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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
19 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Fantastic Presentation of the German Viewpoint,
By
This review is from: It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944 (Hardcover)
The difficulty with reading Ryan's "A Bridge to Far" or Middlebrook's "Arnhem" (both excellent books) is you don't get the full sense of what's happening on the other side. It wouldn't matter so much in histories of many other battles, but Operation Market-Garden was notable for its confusion. As a result, the understanding of the whole story particularily benefits from the German viewpoint.Kershaw takes a logical method of breaking the battle down into pieces, and has added new insights to each section of the battle. Some parts are slightly sketchier than others, but I suppose that's due to the lack of available information. The book also has several series of photographs, though Kershaw takes the somewhat annoying tack of describing each photograph in the text as well -- one picture is worth a thousand words. Lastly, the author disputes the theory that the British 1st Airborne would have held the Arnhem bridge if they had landed closer to it.
18 of 18 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Lacks Photos,
This review is from: It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944 (Paperback)
Be forewarned, this paperback edition lacks all the original photographs that appear in the original hardback edition. It has the color maps of the original edition reprinted in b&w. Search out the original edition.
17 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
An Excellent Battlefield Account,
By
This review is from: It Never Snows in September (Hardcover)
Although there are many books on the famous Operation Market-Garden in September 1944, It Never Snows in September is the best account in English that covers the German perspective on the battle. The author, a serving British army officer, delivers an excellent account that offers valuable insights from the enemy viewpoint as well as sound military analysis. Furthermore, the well-written narrative is enriched by excellent photographs (many from German collections) and detailed tactical maps. This book is a feast for military historians and deserves a place in any military library. The book is divided into 27 short chapters that cover the period from 2 September to 4 October 1944. Three interesting appendices cover the German orders to 2nd SS Panzer Corps on 17 September 1944, a detailed German order of battle for the entire campaign and a casualty estimate broken down by sub-units. Kershaw's research into German sources is extensive and while it does have gaps, it provides far more detail than standard sources on the battle than journalistic accounts like A Bridge Too Far. For example, Kampfgruppes Spindler, the vital blocking force that prevented the British 1st Airborne from reaching its objectives in strength on the first day, is not even mentioned in Ryan's classic account. Kershaw's view of the battle differs from most of the Allied accounts of the operation. In his view, "Allied historians have tended to blame mistakes rather than effective countermeasures in order to account for the failure." It was, "improvisation and rapid build-up of [German] force [that] blunted the attacks...German reaction times were astonishing." Certainly the ability of the German commanders to rapidly assemble effective battle groups from various odds and ends - including Luftwaffe ground troops, sailors and railway workers - and throw them into the battle was incredible, but it came at the price of high casualties. The untrained German kampfgruppes often suffered 50% losses in initial combat and these units had little ability to gain ground. Nevertheless, the rapid deployment of these hodgepodge formations frustrated the over-complicated Allied plan that had not allowed for any significant enemy action. Thus, Kershaw concludes that alterations to the Market-Garden plan, such as dropping the British 1st Airborne Division closer to Arnhem Bridge, probably wouldn't have changed the outcome very much. Another unique aspect that Kershaw brings out is the huge command and control problems affecting the German response to a huge, unexpected airborne attack. The German chain of command in Holland was vague when the attack began and the Germans had made the amateur mistake of making the main north-south highway the command boundary; the British 30th Corps attack up this highway physically split the German forces. Lack of radios in most units forced the German to rely on telephones and runners, which made response times very slow and inhibited the flexible tactical style that the German leaders preferred. Officers were given ad hoc units and had to inspire untrained, often un-motivated troops to assault elite Allied paratroops that were dug-in. Coordinating the attacks to sever the vital Allied link on "Hells Highway" was very difficult for the Germans and their command and control deficiencies were a critical restraint on their ability to effectively counterattack. Although the book overall is excellent, there are a few noticeable omissions and errors. In terms of omissions, the critical actions around Elst on 21-23 September 1944 are not detailed. How exactly did the Germans stop the final Allied lunge toward Arnhem Bridge and what exactly did the British do to try and break through? Interestingly, part of the initial contact between the British 43rd Wessex Division and kampfgruppes Knaust near Elst on the evening of 22 September 1944 is mentioned, but only concerning British casualties. There is no mention that the British ambushed and destroyed five Tiger tanks in that action. With the artillery, air and armored firepower available to 30th Corps, the inability to breach the German defenses at Elst deserves more attention in this account, particularly since the author cites the actions north of Nijmegen as decisive in determining the outcome. In terms of errors, there are some noticeable mistakes in the German order of battle, particularly concerning the Tiger tanks used in the battle. Only two companies of the 506th Heavy Tank battalion, with 30 Tiger II tanks, served in the later stages of the battle - the other company went to Aachen. Kershaw incorrectly identifies the "Hummel" company as part of the 506th, but it was actually an independent company with 14 Tiger I tanks. Panzer Company 224 had 16 ex-French Char B tanks, not 8 Renault tanks. The composition of the 10th SS Panzer is also overly-vague. The point is that the author's research is over twelve years old and new research in German archives have turned up information that clarifies and refines some of the data presented in this book. Overall, this book provides a much-needed English language account of the German view of Operation Market-Garden. Many fine details that help to clarify the critical elements of the battle are presented here. Some of the author's conclusions, such as those attempting to develop lessons that might assist a NATO defense against a Soviet airborne attack, are no longer relevant but the details of this brutal, exhausting, nerve-wracking, too-close-to-call battle provide their own lessons. This book belongs in any professional military reading list.
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