Customer Reviews

The New Chinese Empire: And What It Means For The United States

5 star:		(7)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(5)
2 star:		(3)
1 star:		(6)

 

 

By the middle of the first chapter of this book, you know exactly where Ross Terrill stands. He is not a fan of the CCP. That being said, I found his view refreshing. There are many China apologists writing out there, and this book tries to balance the field.

Some complaints:
- Terrill is vague in parts. Take this sentence for example: "Historically, the centralization-devolution swings were sometimes a prelude to dynastic decline and fragmentation, but not always"(pg. 180). There are many wishy-washy sentences like that in "New Chinese Empire." Also, I am in the dark as to what 'synergy' really means in the context of international relations. A more detailed explanation would have been welcomed.
- China scholars would disagree with Terrill that because China does not hold national, free elections, Chinese citizens have no say in their government (see Shi Tianjian's "Political Participation in Beijing"). Elections are not the only, and not even the most effective, mode of participation. Chinese participate in a variety of ways...refusal to attend meetings, local elections, protests against local cadres, letter writing (which Terrill dismisses offhand as 'petitioning the court'), etc.
- Some of what Terrill writes contradicts what I have learned (not to say I am right; conflicting sources automatically make me wary). For example: Terrill claims the protests following the accidental American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia were coordinated by the government. I was under the impression that the government tried its best to get Chinese to stop protesting for the sake of Sino-American harmony.
- Terrill can be overly harsh on China. In his disussion of Sino-Japanese relations, he criticizes China for not letting World War II issues go. To be fair, Japan never has apologized for atrocoties committed in that war, and its nations textbooks do not address the question honestly. The fact that China also censors its textbooks / history does not lessen Japan's blame . Also, there were a few times I felt Terrill was a micrometer away from calling China "Chicom," and he did call it a 'semi-terrorist outfit.' This seems a bit much.
- Terrill's argument seems to rely too much on emotion. He taps into American frustrations at China's grandstanding, and finds a historical basis for it.
- Some of the accusations Terrill waves at China could be said just as equally about America, or any country for that matter. He states China doesn't have allies, and therefore they are inconsistent and dishonest in foreign policy. No country has allies, they have interests, and these interests change over time. Terrill's accusation singles China out, but can be applied to every country in every time.

All those complaints aside, overall I liked this book. I particularaly liked his explanation of China's claims on territory that is simply not theirs (Tibet, Xinjiang, Manchuria, etc.). His view on Taiwan was especially appreciated. He notes that talk about the "Taiwan problem" masks that there is no problem. Taiwan is a healthy, prosperous democracy. The problem is that China claims to own it. Having lived in Taiwan, I can attest to the fact that the Mainland's propoganda claiming that the Taiwan issue is exacerbated by American policy is absolutely false. I have yet to meet a Taiwanese person who thinks "re"unification is anywhere close to a good idea. But I digress...

Okay, so in summary, this book was a good read, but read with a critical eye.

Ross Terrill sees continuity between the past and the present in China's domestic politics and international relations. The imperial system, he believes, is still the fundamental structure in which China's leaders make decisions, even in the twenty-first century, and even after more than fifty years of Communist rule.

That leaders like Mao and Deng (and even Jiang) were emperors in all but name is something of a cliché, but Terrill gives a fresh perspective to this commonly-held notion. He is well-read in China's history, and shows it here to good effect without weighing himself down with excessive scholarship. His style is light and well-suited to his approach: prove a point to the general reader's satisfaction and then move on.

By far the most interesting sections of Terrill's book are those having to do with China's world view. China has traditionally looked upon not just the rest of East Asia, but even the rest of the world as an extension of China itself. This was not so much a ruling concept as it was a pervasive ruling assumption, and it formed the basis for imperial China. When China was strong, this assumption allowed it to swallow up other areas from Tibet to Vietnam without elaborate conceptual justifications; when China was weak, the assumption was still in force through tributary relations or complex diplomatic relations that allowed Beijing to appear to have the upper hand even when it did not. Circumstances may change, but the assumption is never questioned.

Terrill draws numerous parallels between imperial China and today's new China. Beijing still seeks to punch above its weight by formalizing relationships with other countries in ways China prefers even when it cannot immediately achieve its aims (this explains why China puts such stress on its "One-China" policy with the United States). What is remarkable, he argues, is not so much that China would use this strategy as how successful it is in doing so. Other nations - whether out of excessive respect for China's culture or fear of losing access to China's market - bow down and accede to many of China's demands.

In the area of international relations, this book should be viewed as the counterpoint to "The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security." Whereas the authors of that book, Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, view China as fundamentally conservative in its international outlook, Terrill sees it as potentially destabilizing.

The coincidence is remarkable: Niall Ferguson's book on the British Empire, Dominic Lieven's on the Russian Empire, and now Ross Terrill's on the Chinese Empire - all appear at the same time. All are histories with a message - the subject is more like political science than strictly history.

While Ferguson's final message on the British Empire is that America is in fact an empire and should be a larger one still in the future, Terrill argues similarly that China today is also an empire - but one that should cease to exist if possible.

This book is somewhat confusing, a jumble of anecdotes, historical analysis, and political theorizing. It is so full of complaints about the present Chinese government that I doubt this is unintentional: Ross Terrill is making a statement, being deliberately provocative (no doubt improving sales here in America), and leaving behind a personal manifesto for posterity, so to speak. This book is unlikely to make the bestsellers lists in China, to put it mildly.

If I'm not mistaken, Terrill believes China will democratize - and break up into a federation of semi-independent states. He offers a number of scenarios, but the point is the same: China cannot, must not, and will not remain what it is today. He means politically. Of economics he has little to say.

While I agree with him that China will change, Terrill is a bit vague on his specific timeframe.

My personal observation is as follows. China has undergone more changes politically and economically in the last two hundred years than it had ever had since 400-200 B.C., when China was in political, military, cultural, economic and social turmoil before finally achieving the prosperity and stability of the two Han Dynasties. Today China is still in transition, and one cannot expect China not to change. Terrill's point is valid, if somewhat overstated. Every country follows its own course, which is marked out by its history and shaped by international events. Certainly China will eventually liberalize and be part of the international community in every sense. Why be so impatient? China today is authoritarian and totalitarian. What Terrill doesn't ask is: Is China more authoritarian and totalitarian today than a quarter century ago, or is it less so? The answer is of course LESS SO. Moreover, all signs point to the same thing: China is still moving in the democratic direction, and however slow this process may be, it seems irreversible. Terrill chooses not to point this out. (If China were NOT moving in the right direction, I doubt very much the 2008 Olympics would have been awarded to Beijing. The reason why comparing the Beijing Games to the "Hitler Olympics" in 1936 doesn't make sense is that Germany in the 1930's was moving in the wrong direction, while China today is clearly changing in the right direction, politically as well economically.)

I have a slight problem with authors who make their points with highly selective facts. It makes me suspicious of their integrity (or worse, their competence). I have no doubt Terrill is a China-lover. After all his biography of Mao is one of my favorite books. But this book is a little different. One detail illustrates my point. On p. 281: "In fact, after two decades of MFN status for China, US trade with the PRC was very far from being 'ten times' its trade with Taiwan. In 1999, US exports to the PRC were LESS than its exports to Taiwan."

First of all, considering this book just came out of the printers, I find it odd that he has chosen 1999 to make his point. US exports to China in Feb 2003 was $4 billion, compared to $2.5 billion to Taiwan - not LESS, but 1.6 times. US total trade with China for the month of Feb, 2003 was $11.69 billion, compared with the puny $3.38 billion with Taiwan. For the whole year of 2002, US total trade in both exports and imports with China amounted to $147.3 billion, compared with the much smaller $50.6 billion with Taiwan. (All figures from the US Dept of Commerce.) Now, of course none of these figures invalidate Terrill's point that US trade with China is still less than ten times that with Taiwan, but what he suggests is misleading (and in his suggestion that US exports to China is less than to Taiwan, wrong). The truth is, China is doing much more trade, both ways, with America than Taiwan is. It may not be ten times as much - YET - but considering the fact that America has been seriously trading with China for only a decade, while it has been doing so with Taiwan since 1949, the ten times conjecture is very possible in the future. China is already America's 4th largest trade partner - coming fast on the heels of Japan - while Taiwan is only 9th. Terrill neglects to mention that the trade growth between China and the US is extremely fast, while America's trade with Taiwan is stalled. He also fails to note that two-way trade betwen China and Taiwan is also growing healthily (despite SARS). Terrill is suggesting that when Deng Xiaoping made this forecast to Carter, he was lying. But he wasn't, because he never said when this target would be achieved. In time, it will be.

Terrill makes this observation to illustrate the difference between what the Chinese govenment says and the reality. This book has countless such examples. No doubt the point itself is well-made and correct. (Show me a government - any government - that tells the truth, the whole truth and nothing but! Where are the WMD and al-Qaeda links in Iraq?) But since the reality he himself presents is often so misleading and sometimes wrong, he makes a fool of himself. He must first find out the truth himself before accusing others of not telling the truth.

While I'm on this subject of trade, Terrill doesn't ask himself why trade with the West will not be the key to political changes in China. It WILL be. Indeed he has little to say about economics in general, even though foreign trade leads to economic prosperity, which in turn will drive social and political liberalization, not to mention further economic reform. Trade is China's political and economic engine. Instead he focuses on the one thing he loves to talk about: political ideology. That puts the cart before the horse. Also, he doesn't discuss why China even with an authoritarian system can still be a responsible and constructive partner with the US over foreign problems, such as North Korea, as it is indeed proving to be so. India is a democracy - how is India helping America? France too is a democracy for that matter.

I find this book full of rage. No doubt it stems from his personal love of China and his hatred of the regime, and I empathize. Or maybe it's just a deliberate posture (what they call "grand standing")? But it is foolish to be impatient and fail to take the long view. (This is doubly odd since Terrill's familiarity with China's history is evident in this book.) It is also unwise to neglect the economic factors in the equation, and dishonest to be highly selective in presenting facts and figures to prove his points.

As a student and actor in Chinese-American politics, I have often been struck by a sense of inaccuracy in Chinese portrayals of history and particularly its relationships with border areas and people. Terrill has done an admirable job of drawing continuity between dynastic China's policies and perspectives and those of modern times, and I have benefitted greatly from this comprehensive perspective.

Even 10 pages in, it is very clear where Terrill stands in his argument, and his points are tinged with certain overtones of bias. That said, however, his scholarship is factually and historically accurate, although he could have improved his book by drawing upon a greater variety of examples. Also, as I believe another reviewer has stated, his use of the term "synergy" is fundamentally problematic. While Terrill argues that the nature of being "Chinese" is grounded in actual human policies and feelings, this idea of synergy skirts a "civilizations" reading of history: immutable, cultural characteristics of China which clash or complement characteristics of other countries/cultures. While I can broadly see what he is talking about, a greater connection to the political choices that were made, and a clearer articulation of "synergy", would have made the book much better.

All in all, Terrill's book is an excellent overview of the political history of China and how domestic perspectives bleed into foreign policy. It provides a compelling and entertaining viewpoint on modern Chinese politics, and is best used as either an introduction to the subject, or as a useful complement to a straight history of modern China and the (not necessarily "Chinese") dynasties that preceded it.

As a researcher of Chinese foreign policy in Taiwan for more than 10 years, I thank the author for supporting the status of Taiwan. But to be frank, some facts inside this this edition are simply distorted and covered. And this compassionate book is not a serious academic research based on precisely defined concepts, such as "empire" and "ethnic cleansing."

For example, the author said that China started its rule in Taiwan from 1884. This is simply a ignorance or mistake in Taiwanese or Chinese history. The year of 1884 is the time Qing Dynasty formally entitled Taiwan as a province. Before 1884, Taiwan island, which consisted of several counties, was under the rule of Fujian Province for more than 100 years. Qing absorbed Taiwan in late seventeenth century by defeating a Ming general retreated from the mainland, and then places one "district" (Fu) and three counties (Xian). I am curious why the learnt author did not know this simple fact.

The author also failed to clearify the concept of "ethnic cleansing" and applied this indifferently to Tibet, Inner Mongolia and East Turkistein (Xinjiang). We are not sure if the author accused China of doing the same things like Nazi and wartime Japan. Common sense is not persuasive in these cases.

If the reader is searching for a serious study of contemporary chinese foreign policy which argues for containment of this "sinocentric empire," Mearsheimer's "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" will be much better than this novel book.

Good for a 'counter' view of modern China...this is how the far right want to see China in the near future. So its worth a read to understand the criticisms being made of the PRC and its leadership. Sadly, Terrill seems to want little more than for the PRC to be another United States - odd for a fellow actually born in Australia!

In fact this book reads like the standard far right/conservative nonsense - ignore the facts and twist the evidence to suit a pre-determined point of view. Example - Terrill quotes (with approval) the thoughts of Friedrich Hayek as if these are appropriate to apply to China. In doing so he ignores the current contest over the use of this brand of economics in the West and the hot debate over whether it has any place at all in the developing world.

Terrill also evades much too easily the current global debate over the US as a latter day imperial power.

And he misreads the history of Taiwan and (South) Korea in argung a connection between liberal democracy and capitalist development. In truth both these countries laid the foundation of economic growth through progressive policies of land reform during periods of military dictatorship.

Terrill also misrepresents (for his narrow ends) the position of 'overseas' Chinese and their construction of self-identity. His claim that such people are BOTH Chinese and (say) American glosses over the experience of many who wrestle with belonging in both places and neither at the same time.

After his much more colourful biography of Mao (warts and all I might add) this book was a disappointment. But that does not make it any less a useful insight...this time into the recycled Cold War Warriors of the US.

It really doesn't take a genius to see that Ross Terrill is ultra-anti Communist. He severely criticizes China for being an authoritarian state that is going towards a direction of failure. Yet, authoritarian states like South Korea and Taiwan went through similar paths as China, subjected their population to iron-fisted rule, fear, torture and intimidation and eventually became democratic. Why didn't he give these countries the same criticism?

Terrill also stated Eastern European and Soviet Union seem to be became democratic countries for the better. Sorry, when there are hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by the Kosovo war, total economic chaos in Russia for many years (and Russia is still trying to find stability), etc, you don't need to be an economic or sociology genius to figure out the transition that the Eastern European countries and Russia went through were exactly really good ways of creating stable democracies. Their transitions should been a lot smoother.

Terrill's biases show up evidently by his pro-British stance. What the British did to China was very evil when they forcefully traded Opium to China and caused the country to be severely unstable, indirectly causing Taiping Rebellion to happen, causing 30 million deaths in the process, while opening doors to other European countries to come in and rape China. So Terrill is suggesting that was a great way of opening up China to the west?

He stated that China's takeover of Xinjiang and Tibet is evil and irresponsible, which of course is true. However, the same can be said of USA's taking over of California and Texas. The intent of taking over these lands is no doubt that of evil empire expansion motives; but there's a good argument that as long as the lands are modernized and their inhabitants' lives are made easier (Terrill even said an inhabitant of Xinjiang wants peace and doesn't agree with the separatists), it may not be a totally bad thing; a valid argument can be made that these states today are in better hands under a stable government than if they are independent eg., Nepal.

However, having said all these things, Terrill does have some valid points about China. I am Chinese myself and do think that Terrill's point about us having the superiority complex is true; Chinese people need to eventually get rid of this mentality if it wants to globally accepted.

Terrill's seven scenarios about Communism breaking up do have some legs in them, since economists, think thanks and intellectuals (including Alan Greenspan) believe the same. He believes mostly in the scenario that China will eventually rebel about repressive authoritarian ideas and that the new generation of Chinese will bring China to democracy; I find this scenario very feasible since something similar happened in South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. The educated young, which will eventually fill out most of the Chinese population, will slowly take over China and bring it into a democratic state.

Terrill has an excellent knowledge of China unlike some other anti-China authors. However, he reminds me of somebody who likes to look at the worst of a person he detests. He likes to dwell on the person's bad things instead of the good.

I was a little skeptical of this book's relevance to me and my work given the (somewhat misleading) subtitle of "What it means for the US". Don't pay too much attention to it. As is anyone's guess almost anything written about China is most likely relevant to everyone in business.

While most news publications choose to focus on China's Global-Sweatshop status or its enviable FDI levels in the past decade or so, a recent spate of authors have also picked up the counter-theory cudgels to dispel all such quickfooted "China is the next superpower" myths. Notable among these are Chang's best selling "The Coming Collapse of China" or Cheff's "China Dawn" that raised some interesting flags about the cracks in the Chinese scaffolding.

So the overall theme of this book is not a big seminal surprise. We have seen and heard this before -- an onerous finger being pointed squarely at China's somewhat defunct cloak-and-dagger posturing towards information control and political rule.

But where Terrill's work stands out and becomes a compelling addition to your China related stash is his fabulous coverage of the last 2000 years of Chinese history and how it relates to the nation's policies in the present. Among the symptoms that the Chinese regime is "dysfunctional in the world of nation-states" is its clinging to the ways of empire. Over the years, China has used its imperial good times to grab neighboring territories including Yunnan, Tibet and Xinjiang. During periods of weakness, Chinese strategy has tended to be "Let us bide our time, and disguise frailty as power". To awe their subjects, for instance, the mandarin emperors falsely maintained that leaders ranging from Britain's King George III to the Mughal Tamerlane were paying tribute to them.

The author contends that even today the state continues to turn weakness into strength in a similar fashion -- by convincing the world that in both business and diplomacy it needs China more than China needs the world -- thus remaining an "empire of theatre and presumption," a nation that is "deeply corrupt, politically unstable, yet extremely ambitious."

This politically charged analysis is IMHO a very refreshing perspective and although no concrete predictions about how this will/can change are forthcoming, perhaps understandably so, Terrill still offers an interesting framework for reckoning China's supposedly stellar future by laying out its imperialistic past in such excruciating but lucid detail.

A very satisfying, insightful read and an important addition to your collection if you understand that the thematic intent of this book is very specific. If you are interested in China and haven't yet read Gordon Chang, I would also recommend "The Coming Collapse of China".

The credibility of this author was completely shot with me when he described russia under vladimir Putin as a responsible and stable democracy in the first chapter of the book.

This is a good book, but its problem is not racism, it is naivety.

The typical western thinking is like "a straight intestine goes directly to the bottom". That is, the relationship between the historical evolutions from dictatorship to democracy is always misconstrued as a linear process, democratization is deemed a historically inevitable process, which can not be stopped, regardless of current realities, in cases of countries that have adopted certain Western institutions and socioeconomic approaches.

These journalists can add a lot of stories to our knowledge, but they usually can't think; and when they think, they can't get out of the "prison of one culture".