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New Lies for Old Paperback – December 1, 1990

ISBN-13: 978-0945001133 ISBN-10: 0945001134

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Product Details

  • Paperback: 420 pages
  • Publisher: G S G & Associates Pub (December 1990)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0945001134
  • ISBN-13: 978-0945001133
  • Product Dimensions: 1 x 6 x 9 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 1 pounds
  • Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (11 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,231,388 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

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The book requires a serious mind.
Paul W. Davis
This prediction comes from Golitsyn's second book published in 1995, The Perestroika Deception.
Dean M. Jackson
In any case, a fascinating, fascinating book.
D. Moore

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

37 of 40 people found the following review helpful By D. Moore on June 19, 2008
Format: Paperback
This is a difficult book - allow me to attempt to review it with the hope that someone reading this might be persuaded to temporarily ignore the John Birch Society atmosphere its conclusions engender. I believe it holds the key to certain geostrategic facts which an astute reader will infer, although they are too difficult to describe in a short book review.

Golitsyn is an important and controversial defector (1961). This book, however, allegedly provides evidence of his profound paranoia that his critics argue ultimately misled such officers as James Angleton at CIA counterintelligence and inflicted great harm on US national security. This may be true, and Golitsyn's conclusions here are unfalsifiable, but the fact is this is not the book a madman would write, and at least on that basis its propositions ought to be considered seriously if for no other reason than that he is a genuine defector who provided much valuable information to the CIA.

His main thesis is that after Stalin (d. 1953), and the German, Polish, and Hungarian revolts (last 1956), the Soviet state faced a profound destabilization. Stalin's power monopoly within the party was so complete there was a succession crisis following his death; his methods were so brutal re the newly created Soviet satellites that the populations took the opportunity of his death to revolt. Tito's rejection of Stalinism and Moscow's friction with Mao in particular also demonstrated dangers posed to the new Communist bloc's strategy of promoting revolution in the West and elsewhere. Lastly, and perhaps most urgently, the Soviet Union determined export by revolution through military means could never be accomplished in light of the advent of nuclear weapons and the West's determination (NATO, etc.
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35 of 42 people found the following review helpful By ameagle@wmonline.com on June 9, 1999
Format: Paperback
Is KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn right? Do the communists have a long range strategy to destroy the west, implemented in the 1960 time frame and extending over 40 years? He makes a strong case, based on his personal experience in the KGB and the history of the USSR. Furthermore his predictions have largely come true--if anything he was too conservative. At any rate, if Golitsyn was right, the strategy ought to be coming together real soon, the point of which is to isolate and defeat America with a united communist front.
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12 of 13 people found the following review helpful By Dean M. Jackson on June 2, 2011
Format: Paperback
Why are the bureaucracies in the former USSR and the East Bloc still run by Communists (90% in the case of the Russian Federal government)?

Why was there no decommunization program after the collapse of the USSR to ferret out Communist agents still in positions of power?

Where were the `crimes against humanity' trials in Russia of Communist criminals after the collapse of the USSR?

Why are KGB/GRU officers from the 1970s and 1980s in control of the major businesses in Russia?

Why are the electorates of the fifteen republics that made up the USSR continuing to elect (since 1992) to the top executive offices in their respective countries persons who were Communists before 1990?

Why do intelligence officers from Russia still defect to the West? Other than from Russia, when has an intelligence officer from a democracy ever defected to another democracy? Never, because such behavior would be oxymoronic.

Though published in 1984, New Lies for Old allows us to answer these disturbing `post USSR' questions for ourselves. Defecting in 1961, KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn informed his CIA interrogators that in 1960 all Communist nations had signed onto a new strategy to defeat the West. Called the `Long-Range Policy' (research on the policy beginning in 1958), the purpose for the policy was to repair Stalin's mucking up the Communists' goal of world domination. Thanks to Stalin's strategic incompetence, Western nations formed defense pacts to counter Communism (NATO, SEATO, ANZUS, and CENTO). After the death of Stalin the Communists decided that a much more subtle strategy was needed if Communism was to prevail.
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15 of 18 people found the following review helpful By Maxwell Hoffman on October 7, 2006
Format: Paperback
It's quite shocking how much of Golitsyn's warnings have come true. How the West is quite blind into trusting "former" KGB types such as Putin whom echo the words of dedicated Marxists that the "fall" of the USSR was a "geo-political disaster". Quite shocking as how even the "peace" movement of today are still in the hands of our enemies such as people Justin Raimondo whom has praised Putin "going after neo-cons". And how members of the "peace" movement see "neo-cons" as a greater threat than someone like a "former" Communist like Putin.
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7 of 9 people found the following review helpful By J. Southworth on December 14, 2010
Format: Paperback
Back in the 1960s and early 1970s, a bitter power struggle was taking place inside the CIA, between those in favour of detente with the Soviet Union and those who opposed it, with James Angleton, the director of Counterintelligence, a prominent figure among the latter. At the centre of the controversy was the author of this book, a KGB defector who claimed the existence of a communist masterplan, based on the use of disinformation to deceive the West into lowering it's guard.
The principal objections to such a concept are fairly obvious, for example the levels of control and discipline needed to manipulate thousands of people into performing their individual roles in the overall plan, and the problem of keeping the whole operation secret. Nor is it clear what motivated Golitsyn to make these claims. But that does'nt mean we can dismiss them out of hand. Golitsyn's explanations of various different forms and objectives of disinformation are lucid enough to make the reader suspect that, much of the time, he is quoting from KGB documents. This in itself makes the book worth a look. In general he is less successful in his attempts to relate the theory of disinformation to practical and historical example, although I would'nt dispute that Soviet attempts to spread disinformation and propaganda on nuclear issues during the early 1980s were both extensive and well organised.
Page 95 contains the interesting statement that "the identities of secret agents who for one reason or another are reaching the end of their usefulness to the communist side may be given away through a source in whom the communist side is seeking to establish Western confidence". It was of course Golitsyn who finally exposed Angleton's former colleague, Kim Philby, as a Soviet agent.
Not a great book, but an interesting historical document.
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