2 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
The Long View, Narrated by a Veteran Peace Activist, December 29, 2004
This review is from: Negotiating Outside the Law: Why Camp David Failed (Hardcover)
Helmick's Why Camp David Failed: Negotiating Outside the Law is a timely and powerful addition to the recent spate of articles and books on the subject. The U.S-brokered negotiations for a final settlement between Israel and the Palestinians that took place at Camp David in 2000 and at Taba in January of 2001 can serve as an object lesson for what must be done differently when a new attempt at resolving the conflict is undertaken.
While the events leading up to Camp David and its immediate aftermath are the focus of the book, Helmick sets the negotiations within a masterly and evenhanded narrative of the Israel-Palestine conflict since 1985, when diplomacy focused on the conditions that were put forth by the U.S. and Israel for negotiating directly with the PLO.
Helmick's presentation of the events on the ground during this period is vivid. He is sympathetic to both Israelis and Palestinians and his narrative allows the reader to share both the hope and the despair that is the backdrop to the period's diplomatic activity.
Why Camp David Failed reads briskly and is often hard to put down. At the same time, the book's thorough index and documentation of sources give it the added virtue of being a highly accessible handbook to this period for serious students of the Israel-Palestine conflict.
The author, a professor of Conflict Resolution teaching in the theology department at Boston College, draws on insights from thirty years of his work in unofficial diplomacy in the Middle East as well as in other conflict areas around the globe. He adds to his narrative at appropriate points the letters he exchanged with some of the principal personalities involved in U.S.-Israel-Palestine diplomacy, including Barak, Sharon, Clinton and Arafat.
With many trenchant insights into the challenges that faced these personalities at the time, Helmick's letters impress the reader with their boldness as well as with their grace and clarity. As we read these letters we follow the conflict through the eyes of a courageous individual insistent on speaking truth to power in order to further the goal of peace.
But Helmick does not feel that the flaws in Camp David that ultimately led to its failure lay in the personalities involved or in their lack of good faith. In his analysis, the flaws were structural. He points to the imbalance of power between the two sides, a factor that forced the weaker party to believe it could only protect its core interests by resisting continued pressure from the stronger party to make concessions. The needed counterweight to this power imbalance, tragically missing in his view at Camp David, is a legal framework for the negotiations. Helmick's thesis is that an affirmation by both sides of their willingness to abide by international law - in this case the UN resolutions on the return of occupied territory and amelioration of the situation of refugees - is the necessary framework for successful Israeli-Palestinian talks.
His moving narrative provides support for this argument.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
0 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
The Real Deal, January 22, 2005
This review is from: Negotiating Outside the Law: Why Camp David Failed (Hardcover)
This book is a positive, one might say spiritual view of one of the longest running conflicts of recent times. The author has first hand information about the players on all sides, Israel and Palestine as well as the US and he can see their warts, sunbeams and their best human qualities. I found that hearing (reading) the actual words of the participants is a rare opportunity to see that they are special people but they also put their pants on one leg at a time. If you want the real deal about the Camp David talks, the supposed generous offer and the reaction to it read this book first and then read the others.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
2 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
Legally and Logically Flawed, August 4, 2006
This review is from: Negotiating Outside the Law: Why Camp David Failed (Hardcover)
As its title suggests, this book's leitmotif is that peacemaking can succeed only if based on international law, and that Israel is responsible for the failure of the 2000 Camp David negotiations between itself and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) because its positions were inconsistent with international law. As Joel Singer of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLPs, wrote, the justification presented by Helmick (a Jesuit priest, who makes no claim to a legal education) for his theory is both legally and logically flawed.
He argues repeatedly that U.N. Security Council resolution 242 requires complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 armistice line, even though this resolution only requires withdrawal from occupied territories (but not all the territories), a wording long recognized as not requiring full Israeli withdrawal. This phrasing requires only that the two parties negotiate the location of a "secure and recognized" boundary, not necessarily the armistice line. In fact, the author himself, disregarding his main argument, proposes territorial changes in Israel's favor in the boundary in the Jerusalem area.
Helmick also preaches the idea that, to be consistent with international law, any final Israeli-Palestinian agreement must include an Israeli commitment to permit the Palestinian refugees to relocate to Israel in accordance with U.N. General Assembly resolution 194, while expressing the hope that this step will not lead to the destruction of Israel, because perhaps not all 3.5 million Palestinians that call themselves refugees will choose to immigrate to Israel. In making this argument, the author ignores the small fact that resolution 194 is not part of international law, that the two parties specifically based the Oslo agreements on U.N. Security Council resolution 242 (and its companion resolution 338) but not on resolution 194 (or any other General Assembly resolutions), and that the relocation of Palestinians to Israel is wholly inconsistent with the Oslo agreements that were intended to create two states, one Jewish and one Palestinian, rather than two Palestinian states.
Negotiating Outside the Law is replete with embarrassing factual errors and bizarre assertions. Helmick calls the Palestinian intifada "a campaign of nonviolence," and claims that Abu Nidal was an Israeli Mossad agent. He ludicrously asserts that prior to the Madrid conference, Secretary of State James Baker obtained a written commitment from Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to allow the PLO to have a recognized headquarters in Jerusalem. Hezbollah attacks on Israel, he suggests, were merely reprisals for Israeli attacks on their villages, and Helmick indicates that the notorious Hamas terrorist, Yahya Ayyash (the "engineer"), who orchestrated suicide bombings that caused the deaths of more than seventy Israeli civilians, restrained Hamas from suicide attacks. With that kind of twisted logic, no wonder that Helmick's only other publication on these matters, an article summarizing his book,[Raymond G. Helmick, S.J., "Coercive Agreements and the Disparity of Power," Counterpunch, Dec. 18-19, 2004] was published in Counterpunch, an Internet magazine edited by Alexander Cockburn, who also published articles claiming that Jews spread anthrax and that the Israeli Mossad bombed the World Trade Center on 9-11.
Other than its flamboyant mistakes, Negotiating Outside the Law is supremely dull, consisting of a summary of the main peace process-related events that occurred from the mid-1980s through the post-Camp David conference, based almost exclusively on New York Times articles. Intertwined with this potted history are the full texts of long letters the author wrote during those years--primarily to his Palestinian correspondents--advising them on how to negotiate more effectively with Israel. His advice was not limited to the verbal; Helmick, who falsely claims the title of mediator, urged his Palestinian friends to open an intifada against Israel shortly in early 2000.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No