Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (Cross-Cultural Negotiation Books) [Paperback]

Scott Snyder (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: November 30, 1999 | Series: Cross-Cultural Negotiation Books

The ordeal of negotiating with North Koreans during the Cold War has left the impression of a “crazy” and “bizarre” diplomacy, of negotiators who insult and provoke their Western counterparts while fabricating crises and fomenting discord. As Negotiating on the Edge reveals, however, there is not only a method to this “madness” but also an ongoing shift toward a less provocative negotiating style.

Drawing on interviews with an eminent cast of U.S. officials and marshalling extensive research on North Korea past and present, Scott Snyder traces the historical and cultural roots of North Korea's negotiating behavior and exposes the full range of tactics in its diplomatic arsenal. He explains why North Koreans behave as they do, and he argues that there is, in fact, an internal logic to what often seems to be outrageous conduct.

Finally, Snyder explores how economic desperation and the end of the Cold War have forced North Korea to modify its negotiating style and objectives. Focusing on the U.S. negotiating experience with North Korea in the 1990s, Snyder also deals comparatively with recent South Korean and multilateral attempts to engage Pyongyang.

Editorial Reviews

Review

Snyder focuses a clear and steady light on the little understood topic of North Korean negotiating behavior.

The best, and perhaps the only full fledged, analysis of North Korean negotiating behavior and . . . an indispensable manual for those who have the tough luck of negotiating with the North Koreans or others, if any, who are like them.

About the Author

Scott Snyder is a program officer in the Research and Studies Program of the United States Institute of Peace, where he has organized a working group on U.S. policy toward North Korea since 1994. Author of numerous articles, he has been an Abe fellow and a staff member at the Asia Society.

Product Details

• Paperback: 236 pages
• Publisher: United States Institute of Peace (November 30, 1999)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1878379941
• ISBN-13: 978-1878379948
• Product Dimensions: 0.6 x 5.9 x 8.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.7 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (9 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,130,575 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Scott Snyder is senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), where he served as an adjunct fellow from 2008 to 2011. He served as the project director for the CFR's Independent Task Force on policy toward the Korean Peninsula in 2009-2010. He is based in Washington, DC, and writes for CFR's blog, "Asia Unbound."

Prior to joining CFR, Scott Snyder was Director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at The Asia Foundation and a Senior Associate at Pacific Forum CSIS. He lived in Seoul, South Korea as Korea Representative of The Asia Foundation during 2000-2004. He has also served as a Program Officer in the Research and Studies Program of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and as Acting Director of The Asia Society's Contemporary Affairs Program. Snyder received his B.A. from Rice University and an M.A. from the Regional Studies East Asia Program at Harvard University. He was the recipient of a Pantech Visiting Fellowship at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center during 2005-2006, received an Abe Fellowship, administered by the Social Sciences Research Council, in 1998-99, and was a Thomas G. Watson Fellow at Yonsei University in South Korea in 1987-88.

Mr. Snyder is the editor of The U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Meeting New Security Challenges (forthcoming 2012, Lynne Rienner Publishers) and the author of China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security (2009). Other publications include Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea (2003), co-edited with L. Gordon Flake and Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (1999).

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

13 of 13 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent study of all levels of NK negotiating behavior December 1, 2001

By Nichomachus

Format:Hardcover

A balanced and pragmatic analysis of North Korean negotiating perceptions and behavior, Snyder's book will be one of the most significant and useful studies of North Korea for years. His study ranges at all levels, thus we see analyses of both negotiating tactics as well as the cultural and psychological perceptions that inform those tactics. This book is highly recommended for anyone who wants a glimpse into North Korean decision making and thought, not just how they negotiate. The quasi-self-contained world of North Korea has generated a psychological perspective and mindframe that has its own internal rules of logic and acceptibility. An understanding of that world, and taking advantage of its contradictions and absurdities, is what makes this book all the more valuable.

Policymakers, diplomats, media, scholars, and students will all find this a useful and informative tool. Snyder's well-written presentation of the unique mindset of North Korean actors helps us understand their motivations and behaviors beyond the "irrational and reclusive" mantra of years gone by.

9 of 9 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars not so wild and crazy guys October 23, 2000

By [e-mail]

Format:Paperback

Many commentators fall back on North Korean irrationality, craziness, insanity etc. This book shows that North Korean behavior can be understood in an entirely rational framework. The North Koreans do have their moments, though. The anecdote about the negotiator trying to storm out of his own embassy was pretty funny.

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Negotiaing Behavior March 26, 2000

By Bae, Jongchan

Format:Paperback

Snyder analysed the actual patterns when both koreas negotiated. According to him, the nature of the competition and level of distrust among north and south Korea is such that toughness and brinkmanship have been the preferred strategy, even in a bargaining situation where benefits may accrue to both sides. The communist tactics were attempts to load the agenda in order to create an environment for one-sided concessions. They dishonored commitments already made and applied a different interpretations to its content or significance. Negotiation was primarily used to as another form of competition. But when it comes to the Basic Agreement, there are bifurcated opinions about the real intention of the north. Anyway, it is clear that North Korea came to negotiation table only when there were any structural changes external to the Korean peninsula. And South Korea usually feel that only power can change the basic attitude of the North Korean style of negotiation. So they didn't like the way that U.S. showed when Americans directly negotiate with north Korea on the nuclear issues.