Shapin describes the first chapter as "an attempt to survey changing sensibilities in the history and social studies of science over the past few decades", an attempt that is "both a reflection on what I have done - as represented by the contents of this book - and on what has changed over the past several decades in academic historical and sociological engagements with science." He emphasizes that "each scholar is a unique product of his or her times" and that "it is never right for historians to think of themselves alone as outside of history." The remaining fifteen chapters (and this is a weighty, 500-page collection that includes over 100 pages of notes) consist of lightly edited, previously published material from 1984 through 2007, broken down into several parts: "Methods and Maxims", "Places and Practices", "The Scientific Person", "The Body of Knowledge and the Knowledge of Body", "The World of Science and the World of Common Sense", and "Science and Modernity". Notes by the publisher indicate that this collection of essays reflects on "the historical relationships between science and common sense, between science and modernity, and between science and the moral order. They explore the relevance of physical and social settings in the making of scientific knowledge, the methods appropriate to understanding science historically, dietetics as a compelling site for historical inquiry, the identity of those who have made scientific knowledge, and the means by which science has acquired credibility and authority." While this is a good summary of what Shapin presents in this book, and this reviewer found much of the material interesting, this reviewer does agree with other reviewers here that this collection could have benefited from some editing, although it appears that the current publishers of this collection wished to refrain from significantly editing source material.
Among this reviewer's favorite chapters is Chapter 16, the last in this collection called "Science and the Modern World", which is coincidentally the most recently written of the previously published material, and this reviewer wonders whether other critical reviewers ever read this far into the book (this reviewer has a personal policy of reading texts in full prior to submitting reviews). While author Alfred North Whitehead is quoted as writing in his "Science and the Modern World" that the Scientific Revolution was "the most intimate change in outlook which the human race had yet encountered since a babe was born in a manger", it is unfortunate that Shapin permitted his philosophical viewpoint to get in the way of an otherwise worthwhile discussion: "Scientists, of course, are leading the charge in the recent American defense of Darwinism in the classroom, but, according to the Gallop Poll, only a bare majority of them - 55 percent - actually assent to the Poll's version of Darwinian evolution. Physician, cure thyself." The latter sentence in this quote, which points to the prior chapter entitled "Descartes the Doctor: Rationalism and Its Therapies" and published in "The British Journal for the History of Science" in 2000, is simply misplaced, especially in a 21st century world where such theories continue to be debated.
Other favorites of this reviewer include Chapter 2, "Cordelia's Love: Credibility and the Social Studies of Science", Chapter 4, "Science and Prejudice in Historical Perspective", and Chapter 14, "Proverbial Economies: How an Understanding of Some Linguistic and Social Features of Common Sense Can Throw Light on More Prestigious Bodies of Knowledge, Science for Example". The name of the third chapter that this reviewer lists here is an example of other reviewers' complaints that more editing is needed in this text, but there is dry humor amidst. For example, the author writes in this chapter that "it was not until fairly recently that dissenting voices emerged from within cognitive psychology. Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleagues in the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition have criticized the notion that decision-making - lay and learned - ever takes place in scenes where time is very abundant, where total pertinent knowledge is possible, and where computational capacity is unlimited. That is to say, all human judgment that is actually judgment about real-world predicaments is judgment under uncertainty. The learned are in the same boat as the vulgar. As Gigerenzer and his colleagues write, the greatest weakness of the model of unbounded rationality 'is that it does not describe the way real people think.' Not even how philosophers think: 'One philosopher was struggling to decide whether to stay at Columbia University or to accept a job offer from a rival university. The other advised him: 'Just maximize your expected utility - you always write about doing this.' Exasperated, the first philosopher responded: 'Come on, this is serious.'"