rapid production in Germany slowed due to shortages (p.162). If Germany was to attack Russia in 1941, that meant the Western campaign must be finished in 1940 (p.171). Winterbotham wondered what would have happened if Britain expanded their Air Force years earlier (p.187). Could that have saved France? Chapter 13 answers that question (p.189). It also tells how they were able to photograph from 20,000 feet (pp.194-195). Other airplanes continued this work, identifying German tanks ready for the 1940 Blitzkrieg - but the French disregarded this information (p.201). High-altitude photography avoided the wastage that occurred in World War I (p.202). In Chapter 14 Winterbotham says the Munich pact gave Britain a year to prepare for the Battle of Britain (p.204). Was it really a mistake? After the start of the war Winterbotham was put in charge of the decoding of German messages (p.211). This, and radar, allowed the successful use of a smaller force against a larger attacking force. Winterbotham's comments implicitly tell about his political views.

This is an extraordinary account by an extraordinary British Patriot, who played what he himself called a dangerous confidence trick, to learn in advance of World War II, Hitler's exact (at first secret, but by 1935 increasingly open) plans to rebuild Germany's Luftwaffe.

As a flying ace in World War I, Winterbotham's rickety set up was quickly shot down on July 13, 1917 and he was held prisoner by the Germans for the duration. This gave him a bit of German language, but more importantly, useful insights into German regional characteristics that later came in very handy.

Originally, he thought information collected on frequent trips to Berlin from 1934 through 1939 were "sufficiently bizarre to convince even the most skeptical and unimaginative politician that the details were genuine."

But these were insufficient to surmount the vagaries of politics, democratic elections and public opinion.

With help from Baron William de Ropp, Winterbotham obtained meetings with Alfred Rosenberg, Hermann Goering, Hitler himself, General Walther van Reichenau, many others--and hundreds of details, complete with dozens of photographs from 'Hitler's bible,' 'GEHEIM' (top-secret), multi-volume war plan--including "The Establishment of Flying Schools" and lists of their locations across Europe.

"Obviously you cannot persuade people to take suitable precautions against new strategic warfare methods unless, in the first place, you have convinced them of the dangers," Winterbotham observed in 1978, when this book was published. Of course, Britain made much good use of the information Winterbotham collected.

But even a conservative, British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, in May 1935 pretended not to know details of Hitler's rearmament, which if he'd made them public, could have prevented World War II, or shortened it by years and forestalled 10s of millions of needless deaths.

It was political expedience alone that prevented Baldwin from acting--and when he finally admitted in November 1936 he had not taken German rearmament seriously enough, it was too late to do as much as he could even a year earlier.

It is political expedience alone, today too, preventing most politicians from acting to sufficiently protect Western civilization from the latest global threat.

All U.S. presidential and other candidates should read this book, and be forewarned. History repeats itself, all too frequently. And denying facts, uncomfortable though they may be, is never a good idea. The electorate does not forgive such errors--as Baldwin would readily have admitted later on.

--Alyssa A. Lappen

This is an extraordinary account by an extraordinary British Patriot, who played what he himself called a dangerous confidence trick, to learn in advance of World War II, Hitler's exact (at first secret, but by 1935 increasingly open) plans to rebuild Germany's Luftwaffe.

As a flying ace in World War I, Winterbotham's rickety set up was quickly shot down on July 13, 1917 and he was held prisoner by the Germans for the duration. This gave him a bit of German language, but more importantly, useful insights into German regional characteristics that later came in very handy.

Originally, he thought information collected on frequent trips to Berlin from 1934 through 1939 were "sufficiently bizarre to convince even the most skeptical and unimaginative politician that the details were genuine."

But these were insufficient to surmount the vagaries of politics, democratic elections and public opinion.

With help from Baron William de Ropp, Winterbotham obtained meetings with Alfred Rosenberg, Hermann Goering, Hitler himself, General Walther van Reichenau, many others--and hundreds of details, complete with dozens of photographs from 'Hitler's bible,' 'GEHEIM' (top-secret), multi-volume war plan--including "The Establishment of Flying Schools" and lists of their locations across Europe.

"Obviously you cannot persuade people to take suitable precautions against new strategic warfare methods unless, in the first place, you have convinced them of the dangers," Winterbotham observed in 1978, when this book was published. Of course, Britain made much good use of the information Winterbotham collected.

But even a conservative, British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, in May 1935 pretended not to know details of Hitler's rearmament, which if he'd made them public, could have prevented World War II, or shortened it by years and forestalled 10s of millions of needless deaths.

It was political expedience alone that prevented Baldwin from acting--and when he finally admitted in November 1936 he had not taken German rearmament seriously enough, it was too late to do as much as he could even a year earlier.

It is political expedience alone, today too, preventing most politicians from acting to sufficiently protect Western civilization from the latest global threat.

All U.S. presidential and other candidates should read this book, and be forewarned. History repeats itself, all too frequently. And denying facts, uncomfortable though they may be, is never a good idea. The electorate does not forgive such errors--as Baldwin would readily have admitted later on.

--Alyssa A. Lappen

This is an extraordinary account by an extraordinary British Patriot, who played what he himself called a dangerous confidence trick, to learn in advance of World War II, Hitler's exact (at first secret, but by 1935 increasingly open) plans to rebuild Germany's Luftwaffe.

As a flying ace in World War I, Winterbotham's rickety set up was quickly shot down on July 13, 1917 and he was held prisoner by the Germans for the duration. This gave him a bit of German language, but more importantly, useful insights into German regional characteristics that later came in very handy.

Originally, he thought information collected on frequent trips to Berlin from 1934 through 1939 were "sufficiently bizarre to convince even the most skeptical and unimaginative politician that the details were genuine."

But these were insufficient to surmount the vagaries of politics, democratic elections and public opinion.

With help from Baron William de Ropp, Winterbotham obtained meetings with Alfred Rosenberg, Hermann Goering, Hitler himself, General Walther van Reichenau, many others--and hundreds of details, complete with dozens of photographs from 'Hitler's bible,' 'GEHEIM' (top-secret), multi-volume war plan--including "The Establishment of Flying Schools" and lists of their locations across Europe.

"Obviously you cannot persuade people to take suitable precautions against new strategic warfare methods unless, in the first place, you have convinced them of the dangers," Winterbotham observed in 1978, when this book was published. Of course, Britain made much good use of the information Winterbotham collected.

But even a conservative, British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, in May 1935 pretended not to know details of Hitler's rearmament, which if he'd made them public, could have prevented World War II, or shortened it by years and forestalled 10s of millions of needless deaths.

It was political expedience alone that prevented Baldwin from acting--and when he finally admitted in November 1936 he had not taken German rearmament seriously enough, it was too late to do as much as he could even a year earlier.

It is political expedience alone, today too, preventing most politicians from acting to sufficiently protect Western civilization from the latest global threat.

All U.S. presidential and other candidates should read this book, and be forewarned. History repeats itself, all too frequently. And denying facts, uncomfortable though they may be, is never a good idea. The electorate does not forgive such errors--as Baldwin would readily have admitted later on.

--Alyssa A. Lappen